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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to critique the validity of selecting specific material features of human 
embodiment (such as sex or skin colour) as stable sources of identity. Insofar as such identities are 
generalised into rigid “types” of people using a feature of embodiment as an indicator of set 
membership (such as “male” and “female” within “sex”), I argue that such typologies necessarily 
misrepresent and subsequently mistreat people, since it is impossible to reduce human identity to 
either a single embodied feature or a small group of features, and therefore impossible to produce 
enduring descriptions of embodiment as a means of representing that identity. I hypothesise that 
such typologies are always descriptively distorted in attempting to describe human identity, despite 
being treated as universally applicable by their proponents, and consequently that attempts at 
deriving normative prescriptions from such typologies (such as racial segregation or heterosexual 
marriage) are bound to be unjustifiably exclusionary, since they differentiate and distribute moral 
treatment along an arbitrary and artificial axis of contingent and incomplete bodily 
sameness/difference. 
In critiquing the logic of appealing to embodied identity, I will focus on sexual embodiment and take 
the French feminist Luce Irigaray’s theory of sexual difference as an exemplar. Irigaray’s theory is a 
good example of an attempt at both deriving a universal typology of stable, unified human identities 
from specifically-selected bodily features, and at organising this typology into a social order. 
Irigaray’s theory assumes the existence of two and only two coherent sexual categories into which 
all persons naturally fall: male and female. It further assumes that the characteristics of each sex are 
not interchangeable between the sexes, and that these embodied features produce not only entirely 
different bodies but also entirely different subjectivities, capabilities, and worldviews. In contrast to 
the historical privilege accorded the male subject as the supposedly “universal” subject, Irigaray 
envisions a new society that breaks this hegemony of sameness with sexual difference, ordering 
society between two and only two different sexes. 
Part 1 of the thesis provides an exposition of Irigaray’s thought. Within Part 1, Chapter 1 explores 
Irigaray’s diagnostic critique of the patriarchal order. Chapter 2 explores the alternative to patriarchy 
presented in her own system of sexual difference. Part 2 of the thesis engages in a critical analysis of 
Irigaray’s theory. In Chapter 3 I argue that the most recent scientific evidence disproves the 
existence of two and only two sexes with distinct subjectivities, that the heteronormative and 
cisgender typology upon which Irigaray’s social vision rests unethically excludes non-binary persons 
and non-heterosexuals, that the sameness/difference binary is a pseudo-problem insofar as it still 
universalises “same” and “different” descriptions using the same contingent and arbitrarily-selected 
referent, and that both the patriarchal and Irigarayan definitions of “male” are distorted. With these 
findings I suggest that Irigaray’s notions of both “sex” and “difference” are untenable, 
problematizing her theory of “sexual difference” in general. Lastly, in Chapter 4 I briefly sketch the 
outline of an alternative theory of identity without embodied specificity, based instead upon the 
universally humanly shared characteristic of vulnerability. 
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Abstrak 
Die doel van hierdie tesis is om die geldigheid daarvan te beoordeel om spesifieke materiële 
kenmerke van menslike vergestalting (soos geslag of velkleur) as stabiele bronne van identiteit te 
kies. In soverre sodanige identiteite as rigiede “soorte” mense veralgemeen word deur ŉ kenmerk 
van vergestalting as aanduiding van groeplidmaatskap (soos “manlik” en “vroulik” onder “geslag”) te 
gebruik, voer ek aan dat sodanige tipologieë noodwendig mense vals voorstel en vervolgens 
verkeerd behandel, aangesien dit onmoontlik is om die menslike identiteit tot óf ŉ enkele 
vergestalte kenmerk óf ŉ groepie kenmerke te vereenvoudig, en dit dus onmoontlik is om blywende 
beskrywings van vergestalting te skep as ŉ manier om daardie identiteit te verteenwoordig. Ek 
hipotetiseer dat sodanige tipologieë altyd onvoldoende beskrywend is in die poging om die menslike 
identiteit te beskryf, ondanks die feit dat die voorstaanders daarvan dit as universeel toepasbaar 
bestempel, en dat pogings om normatiewe voorskrifte (soos rassesegregasie of heteroseksuele 
huwelike) vanuit sodanige tipologieë af te lei gevolglik uit die aard van die saak ongeregverdig 
uitsluitend sal wees, aangesien hulle op grond van ŉ arbitrêre en kunsmatige spil van kontingente en 
onvolledige liggaamlike eendersheid/verskillendheid onderskei en op morele behandeling besluit. 
In die beoordeling van die logika daarvan om jou op vergestalte identiteit te beroep, sal ek op 
geslagsvergestalting fokus en die Franse feminis Luce Irigaray se teorie van geslagsverskil as ŉ 
voorbeeld behandel. Irigaray se teorie is ŉ goeie voorbeeld van ŉ poging om sowel ŉ universele 
tipologie van stabiele, saamgebonde menslike identiteite van spesifiek uitgesoekte liggaamlike 
kenmerke af te lei, as om hierdie tipologie as ŉ maatskaplike bestel te organiseer. Irigaray se teorie 
maak die aanname dat daar twee en slegs twee koherente geslagskategorieë is waarin alle mense 
van nature val: manlik en vroulik. Dit maak voorts ook die aanname dat eienskappe van elke geslag 
nie uitruilbaar tussen die geslagte is nie, en dat hierdie vergestalte kenmerke nie slegs geheel en al 
verskillende liggame tot gevolg het nie, maar ook geheel en al verskillende subjektiwiteite, vermoëns 
en wêreldbeskouings. In teenstelling met die historiese bevoorregting van die manlike onderwerp as 
die kwansuis “universele” onderwerp, stel Irigaray ŉ nuwe samelewing voor wat hierdie hegemonie 
van eendersheid met geslagsverskille verbreek, en wat die samelewing in twee en slegs twee 
verskillende geslagte verdeel. 
Deel 1 van die tesis bied ŉ uiteensetting van Irigaray se denke. In hoofstuk 1 word Irigaray se 
diagnostiese beoordeling van die patriargale orde ondersoek. Hoofstuk 2 ondersoek die alternatief 
tot patriargie wat in haar eie stelsel van geslagsverskil aangebied word. Deel 2 van die tesis behels ŉ 
kritiese analise van Irigaray se teorie. In hoofstuk 3 voer ek aan dat die nuutste wetenskaplike 
getuienis die bestaan van twee en slegs twee geslagte met afsonderlike subjektiwiteite weerlê, dat 
die heteronormatiewe en cisgender tipologie waarop Irigaray se maatskaplike visie berus nie-binêre 
persone en nie-heteroseksueles heel oneties uitsluit, dat die eendersheid/verskillendheid-binêr ŉ 
pseudo-probleem is in soverre dit steeds beskrywings van “eenders” en “verskillend” universaliseer 
deur dieselfde voorwaardelike en arbitrêr uitgesoekte referent te gebruik, en dat sowel die 
patriargale en Irigarayaanse definisies van “manlik” te eng is. Met hierdie bevindinge stel ek voor dat 
Irigaray se begrip van sowel “geslag” as “verskil” onhoudbaar is, wat haar teorie van “geslagsverskil” 
oor die algemeen problematies maak. Laastens, in hoofstuk 4, skets ek kortliks die buitelyne van ŉ 
alternatiewe teorie van identiteit sonder vergestalte spesifisiteit, wat eerder op die universeel-
menslike eienskap van kwesbaarheid gegrond is. 
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0. CHAPTER 0: INTRODUCTION 
0.1. DEMARCATION: TOPIC AND MOTIVATION 
The limits of the sayable, the limits of what can appear, circumscribe the domain in which 
political speech operates and certain kinds of subjects appear as viable actors (Butler, 
2006:xvii). 
The limits of my language mean the limits of my world (Wittgenstein, 2001:68). 
[I]t seems equally urgent to question the seduction function of law itself. And its role in 
producing fantasies. When it suspends the realisation of a seduced desire, law organises and 
arranges the world of fantasy at least as much as it forbids, interprets, and symbolises it 
(Irigaray, 1985a:38). 
Two pieces of sleight of hand that are never unveiled compete in the process of 
representation. A split tears open the arche of presence. And because that division is 
irreconcilable, it undermines from time immemorial the serenity of wisdom, of philosophy 
(Irigaray, 1985a:274). 
A social and political order which is not founded on the real is precarious, and even 
dangerous. All the imaginary disturbances, all the authoritarian deviations, all the cultural 
regressions are possible here (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:149). 
The topic of this thesis is the ethics of corporeal embodiment, and the validity of the logic underlying 
appeals to such embodiment. It may thus be described as an exploration of the epistemic question of the 
relationship between representation and reality, through the lens of the ethics of embodiment. For the 
purposes of this thesis, I will claim that politics can be described as the distribution of identity; and given 
that such identity is typically a representation produced by the legal or cultural hegemony, it is worth 
asking, for both epistemic and ethical reasons, what role the “reality” of corporeal embodiment plays in 
resisting or generating such abstract representations, and whether there is an “ethics of space” in the 
distance between the self-determined reality generated by bodily experience, and the representation 
identified and recognised by others. The appeal to an apodictically-experienced body capable of 
generating its own truths unmediated by social norms, may be seen as both simplistic and controversial. 
Regardless, for the sake of advancing an argument in this thesis I will assume the following: that there 
exists a distinction between “unmediated bodies” and “mediated bodies”. Unmediated bodies are bodies 
whose experiences are meaningful without the categories of social identity such as “black” or “gay”. 
These bodies can be considered analogous to the sort of bodies we might find in a Hobbesian state of 
nature, or a Rawlsian original position. The experiences and desires of these bodies are not primarily 
identified or given meaning by cultural norms; examples would be stubbing one’s toe, or the experience 
of desire for something not identified by social categories; such as sexual desire.1 The claim is therefore 
that there exist unmediated instances of corporeality between the cracks of social identification, 
suggesting the presence of a subjective ground that not only resists categorisation, but, in such 
resistance, can exist outside social identification. This is in contrast to “mediated bodies” and their 
experiences, which acquire meaning through arbitrary and artificial categories, such as “teacher” and the 
subsequent culture surrounding the vocation of “teaching”. 
In exploring the space between reality and representation, I2 will focus more specifically on the 
il/legitimacy of appeals to embodied specificity (through physical markers such as sex) as empirically 
sound, epistemologically coherent, and ethically useful indicators of identity, especially where such 
markers are used to distribute and order identity in, for example, hierarchies and other systems of 
sameness/difference; in other words, where such markers exceed their descriptive capacities and 
become prescriptive. In brief then, starting with the broad topic of “representation and reality”, our focus 
                                                 
1 No doubt this will be considered controversial, yet my point here is simply that, for instance, homosexual 
desire has always existed, regardless of whether it was identified and conceptualised with a label 
(“homosexual”) or not. 
2 See point 1 under “Further textual notes” below on page 21 for the use of personal pronouns in this thesis. 
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will be on the “representation” half, specifically on the logic of embodiment as a marker of identity (or 
representation of a person), and the way this may misrepresent a person3 and thus cause an unfair 
structuring and distribution of rights and goods according to that representation. We will take sex as a 
specific example of embodiment under representation, and explore the way embodiment is usually 
represented along the same/different axis, which, in turn, presupposes the essentialist/social constructed 
dichotomy as a means of defining said embodiment. 
This topic was prompted by several related observations, which together form the background 
motivation for the ensuing discussion. The first two observations are conceptual: firstly that different 
kinds of embodiment (such as racial, sexual, or abled) are given different moral treatments, and secondly 
that appeals to embodiment serve the function of oppression as well as liberation using the self-same 
embodiments (for instance Black Power against segregation, or difference feminism against patriarchy). 
On the first point, different types of embodiment are understood differently under the rightfulness of a 
same/different dichotomy. For instance, we no longer assume there is anything naturally different about 
“races” and the movement for desegregation and reintegration in countries such as the United States of 
America and South Africa have centred upon the erasure of race as a morally significant category – we 
consider it justified to say that we are all the same (racially). On the other hand, difference feminists 
argue that we are fundamentally naturally different (sexually), and that arguing for the same rights would 
be to misunderstand the requirements of our different bodies and different subjectivities. On the second 
observation, this reversibility centring upon the same body4 led me to wonder whether the embodiments 
in question are, in reality, stable as natural kinds or whether they are produced, represented, and 
misrepresented in successive appeals to embodiment, and therefore whether emancipatory corrections 
such as difference feminism are in fact more accurate representations of the reality of embodiment than 
their predecessors, or whether they, too, are prone to reversal and correction pending the insights of yet 
another new movement. Is embodiment a valuable category of identity if it is a reversible double-edged 
sword that can cut sameness as both bad and good, and cut difference as both bad and good, using the 
same body? This in turn led me to wonder whether descriptions such as racial sameness or sexual 
difference have any non-reversible5 concrete basis in reality as representations whatsoever, regardless of 
whether the sameness/difference upon which those representations are based is figured on the basis of 
essentialism or social constructionism.6 Thus taken together, these questions made me ask: does the fact 
that such representations present contradictory, oft-reversed descriptions and prescriptions of the body 
not perhaps indicate the absence of any stable, coherently identifiable body beneath it all? Is the 
sameness/difference debate therefore not a pseudo-problem? 
These conceptual observations led to the topic of the thesis, but the observation of several other social 
and cultural developments, in rapid and well-documented succession, provided the motivation for a 
potential answer. In 2011 “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” was repealed in the United States of America allowing 
non-heterosexuals to serve openly in the military; in 2013 Uganda introduced the notorious “Kill the gays 
Bill”, in the same year both England and France legalised same-sex marriage; in 2015, same-sex marriage 
was legalised by the Supreme Court across the USA, in the context of the “Bathroom Bill” crisis 
surrounding transgender rights; in 2015 same-sex marriage became legal in the Republic of Ireland, the 
first in the world by public referendum; in 2016 the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in South Africa 
backtracked on its openness towards non-heterosexual members; in the beginning of 2017 Chechnya 
                                                 
3 On the assumption that whatever “truths” may exist about the unmediated “brute” body are reliably 
misidentified or overextended in attempts at creating categories of embodiment, such as “race” or “sex”. 
4 For instance: for slave owners, black bodies are different from the humanity of white bodies and can 
therefore be treated as slaves; for abolitionists, the same black bodies are the same as the humanity of white 
bodies and should be granted the same freedoms. These different treatments stem from different contextual 
reasons about the same bodies. 
5 That is, that they cannot be contradicted. 
6 Social constructionism and essentialism are very much opposing views, and so it may seem a contradiction to 
suggest the same critique of both. My point is not to assume that they are the same, but to point out that any 
generalised proposition along the lines of “type of person X exists, and all types of people X have property Y”, 
if maintained dogmatically and universalised (as a description that applies in all places at all times) is 
problematic. 
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began a roundup persecution of non-heterosexuals, in July 2017 Scotland announced the introduction of 
gender neutral bathrooms in its schools, and on 26 July Donald Trump announced a ban on transgender 
persons in the United States military. Discussions surrounding embodiment, in these cases sexual 
identity, are fraught with conflict and inspire great social change, and discussions about post-
embodiment, such as post-race, transhumanism, or post-humanism, are even more controversial, 
especially in post-conflict post-colonial transition societies such as South Africa which has a history of 
oppression and liberation, both premised precisely on the (mis)representation and subsequent (mis)use 
of embodiment.7 Today one need only open a newspaper to see evidence of this anxiety in everything 
from #RhodesMustFall and #ScienceMustFall, to the refugee influx and xenophobia in Europe. Specific to 
the discipline of philosophy, this is evidenced in the controversy over a recent article comparing 
transgenderism with transracialism (Tuvel, 2017), and the upheaval within the Philosophical Society of 
South Africa in 2017 over the question of which race has the epistemic and moral authority to speak 
about race (Winkler, 2017). 
The list is diverse and long, but what these instances all have in common, I would like to suggest, is a logic 
that identifies embodiment first as a supposedly immutable or at least enduring fact and then acts upon 
it morally/socially/politically, using sameness/difference as a measure of justice based on the initially 
identified “fact” of embodiment. Maré (2014:28), drawing on Appiah’s term “racialism”, refers to these 
two stages in the context of race as “racialisation” and “racism”. The first stage in this “ideology of 
embodiment”8 is a metaphysical or ontological description (and implicit acceptance) of the existence of 
human types; the second stage is a cultural prescription of how those types ought to relate to one 
another and what they are entitled to within a structure, such as a nation. On this view, one can be a 
racialist without being a racist; but one cannot be a racist without being a racialist. One can firmly believe 
in the existence of races as “natural” types, but believe that they should be treated equally without moral 
differentiation. Racialism, then, is always and necessarily the latent foundation for racism. We can 
translate this into the language of sexed embodiment as “sexualism” or “sexualisation” in the first stage, 
and “sexism” in the second. The product of these two stages is a typology of human beings, coherently 
defined on their own as elements in a particular social pattern, and coherently organised among other 
types according to normative prescriptions, such as the law. In Butler’s language, “[o]ntology is, thus, not 
a foundation, but a normative injunction that operates insidiously by installing itself into political 
discourse as its necessary ground” (2007:203). Put differently, the assumption that there are types 
(racialism/sexualism), or the ontological assumption about the existence of certain categories of being, 
provides the foundation for a “normative injunction” that discriminates on the basis of these types 
(racism/sexism). Indeed, Butler seems to suggest here that the initial ontological assumption is, in fact, 
not neutral, but normatively charged from the outset. Umberto Eco, writing on the production of 
(“infinite”) lists and typologies, makes a similar remark: 
A semantic representation by essence presupposes as a background a tree of the 
genealogical type, a series of embedded classes and subclasses so that the creation of the 
supporting structure precedes the identification of individuals, genera and species, and all of 
them can obtain an identity solely thanks to that structure (2012:231). 
                                                 
7 It is possible to view anxieties surrounding post-embodiment as symptoms of privilege. For example, in 
reaction to patriarchal oppression on the basis of the same, the position of difference feminism does indeed 
offer some respite and helps liberate the female body from descriptions and prescriptions set by the male 
subject. This is not only true, but useful. Yet the attempt to cement and defend difference feminism and resist 
responses and alternatives that propose moving beyond sameness and difference, “male” and “female”, or the 
assumption of “sex” existing at all, likely betrays the presence of a clearly-sexed, cisgender, heterosexual 
female subject who benefits from difference feminism in much the same way that the attempt to defend 
patriarchy betrays the presence of clearly-sexed, cisgender, heterosexual male subject limited by those 
“embodied” horizons epistemically, and benefitting from those physical markers socially (accessing certain 
privileges by virtue of being a man). 
8 My own phrase. It is worth noting that when I use “ideology” I do not mean something like “problematic 
hegemony”. Rather, I intend to use “ideology” in a neutral sense to mean “system of ideas”, which may of 
course turn out to be exclusionary and hegemonic, or not. 
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Eco’s point, and mine, is that the identification of even ostensibly neutral or natural types, such as sex or 
race, depends upon the existence of a prior vocabulary, and such a vocabulary is always, by definition, a 
contingent and fallible project. Concepts do not spring from things-themselves, fully formed and 
armoured like Athena from Zeus’ head. Concepts are cobbled together in order to draw a circle around a 
particular experience and express subjective beliefs about that experience; and moreover, they only 
acquire meaning when embedded into a vocabulary that recognises them. 
Drawing on the observations above, I would like to suggest as the background assumption of this thesis 
that the logic of embodiment functions in a certain way. The logic of embodiment functions by 
attempting to represent reality (the body) with a particular identity (such as “male” or “black”) that is 
always either the same as or different from others, so as to distribute that identity and its rights to 
persons according to whether they are “x” or “not-x”. Whether this identity is given in essentialist or 
social constructionist language does not have much effect once it is encoded within the law. The diagram 
below (Diagram 1) offers a simple summary of this view, with some examples. This forms the basis of my 
initial background response to the question of embodiment, and the ethics of representation. 
Diagram 1: 
INTERNAL: the mechanism of ideological development 
First stage Second stage Third stage 
Universalised Descriptive (is) 
Person (already identified as potential actor) 
+ Normative (ought) 
+ script 
= Hegemonic typology 
= performance 
 
Self/Other is established as 1. existing and 2. 
universalised into types that are same/diff for 
all persons 
Descriptive (is) taken 
as morally significant 
marker of identity 
and subjectivity, and 
therefore treatment 
(ought) 
Universalised types (ises) 
structured into patterned, 
coherent system of 
sameness and difference 
codified in culture, law 
(oughts) 
 
Tracks of original 
descriptive assumption are 
erased 
Examples: 
Racialism/racialisation 
“Racialised bodies exist” 
+ racism 
“These ought to be 
treated in particular 
ways as morally 
significant” 
= colonialism/segregation 
“Public spaces must be 
segregated” 
Racialism/racialisation 
 
+ racism = xenophobia 
Sexualism/sexualisation 
“Your body is sexed male, or female” 
+ sexism 
“Your behaviour 
should accordingly be 
gendered masculine 
or feminine in 
relation to others” 
= hetero-patriarchy 
“There exists a relation of 
desire between M and F 
that orders society, with 
no blending” 
 
Sexualism/sexualisation + sexism = homo/transphobia 
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Bearing in mind Maré’s comments earlier, Diagram 1 above illustrates what I conjecture to be the three-
stage development involved in the creation of any theory of embodiment. The first stage involves the 
descriptive identification of “types” according to properties, usually physical markers such as skin colour 
or sex. The second stage applies a normative prescription to the identified types by selecting those 
physical features as morally significant, and introducing a relation between subjects on the basis of that 
feature; such as racial segregation. The third stage refers to the normalisation of the descriptive and 
normative typology, usually when codified into law. Typically such a “third stage product” becomes 
hegemonic insofar as it conceals its own origin (the arbitrary selection of physical features) beneath a 
well-established social order that considers the physical features in question, and the moral treatment of 
them, as naturally ordained, rather than socially constructed. This three stage process covers the 
“internal” workings of a theory of embodiment. 
But what the list of earlier observations suggested to me was not merely the contingency of embodiment 
and the internal mechanism of appeals to embodiment, outlined above, but also the external way the 
logic of embodiment manifests as a “third stage product” which then plays out dialectically in society in 
competition with other logics of embodiment (such as patriarchy and feminism, or Jim Crow and Civil 
Rights). This is my second suggestion regarding the logic of embodiment, outlined in Diagram 2 below: 
Diagram 2: 
EXTERNAL: the dialectic role of third stage ideological products in society 
Examples: Function: 
“x” “Not-x” Post “x and not-x” 
Generic Hegemonic typology 
“same”  
binary/unity 
Hegemonic typology 
“different”  
duality 
Erasure of typology 
Post-“same vs diff” 
multiplicity 
Civil Rights Jim Crow 
“White” 
“Same” 
Black Power/Consciousness 
“Black” 
“Different” 
Integration 
Post-race 
Sex Patriarchy 
“Man” 
“Same” 
Difference feminism 
“Woman” 
“Different” 
Third-Wave 
“Queer” 
Post same vs diff 
Homosexuality Straight denial 
“Heterosexual” 
“Same” 
Queer Pride 
“Homosexual” 
“Different” 
“Love is Love” 
“Anything goes” 
Post same vs diff 
 
The legalisation of same-sex marriage and the desegregation of races seem to me the most exemplary 
instances here. These examples are generally considered to constitute both a more accurate description 
of embodiment (non-heterosexual desire is not a mental illness, for instance) as well as moral progress.9 
                                                 
9 I am running on the assumption here that developments such as racial desegregation, universal suffrage, and 
same-sex marriage are in fact morally desirable and constitute moral progress in the face of historical 
discrimination on the basis of embodiment, and that the reader will presumably agree with this. Of course 
there exist non-conservative arguments against these. For instance, several queer authors in the collection 
Against Equality: Queer Revolution not Mere Inclusion (Conrad, 2014) make the argument that same-sex 
marriage is undesirable not because homosexuals are undeserving, but because the notion of marriage itself is 
outdated and restrictive. Similar arguments are made against military inclusion. Although I consider such 
critiques potentially useful, I will not entertain them here as they represent a radical utopian order of thinking 
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Yet, and this seems to me to be the crux, they say as little about embodiment as possible. Consider again 
Diagram 2 above. After going through racialism and racism, and entering society as “x”, the third stage 
product “segregation” (or take heteronormativity as a sexed parallel), it quickly (and rightly) receives 
resistance from “not-x”, that is, an entirely opposing view of embodiment, such as Black Power. Here 
then we have two typologies or “logics of embodiment” which have both gone through first stage 
universalised descriptions and second stage normative prescriptions, to provide conflicting accounts of 
embodied identity that assume from the outset the actual, material existence of a stable and accurately 
represented human body beneath their separate ideologies. Both rely on the sameness/difference 
duality, whether in essentialist terms or not. Both ideologies expend energy and time maintaining, 
enforcing, and communicating their particular coherent description of embodiment, and society 
oscillates increasingly between the two views, causing massive wastages such as riots and crackdowns. 
Finally, both are dissolved into a third ideology that rejects the basic premises of each and assumes a 
minimal description of human embodiment; it is post-(x and not-x) and essentially states: “that you are 
black or white should make no difference since you are both the same in being human”. Hence, 
integration, or same-sex marriage, or universal suffrage, or ramp access to a building.10 Importantly, this 
“sameness” is not the sameness of patriarchy which, for example, assumes women are either inferior 
versions of men or do not need care during pregnancy, since this “sameness” does not reduce 
subjectivity to one pole (for example, the male or white universal). 
This, then, is the background motivation and approach to the logic of embodiment I have adopted in 
claiming that embodied identities constitute a problematic attempt at over-extending representations 
onto an inherently unstable reality. In exploring the ethics of embodiment as an appeal to either 
sameness or difference or both, I will implicitly be considering such appeals as functioning according to 
the internal logic in Diagram 1, and as either following or resisting the external dialectic in Diagram 2. 
These are my starting axioms on embodiment, and I will be investigating their validity by applying them 
to a specific example of embodiment to be outlined shortly below. Summarised: I shall take as suspicious 
the attempts of theories to generalise embodied identities under a particular description as either 
coherently same or different (first stage, Diagram 1), as well as the move to introduce these described 
types into a normative pattern of relations (second-order, Diagram 1). I shall then take it that the 
products of such descriptions and prescriptions enter society as hegemonic typologies in social practices, 
but that they can always be contested by an opposing view (“x” and “not-x” in Diagram 2) which is based 
on a more or less reversed view of the same body, no less, and that the progress towards a more 
accurate and morally acceptable description of embodiment comes from a third view, being a negation of 
both contrasting views, with a minimal, negative, and non-specific definition of embodiment. This may 
very broadly be described as a quasi-Hegelian dialectic, although I will not be drawing on Hegel in this 
thesis, and technically the third view in my dialectic is not a synthesis but perhaps a “meta-synthesis” 
that negates both rather than assimilating them. Out of this background view, which this thesis seeks to 
elaborate, we can perhaps develop a heuristic template to aid in the easy identification of problematic 
reasoning about essentialism, embodiment, identity, and difference. This, if it could realistically be done 
at all, would certainly be useful given the continued tension in South African (and indeed global) 
discourse surrounding embodied identity, such as race relations. 
                                                                                                                                                       
that is incompatible with small, practically attainable changes within the current cultural order. For the 
purposes of my argument in this thesis, I will therefore not focus on such radical alternatives, and will instead 
assume that the aforementioned developments constitute moral progress insofar as they extend the rights of 
dignity, self-determination, and equal participation to more individuals. 
10 It may be objected that, in the case of wheelchair access for example, it is a difference in embodiment that is 
behind the move to greater inclusion. But this is to misidentify the goal. The reason for constructing ramp 
access, is after all, because we believe those in wheelchairs are entitled to the same facilities and services. Any 
difference in embodiment here is incidental; which is not to say aberrant or not important for whatever 
identity people may choose for themselves. It is to say that whether we are black, gay, or paraplegic makes no 
difference to what we are entitled to, and whether we should have access to marriage, maternity/paternity 
leave, or public facilities. 
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In summary, my aim in analysing appeals to embodiment (using sexed embodiment as an example) is not 
primarily to make claims about the content or lived phenomenological experience of embodiment (such 
as “having external genitalia has no effect/a large effect on men’s movement and posture), or to make 
comparative claims about ostensibly different types of embodiment (such as “having dark skin induces a 
different relation with the environment than having breasts”), but rather to problematize the logic or 
conceptual validity of selecting arbitrary anatomical markers as allegedly stable and ethically useful 
markers of an individual’s identity, generalising that feature so as to reduce their identity to a function of 
it, and generalising this pattern across many individuals to form an ordered typology of human “sets” 
with clear properties, such as “man” and “woman”, or “black” and “white”. 
In doing so, I will assume that the problematic act of identification follows roughly three stages, as 
outlined in Diagram 1. The resulting product of identification, a highly descriptive and prescriptive 
hegemony we are socially-conditioned into accepting at an early age, enters society in a dance of 
dialectic with opposing products as outlined in Diagram 2, such as slavery and emancipation, 
segregation/apartheid and civil rights, patriarchy and feminism, difference feminism and queer feminism, 
heterosexual marriage and same-sex marriage, until both collapse into a minimal identification that, on 
the basis of describing and prescribing very little, allows a maximum (or at least enlarged) distribution of 
goods and rights. In doing so, the resulting minimal state no longer appeals in any strong sense to 
generalizable traits such as “men are always X” or “black people are always Y”. To use the example again, 
the minimally-descriptive and maximally-permissive result looks something like: “all people can marry” or 
“all people should be able to physically access buildings”. 
Having introduced the topic and the background assumptions informing my approach, let us meet the 
thinker whose thought we will take under consideration, having narrowed embodiment down to “sex”. In 
addressing the topic of human corporeal embodiment, I plan to take as an exemplar the theory of 
sexually dual embodiment developed in the work of French psychoanalyst, linguist, and philosopher Luce 
Irigaray. The choice of Irigaray is not arbitrary. Of the three waves of feminism, Irigaray is arguably the 
most prominent theorist of second wave (difference) feminism, although she has received less 
mainstream attention than other thinkers such as Simone de Beauvoir (end of first wave/equality into 
second) or Judith Butler (third wave and later). Writing her best-known works in the 1970s and 1980s,11 
her work is historically and thematically situated in the context of responding to both traditional 
patriarchy (the de facto Western tradition until the rise of feminism at the turn of the 20th century) and 
first wave feminism; both, Irigaray contends, commit the same error of reducing human subjectivity to 
only one pole, that of the masculine subject, rather than acknowledging the natural subjective duality 
between the male and female sexes. The result, even in the appeal to neutral equality or “universality” 
within equality feminism, has been a denial of feminine specificities and the absence of these in cultural 
and legal representations, causing the Western tradition to be based upon a lack. Irigaray develops this 
idea of the lack into a substantial critique in her early work, and takes this lack or denial of subjective 
feminine space as the basis for a solution that enforces space between subjects,12 creating two equal 
subjectivities.13 Her work in this regard could thus be called a study in meontology or the not. We will 
deal extensively with Irigaray’s critical diagnosis in Chapter 1; an explanatory chapter outline will be given 
shortly hereunder, before commencing with Part 1 and Chapter 1. In response to the regression to 
masculine uniformity, Irigaray imagines a society in her later work where subjectivity is doubled between 
two (and only two) subjects – man and woman – maintained in a non-hierarchical, horizontal relationship 
with the specific gendered needs of each, such as pregnancy, enshrined in the law and equally 
represented in culture. These two subjects are also given various sex-specific attributes in Irigaray’s 
solution, not merely restricted to obvious examples such as pregnancy or the ability to grow facial hair. 
Irigaray’s solution to the patriarchal oppression of the female subject will be covered in Chapter 2. For 
                                                 
11 Such as Speculum of the Other Woman (1974), This Sex Which is Not One (1977), and An Ethics of Sexual 
Difference (1984). 
12 As we will see, for Irigaray the difference, or negative, between differently sexed subjects is both 
insuperable, and desirable for the sake of maintaining a (heterosexual) couple in which both subjects must be 
differently sexed. 
13 I will take up a similar idea relating to such an “ethics of space” in critiquing Irigaray in Part 2. 
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her suggestions that the prime condition of subjectivity is sex (over, say, race), that this sexed subjectivity 
is insurmountably split between men and women (and not between anyone else, such as transgender 
persons), and that the recognition of this requires an overhaul of language, science, rationality, and 
culture, Irigaray has been the source of much criticism and inspiration. Alison Stone, in her book Luce 
Irigaray and the Philosophy of Sexual Difference, finds a workable philosophy of nature and human 
ontology in Irigaray’s sexed cosmology. Other accounts of sexed embodiment, such as Judith Butler’s 
Gender Trouble, problematize the possibility of appealing to necessarily gendered human types. An 
evaluation of Irigaray’s system, presenting mainly my own independent criticism, will be taken up in 
Chapter 3.  
Irigaray is important given our choice of topic, since her work (especially her later, constructive work) 
represents a good example of a case for embodied identity, in which material features of the body are 
identified, selected, grouped together, and presented in a unified representation as either “male” or 
“female”, where being male or female is furthermore taken as the cause of a masculine or feminine 
subjectivity closely tied to those bodily roots. Her theory gives us a logic of embodiment that presupposes 
a same/different dichotomy and espouses strong or “thick” representations (representations with 
positive content, descriptive or prescriptive, as opposed to minimal or negative content) as a means of 
representing reality. Harking back to the very first points raised at the beginning of this introduction, 
Irigaray’s theory thus gives us cause to ask whether her descriptions might overextend their limits into 
the insuperable gap between representation and reality by assuming knowledge of not only the existence 
of two, and only two sexuate subjects, but also the content of their experience as necessarily sexed in 
particular ways. Since these subjects are further codified into a specific social pattern in Irigaray’s ideal 
society, a pattern that maintains a dual male-female subjectivity, it also raises the question of whether 
her typology, as a third stage product consisting of descriptions (sexualisation) and prescriptions 
(sexism),14 stalls the process of the ideological dialectic I hypothesise to be behind more accurate and 
morally permissible descriptions.15 
What I would like to propose in this thesis is that Irigaray, and more specifically the later Irigaray, halts 
this dialectic process without sufficient reason. She disrupts the denial of sexual difference and the 
hegemony of the male universal with the feminine, and rightly so; yet she does not recognise that this 
very logic requires a further disruption of her own new male-female hegemony by that which is neither 
male nor female, ambiguously sexed, or non-sexed. Put again for ease of understanding in quasi-Hegelian 
terms, Irigaray uses the critical distance (difference) offered by her own oppressed, female embodiment 
as an antithesis to disrupt the reigning male thesis, yet she does not fully acknowledge that the new 
synthesis of this rethought union is but another thesis to be disrupted by a further antithesis supplied 
outside her thought by a different set of embodied horizons, such as the queer or even post-human 
perspective. In halting what I hypothesise to be a pattern of moral progress, Irigaray attempts to stabilise 
and maintain an admittedly improved yet still incomplete set of representations (the new synthesis, or 
her “ethics of sexual difference”) over an inherently unstable reality which contains elements that are not 
merely sexually dual, but sexually blended and in some cases, entirely asexual, problematizing her claim 
that any and all human questions must be thought in terms which are not only sexed, but doubly sexed 
(between men and women). By interrupting this process through the creation of a revised set of 
ontological descriptions and subsequent ethical prescriptions in which “men are men” and “women are 
women”, Irigaray establishes a new foundation that, in some but not all respects, is unstable. The 
attempt to maintain this system against the grain (or, to maintain questionable representations against 
reality) causes tensions that fracture her theory, causing notable empirical, epistemic, and ethical issues 
to arise. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Recall Diagram 1. 
15 Recall Diagram 2. 
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In other words, I would like to explore the ways in which Irigaray’s theory of sexed embodiment (or 
indeed any “strong” theory of embodiment) attempts to appropriate the necessary disjuncture between 
representation and reality by describing a human body and human experience that is always in excess of 
such attempts at representation, and the way such over-representations result in the misrepresentation 
and exclusion of those whose embodiment is not recognised under the new description. It is this 
disjuncture or space between representation and reality, the essential and constructed, the symbolic and 
real, the word and referent, the lived experience and semiotic codification, the same and different, 
anticipated in our selection of opening quotes in the introduction, that Bergoffen (2012:108-109) situates 
at the centre of ethics and human rights discourse when she suggests that appeals to human dignity in 
the face of injustice require us to paradoxically articulate “a linguistic response to the unspeakable […] 
forces that assault us”. By this, Bergoffen seems to suggest, again, that there is a representational 
inadequacy in expressing what it is that harms us, and how we are to devise a conceptualised response to 
it (recall, the disjuncture between representation and reality, and the injustice of misrepresenting the 
body). Irigaray herself refers to this disjuncture as “a flaw in the relation between the state of nature and 
civil identity” (2000a:46), suggesting an incompatibility (flaw, not merely misrepresentation) between 
current systems of representation and the bodies within it; specifically, the female body and the lack of 
terms for its expression in the patriarchal order. Writing of homophobia, Sullivan points out that:  
[t]here is, in short, a space within any oppressive social structure where human beings can 
operate from their own will […] its resilience suggests the existence of a human individual 
separate and independent from the culture in which he operates […] between the gesture 
and the space, there is the possibility for human freedom (1996:73).  
This, along with the preceding notion of a disjuncture between body and representation, or self and 
identification, ties in with my assumption of an “unmediated body”. The fact that the body can be 
misrepresented at all, and that we can resist unjust prescriptions, implies that there does in fact exist a 
body beneath those prescriptions with at least a bare minimum set of properties outside 
conceptualisation, hence their misrepresentation or denial in the first place. Lastly, writing together, 
Butler, Laclau, and Zizek make a similar point and remind us that: 
new social movements often rely on identity-claims, but ‘identity’ itself is never fully 
constituted; in fact, since identification is not reducible to identity, it is important to consider 
the incommensurability or gap between them. […] No social movement can, in fact, enjoy its 
status as an open-ended, democratic political articulation without presuming and 
operationalizing the negativity at the heart of identity (2000:1-2). 
Our attention is drawn here, again, to not only the difference between identity (especially self-
determined identity) and the act of identification (especially socially-ordained identities),16 but also to the 
importance of a negative, or horizon of difference that can never be apprehended, which I would like to 
suggest is parallel to what I have called the disjuncture between representation and reality, insofar as 
both describe a disruptive force that resists identification. The mysterious and perhaps unknowable 
“reality” of the body and its subjective experience, firmly and necessarily on the other side of the 
possibility of representation, represents the space for as-yet unmediated and unrepresentable facts of 
human experience to emerge, and is therefore the source of ethical outrage and resistance at 
misrepresentation under a typology of descriptions and prescriptions. Indeed, could we not suggest that 
all injustices throughout history have been the result of a misrepresentation of reality? This points to the 
possibility that injustice boils down to nothing more than a statement about reality being false, which 
returns us to Diagram 1 and the first step in ideological development: a first stage universalised 
description of the human body, which, as a description, can of course be false so long as it attempts to 
universalise the attribution of a property, such as skin colour. This leads us to two insights, if our 
hypothesis is true: firstly, that any theory with an empirically false starting premise will not only require 
empirical adjustment later on in order to account for anomalies in its descriptions and predictions, but it 
                                                 
16 And of course, regardless of “who” does the identifying, the act of creating an identity is necessarily limited 
since no single concept or category, or even list of categories, can fully capture the various dimensions of one 
person’s body or experience, and will therefore fall short of being a comprehensive “identity” for that person. 
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will also lead to an ethical failure if its descriptions are applied to human subjects; and secondly, that 
since it is commonly accepted that human subjectivity cannot be exhaustively described, any attempt to 
produce a positive, specific, and generalizable account of human subjectivity (or of differentiated types of 
subjects) will necessarily start from incomplete or inaccurate premises and cause an ethical dilemma 
further down the line. 
Since all this pivots on the disjuncture between representation and reality, I am also interested in locating 
(or at least, reframing) that elusive space of apodictically-experienced human reality that is the source of 
resistance already discussed above (the disjuncture between reality and representation); in other words, 
I am interested in finding between the cracks of symbolisation, if anything, the minimum necessary and 
sufficient source of that which we call “human”, that which continues to drive our descriptions of 
personhood towards greater syntheses of inclusion. I do not make any claim here towards a truly final 
definition of “humanity” and I acknowledge that perhaps the power of this disjuncture lies not in some 
“essential” source but precisely in its contingency (its shifting meaning) as the arbitrary (being selectively 
identified by a fallible human language) product of the relationship between description and 
indescribable experience. Either way, I hope to pursue a new metaphor for basic personhood and 
humanity towards the end of this thesis. 
Throughout this thesis, we will be talking about sexual embodiment as synonymous and interchangeable 
with other forms of embodiment, such as race. Of course, this is a highly contentious assumption and 
could be used to unseat the whole argument, since our aim is simply to discuss sexual embodiment as an 
example and draw conclusions for embodiment in general, and not just in reference to Irigaray’s own 
view. Suffice it to say the following in response: my claim here is not necessarily that the lived experience 
of different embodiments is the same, but rather that there lies a problem in our beliefs about 
embodiment, the common logic underlying those beliefs, and the way this logic manifests first as a 
descriptive typology of bodily types and subsequently as a normative hierarchy of treatment. I will thus 
not be arguing against the value of embodiment itself by rejecting its materiality or its history in social 
struggles. Similarly, in arguing against typologies of difference I will not be arguing for a simplistic return 
to sameness, since sameness is simply another limited typology. An argument against difference is not an 
argument for sameness. Nor, again, will I be arguing that all forms of embodiment are materially 
equivalent. My aim is simply to explore the ways in which the common logic of identifying, framing, and 
utilising embodiment might necessarily result in exclusionary practices on the basis of maintaining a 
misrepresentation against the grain of reality. 
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0.2. METHOD: STRUCTURE AND APPROACH 
[Philosophical] discourse sets forth the law for all others, inasmuch as it constitutes the 
discourse on discourse (Irigaray, 1985b:74). 
Philosophy has three parts, physics, ethics, and dialectic or logic. Physics is the part 
concerned with the universe and all that it contains; ethics is that concerned with life and all 
that has to do with us; while the processes of reasoning employed by both form the 
province of dialectic (Diogenes Laertius, 1972:19). 
Ancient philosophy was divided into three sciences: physics, ethics, and logic. This division 
fits the nature of the subject perfectly, and there is no need to improve on it (Kant, 2005:55). 
I have demarcated the topic, main interlocutor, and background assumptions. It is now worth turning to 
how I will structure the material, and which method I will use in approaching it. Firstly, I shall define 
philosophy for the purposes of this thesis as having three main branches, which I will call the empirical, 
epistemological, and ethical. These three map very broadly over the three standard branches: 
metaphysics/ontology, epistemology/logic, and axiology/ethics/aesthetics; the world, the way we think 
about our representations of the world, and lastly the value of our experience as human beings. More 
specifically, I will use “empirical” in a broad sense as an investigation of the properties of reality; that is, 
which objects exist, what their properties are, and how they stand in relation to other objects – thus, the 
related fields of metaphysics and ontology, as descriptive. Our methodological position in approaching 
the empirically delineated aspects of the material will be a roughly positivist one. Without regressing into 
scientism, naïve realism, or polemic appeals to the authority of “facts”, we will take in good faith recent 
consensus in the scientific community (see section 3.1. Empirical Facts) on the non/existence of sex and 
race. We will also treat appeals to essentialism and natural types with suspicion and adopt an 
eliminativist, social constructionist position. “Epistemology” will be taken here to refer not only to the 
theory of knowledge, but also to the nature and structure of knowledge as descriptively encoded in a 
system; hence general questions about the way ideas hang together in a system, such as questions 
surrounding language, coherence, validity, truth, and logical fallacies. “Ethics” will be here taken as the 
study not of objects (as in the empirical and epistemological sections), but of conscious subjects in 
relation to one another, how their existential, social, political, and moral ties do and should function, 
prescriptively rather than descriptively as in the previous two branches. Accordingly, I will organise and 
introduce Irigaray’s material along these three lines, and will pursue an analysis thereafter using the 
same three-pronged fork. This three-part division will be repeated throughout the thesis for the sake of 
consistency, and to ensure that all areas of analysis supplied under philosophy are covered. 
This explains the structure of the work to follow. The critical method I will apply to the material thus 
arranged will consist of the following three strands of argument: Firstly, a general critique across all three 
areas, empirical, epistemic, and ethical, of whatever standard issues may arise, such as factual 
inaccuracies or logical fallacies. Secondly, the related notions of “space” and “coherence”, deriving from 
Irigaray’s own investigation of patriarchy, will be applied to her work to see if they might reveal problems 
similar to those she identifies in the Western tradition. Thirdly, the notion that ideology potentially 
mispresents the body when using universalised descriptions and prescriptions will be explored with 
regards to Irigaray’s own solution to patriarchy. This plan will be made clearer with a brief chapter 
outline: 
Chapters 1 and 2 will present a largely sympathetic exposition of Irigaray’s work. In Chapter 1, we will 
begin by following Irigaray’s own reading of the Western tradition, from Plato to Freud, and the particular 
logic of embodiment she identifies as the underlying mechanism of patriarchy. In her view, the 
systematic writing-out of the feminine has created a lack or negated space that is coherently overwritten 
with a male symbolic order. Following Irigaray’s historical diagnosis will necessitate a romp through the 
history of philosophy; or as she puts it, “having a fling with the philosopher[s]” (1985b:151). In section 
1.1., under the “empirical” branch, we will follow her reading of Western metaphysics as a metaphysics 
of solids and mechanics. In 1.2., under the “epistemic” branch, we will explore the patriarchal logic of 
self-identity and self-perpetuation, called the logic-of-the-one. In 1.3., under the “ethical” branch, 
Irigaray will show us the ways in which the patriarchal metaphysics and logic results in a social order 
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limited to only one kind of subjectivity, the male subjectivity, and therefore to sameness, which we will 
see Irigaray oppose with radical difference in Chapter 2. The supposed opposition between sameness and 
difference which fundamentally underpins Irigaray’s reading of and solution to the patriarchal tradition 
(by appealing to difference as a solution to masculine sameness) is important here since Part 2 will 
challenge this opposition, and therefore Irigaray’s own solution. All three sections within Chapter 1 will 
show that patriarchy operates according to a lack or denial of space, bodily and ethical, between subjects 
by reducing them to the same. 
Chapter 2 of Part 1 will introduce Irigaray’s solution to her diagnosis in the previous chapter. Section 2.1. 
will introduce the empirics of Irigaray’s “metaphysics of fluids” by exploring her definition of a processual 
cosmology and the sexually dual subjects – men and women – produced within that cosmology. Her 
essentialist approach – assuming the existence of sexed types, and two and only two types – is especially 
important since it will provide the material for much of the critique to follow in Part 2. Section 2.2., the 
epistemological section, will articulate her views of a language and rationality still to come, and section 
2.3. will expound her ethical alternative to patriarchy in the form of the “ontological negative” – an 
insuperable space or negative between subjects that ensures reciprocity and communication by 
providing a fertile ground between them that cannot be subsumed under the identity of one subject 
only. Irigaray’s ontological negative, as a sexed negative between sexually different subjects that 
attempts to situate ethics only between cisgender men and women in heterosexual relationships, will 
also provide important material for critique in Part 2. In concluding Chapter 2, we will carry over both 
Irigaray’s notion of space as central to ethics, and an awareness of the covert functioning of the logic-of-
the-one. 
Beginning with Chapter 3, Part 2 will initiate the critical analysis of Irigaray after the exposition of Part 1. 
The impetus for this critical turn stems from an understanding of Irigaray’s solution as both heavily 
cisgender-heteronormative and essentialist insofar as it retains the male patriarchal subject and merely 
pairs this subject with an equally essentialist female, without questioning the appeal to “sex” or bodily 
types in the first place as an arbitrary and limited act of identification and ultimately exclusion (excluding 
among others intersex and transgender individuals). This descriptive (essentialist) and prescriptive 
(heteronormative) bias in Irigaray’s work arises mainly out of her insistence that there exist sexual types, 
only two such types, and that they are necessarily the same or different (male/female) in relation to each 
other all the time. This essentialist same/different duality results from Irigaray’s critique and solution in 
Part 1, insofar as she believes a clear “female” subject is needed to break the “sameness” of the “male” 
through “difference”. It is this underlying assumption that is critiqued throughout Part 2. The critique will 
thus treat Irigaray’s solution as simply another hegemonic typology utilising mediated bodies (alongside 
those hegemonies outlined in Diagram 1, such as patriarchy) requiring disruption with a minimally 
descriptive alternative utilising unmediated bodies (following the dialectic outlined in Diagram 2). 
Beginning the critique, section 3.1. of Chapter 3 will provide a presentation of the empirical data on the 
prevalence of non-heterosexuality and the question of “separate” male and female brains. Section 3.2. 
will examine the logical validity of her system, with reference to her concept of space and the notion of 
ordering space into coherent patterns. It will also consider the conceptual validity of sameness/difference 
as a supposed binary, and the way in which Irigaray’s solution, by its own logic, requires disruption by a 
new solution that assumes the existence of more than two sexes. In rejecting the sameness/difference 
dichotomy (and therefore in rejecting Irigaray’s solution of sexual “difference” in opposition to 
patriarchal “sameness”), the concept of “multiplicity” as a negatively non-specific (rather than positively 
descriptive) means of describing unmediated bodies will be introduced. Section 3.3. will consider the 
ethical consequences of Irigaray’s system of difference. It will begin with an overview of her comments 
on homosexuality, before again picking up the concept of space to explore the ways in which her 
male/female duality might suppress the space for a queer body. Lastly, the possibility that both 
patriarchy and Irigaray’s own theory misrepresent men will be investigated.  
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Following the various critiques in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 will briefly sketch the possibility of an alternative 
minimum description of human embodiment using the concept of “vulnerability” as a starting point. 
Carrying over Irigaray’s warnings about the logic-of-the-one (insofar as such as logic takes a single 
subject, such as the male, as its ethical reference point), and her suggested solution of the ontological 
negative (insofar as it suggests an ethics of reciprocity using a space of unknowability), Chapter 4 will 
explore which possible properties can be ascribed to the human subject without resorting to essentialist 
claims and arbitrary over-descriptions (such as those in Diagram 1) based on specific physical traits (such 
as “sex” in Irigaray’s theory). The concept of vulnerability as a general capacity to suffer will be discussed 
as a possible property that does not rely on specific traits. It will be suggested that vulnerability is a 
possible solution compatible with Irigaray’s warnings about the logic-of-the-one, her ontological 
negative, the notion of multiplicity introduced in Chapter 3, and the critique of hegemonic typologies 
relying on mediated bodies within a same/different helix, as outlined in Diagram 1. Finally, Chapter 5 will 
summarise and conclude.  
Before beginning Part 1 and Chapter 1 below, I would like to briefly comment on Irigaray’s style, and raise 
some further textual notes about the format of the thesis. 
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A note on Irigaray’s style 
The largeness and speculative character of Irigaray’s claims have always put me on edge, and 
I confess in advance that although I can think of no feminist who has read and reread the 
history of philosophy with the kind of detailed and critical attention she has, her terms tend 
to mime the grandiosity of the philosophical errors that she underscores (Butler, 2011:11). 
And if anyone objects that the question, put this way, relies too heavily on metaphors, it is 
easy to reply that the question in fact impugns the privilege granted to metaphor (a quasi 
solid) over metonymy (which is much more closely allied to fluids). Or […] to reply that in any 
event that all language is (also) metaphorical (Irigaray, 1985b:109-110). 
Irigaray is a notoriously difficult writer (Deutscher, 2002:8). Her project is a continental feminist one, 
situated at the busy intersection of philosophy, psychoanalysis, linguistics, phenomenology, and ethics. 
The difficulty of her work is not merely to be attributed to the range of topics she aspires to analyse, but 
also to her style of writing. When engaging with her texts the reader is struck by a number of things: her 
work is filled with contradictions and paradoxes (Caldwell, 2002:31), and these present substantial first 
obstacles to her thought. Whitford, arguably the best-known commentator on Irigaray’s work, describes 
Irigaray as “associative rather than systematic in her reasoning” (1991:4), Stone describes her style as 
“inspirational rather than precise” (2009:9), and Grosz refers to her writing as “elliptical” (1994:103). The 
associative nature of her reasoning, the range of traditions covered, and the fact that her use of concepts 
is very often a covert revision (mimesis)17 of those concepts, leaves us with a vast corpus of work that 
does not follow an axiomatic “premise 1 + premise 2 = conclusion” structure with inferences clearly 
indicated, and whose language is moreover ambiguous from the outset. Her style and diction are 
frequently emotive and polemic to the point of interfering with the content of her message, and her work 
is interspersed with graphic purple passages,18 heavy italicisation, capitalisation, ellipses, and dramatic 
exclamations (?!). This “poetic” approach, much like Nietzsche’s, draws either ardent supporters or 
disgruntled decriers (Bordo, 2000:36). Even though it is academically reasonable to raise objections to 
any style that relies as much on rhetoric as argument, and although I will occasionally reference this, I will 
not concern myself with accounting for her style in the process of explaining and critiquing her thought. 
Readers unfamiliar with Irigaray should simply be aware that her aphoristic and poetic style presents a 
further challenge to understanding her thought, in addition to her a/typical lack of traditional evidence-
based premise-conclusion structure. 
However, her choice of style is deliberate, and it should not necessarily be taken as a disadvantage all the 
time. The reasons behind Irigaray’s style will be placed more fully in context below when we examine the 
stages of her thought. At this point, suffice it to briefly say that Irigaray considers the present linguistic 
system inadequate to the task of authentically describing both the female body and equal relations 
between two differently sexed subjects. This issue is neither limited to sex nor isolated. On Irigaray’s 
view, the entirety of human thought, from science and ontology to culture and aesthetics, is corrupted by 
a one-sided logic that is both binary and hierarchical. This limited set of concepts and their negations has 
obscured access to certain ways of being and thinking. As Irigaray puts it, “[i]t’s a matter of questioning 
the foundations of Western rationality and asking yourself why a syllogism is thought to be more rational 
than respect for nature” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:73). For these reasons Irigaray writes in a 
deliberately disruptive style using puns, mimesis, and apparent contradictions, in an attempt at imagining 
a new language and a new epistemology which is not-yet-thought (Whitford, 1991:5). In Irigaray’s own 
                                                 
17 “To play with mimesis is thus, for a woman, to try to recover the place of her exploitation by discourse, 
without allowing herself to be simply reduced to it” (Irigaray, 1985b:76). See also her justification of mimesis 
during her doctoral defence (1985b:151). For Irigaray, mimesis provides a means of disrupting the traditional 
meaning of concepts in a particularly subversive manner: since the patriarchal language contains no concepts 
for the female subject on her own terms (as we will see in Chapter 1), Irigaray appropriates the (male) 
vocabulary and “mimes” or “performs” it in a way that reveals the ambiguities and shortcomings of the 
patriarchal logic. 
18 For an extreme example see the chapter “La Mysterique” in Speculum, with such turns of phrase as “[s]he 
bathes in a blood that flows over her, hot and purifying” (Irigaray, 1985a:200). 
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words, “[p]oetry and philosophy don’t have to be separate. When philosophy is no longer poetry, it’s 
often just scholarly commentary rather than thought. Personally, I’m looking for a way to write 
philosophy that doesn’t split abstract logic on the one hand, and poetry on the other” (Irigaray & 
Lotringer, 2000b:134). We will get a better sense of this style when we encounter her work in Part 1. 
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Further textual notes 
1. Throughout the thesis, I will use both first personal singular and first person plural pronouns. 
When using “we” or “us”, I am not referring to myself in the double, but rather to myself and the 
reader. 
2. I will begin each section with a generous selection of quotes. The purpose is not to covertly pad 
the text (or the reference list), or appeal to authority with a “laundry list”. The former is 
unnecessary given the final length of the thesis, and the latter, I am well aware, is a fallacy. 
Rather, the purpose of these quotes is as follows: 
2.1. Since Irigaray is the main interlocutor in this thesis, I intend the practice as a mimetic 
reference to her own quotational style (the chapters “On the Index of Plato’s Works: 
Woman” and “Une Mere de Glace” in her book Speculum of the Other Woman, her doctoral 
dissertation, are nothing but a compilation of quotes from Plato and Plotinus respectively). 
2.2. In reference again to Irigaray, I intend it as a psychoanalytic exercise in free association, 
since Irigaray is a trained psychoanalyst (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:29; Irigaray, 2007:3). 
2.3. To set up a conversation between thinkers, sometimes opposing thinkers. 
2.4. To engage the philosophical literature at a wider level than the limits of the main text allows, 
and therefore to situate the relevance of this thesis within a broader context than the main 
argument. Related to the idea of free association, I will try throughout the text to draw my 
examples as broadly as possible to illustrate something of the synaesthetic web of 
associations the main argument seems, to me, to be related to. 
2.5. To establish the mood and trajectory of each section by introducing a relevant idea. 
2.6. See point 4 below: Especially regarding the exposition in Part 1, the purpose of these quotes 
is to find evidence in support of Irigaray’s own reading of the Western canon. 
3. To save space, since many of the quotes used in this thesis feature italics in the original, 
especially those by Irigaray, I will leave out the customary disclaimer “emphasis in the original” 
and only append such comments when altering quotes myself. Otherwise, all quotes are 
faithfully reproduced. And as always, round brackets within quotes indicate use by the authors 
themselves, and square brackets indicate my own insertions. 
4. All quotes supplied from primary texts by other canonical philosophers such as Aristotle will not 
be the same as those used by Irigaray in her own texts during her survey of Western thought. For 
the sake of thoroughness, I have tried to find evidence in the philosophical canon for Irigaray’s 
interpretation, independently of her own close readings. This is especially true for Chapters 1 
and 2 of Part 1. 
5. Apart from primary sources by historical thinkers such as Aristotle and Irigaray, I have otherwise 
attempted to use only the most recent secondary sources throughout this thesis (mostly from 
the 2000s and 2010s), and certainly the most recent scientific evidence on the nature of sex, in 
order to ensure both accuracy and relevancy. 
6. I will be using “LGBT+” and “queer” relatively interchangeably throughout, insofar as both refer 
to “non-heterosexual, non-cisgender, or non-heteroromantic”. 
7. I will also assume that the reader is at least familiar with the terms of gender theory, such as the 
difference between “sex” and “gender”, and the difference between “sexual orientation” and 
“romantic orientation”; and of course the many different types within each of those. However, it 
is crucial to understand that Irigaray does not draw a neat distinction between sex and gender, 
or therefore between “female” and “feminine”. Textual evidence and a discussion will be 
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provided in section 2.1., but it is vital to note here that these can be used without rigid 
distinction when describing Irigaray’s own thought. 
8. Of the eleven primary sources by Irigaray surveyed for this thesis,19 only three are supplied with 
indexes. Frustratingly, her most important books, This Sex, An Ethics, and Speculum, are among 
those without indexes in their standard, and best, English translations. Consequently I have 
undertaken the additional project of indexing her work, at least for the purposes of this thesis. 
To that end, I have included an index of Irigaray’s concepts and partial quotes from their 
appearances across her oeuvre in the Appendix (page 116). I will occasionally refer the reader to 
this compendium, where a larger range of references and therefore a larger range of evidence 
can be found, than in the main text. This is not out of a lazy avoidance of engaging and 
integrating Irigaray’s work but rather, on the contrary, out of an attempt at thoroughness. Firstly, 
Irigaray’s style is aphoristic, scattered, associative, and not systematic. For this reason it is likely 
impossible to gain an understanding of her thought by reading one or two standalone primary 
texts with conclusive arguments, since she does not give us that luxury.  Secondly, the central 
point of Irigaray’s argument, as we shall see below, is precisely that women have been “written 
out” of the Western tradition and denied a voice as rational beings on their own terms. 
Answering that challenge requires more than the usual approach and space of a strictly academic 
analysis, hence the appendix where I hope to give Irigaray space to speak beyond the standard 
citations within the main text. And thirdly, as a queer person reading Irigaray, I have been 
perturbed by the lack of attention in secondary texts to the heteronormativity in her work. Just 
as Irigaray has taken it upon herself to present the material of historical thinkers in order to 
highlight certain themes, I hope the compendium will give some insight into her own views on 
sexuality.20 
At this point, I strongly recommend that readers not intimately familiar with Irigaray’s own literature 
briefly scan the index before proceeding to the exposition below in Part 1, in order to gain an idea of the 
range of topics she covers, her views on those topics, and her idiosyncratic manner of articulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Thirteen primary sources are listed in the reference list. Two of those, however, are simply alternative 
translations of book chapters; thus I have left them out when speaking of “eleven” primary texts here. 
20 The phrases “man and woman”, or “man or woman”, or occasionally “only men and women/only male or 
female” appear on virtually every page of every book by Irigaray. This most likely goes unnoticed by a 
cisgender, heterosexual audience, and surely Irigaray herself. But in the shadow of those illuminating words, in 
every single repeated instance, one should read an eclipsed question: What if I am transgender? What if I am 
homosexual? What if I am intersex? What if I am asexual? In much the same way as “black and white, and only 
black and white” rhetoric should raise the questions: What if I am Chinese? What if I am of mixed heritage? 
What if I am adopted? What if I am albino? 
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PART 1: EXPOSITION 
1. CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM: IRIGARAY’S DIAGNOSIS 
By her own account, Irigaray’s work is split very broadly into two phases. The first (as found in Speculum 
of the Other Woman and This Sex Which is Not One) is a diagnosis and critique of patriarchy’s oppressive 
logic and metaphysics, the second (starting with An Ethics of Sexual Difference and exemplified in her 
more recent work) is a creative reconstruction of ethical subjective and intersubjective relations as a 
solution to the problems identified in the first phase (Irigaray, 1995:12; Irigaray & Lotringer, 
2000b:37,63,66-67; Stone, 2009:39; Hirsh, Olson & Brulotte, 1995:95,97). This distinction may then be 
briefly described as concerned firstly with the symbolic order, and secondly with the liberation of 
subjectivity from that order (Caldwell, 2002:23). In providing a sympathetic exposition of Irigaray’s work 
here in Part 1 and highlighting those aspects important for the analysis in Part 2, we will follow the 
structure of this dual division, since it is conveniently both chronological and thematic. Additionally, we 
will apply the structure of our three-pronged approach to each of these phases in turn, following Irigaray 
in what she identifies as the main empirical, epistemological, and ethical trends in the Western tradition, 
before exploring her own responses to each of these three in the second phase.  I should add as well that 
as far as this exposition goes, I aim to not only provide a brief outline of both phases of Irigaray’s work, 
but additionally to identify and extract, as an attempt at identifying an underlying theme, a common 
necessary and sufficient denominator or concept that gives cohesion to her overarching method. What I 
hope to demonstrate beyond simply preparing the work for analysis later on, is that the notion of space, 
variously defined but always as the notion of an “interval” or intermediary for potentiality and 
communication, is covertly central to Irigaray’s system, both in her initial deconstructive21 phase and in 
her later constructive phase.22 For now, let us begin by exploring the early phase of Irigaray’s work. 
To briefly anticipate the content of the exposition below, both Irigaray’s critique of the Western 
intellectual tradition and her defence of embodied sexuality are (diverse) variations on a single theme. 
Her project is premised on the identification of a pernicious and covert lack or negation in the Western 
worldview, one that begins with the denial of the human body and its materiality in general, and the 
female body and its fluid, maternal connotations in particular (Ainley, 1997:22). Both phases of Irigaray’s 
work aim to identify and challenge this lack by tracing its effects across the three areas where it is most 
manifest in the traditional worldview: the metaphysics of solid substance, the logic-of-the-one, and the 
social institution of patriarchy. This triad represents a comprehensive overview of the Western 
cosmology: firstly, a descriptive empirical metaphysics or ontology, secondly a descriptive 
epistemological account of reason and logic, and thirdly, a normative cultural template. Of these three, 
the logic-of-the-one is arguably the most important, since it represents the generalised mechanism by 
which all three operate.  
Both the force of Irigaray’s numerous diagnostic conclusions and her subsequent solution rest entirely 
upon her discovery of what she calls the “logic of the one” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:146), which must 
surely rank as her most important investigative discovery, whatever may be said of her later constructive 
philosophy. Following Lacan’s focus23 on the linguistic aspect of the symbolic order (Irigaray, 1985b:87),24 
                                                 
21 Not a reference to the “deconstruction” movement; I mean “diagnostic” here. 
22 Covert insofar as Irigaray herself does not explicitly use the term “space” in the sense I hope to show, and 
central insofar as it underpins, I will argue, both her critique of patriarchal sameness (as a suppression of both 
subjective and intersubjective space) and her subsequent solution (as an insuperable divide or space between 
subjects of different sexes). This will become clearer once we begin our exposition. 
23 For Lacan, entry into subjectivity and the social order begins with entry into the symbolic order; that is, into 
language (Pick, 2015:57), almost invariably a language created and spoken by male subjects. Drawing also on 
Saussure’s distinction between “signifiers” and “signifieds” (between the word or symbols and its referents), 
and the fact that a single word can have many deferred meanings, Lacan places human desire in a similar state 
of deferred lack in an endless chain of reference (2015:89-90). 
24 “But the truth of the truth about female sexuality is restated even more rigorously when psychoanalysis 
takes discourse itself as the object of its investigations. Here, anatomy is no longer able to serve, to however 
limited an extent, as proof-alibi for the real difference between the sexes. The sexes are now defined only as 
they are determined in and through language” (Irigaray, 1985b:87). 
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Irigaray too acknowledges the way in which the father figure (or any authority figure) not only interrupts 
the Oedipal triangle by imposing his name upon the child and enforcing a “no” upon incest, but also the 
way in which this “no” manifests (itself) as a symbolic negation (Irigaray, 1985b:61; Pick, 2015:57). This 
symbolic negation becomes generalised as the very foundation for the entire symbolic order, whether in 
law, language, or mathematics, covertly establishing an epistemology of hierarchical binaries and a 
metaphysics of rigid, singular presence in which secondary values are always defined as the conceptual 
negation or physical absence of the first rather than values on their own terms; for example true/not-
true, male/not-male, white/not-white, here/not-here, rational/irrational (Irigaray, 1985a:22; 1989:196). 
Furthermore, crucial to understanding Irigaray’s project here is not only her discovery of this 
universalised binary logos, but also the fact that all categories within this logos are sexed (male/female) 
in an attempt at aligning only one sex, the male, with the universal, and at sacrificing, negating, and 
excluding the body, language, and reasons of the other sex, the female. Thus, the central binary of 
male/not-male maps over all others, setting up not only a conceptual hierarchy but also a sexed social 
and ethical hierarchy (which manifested itself historically as patriarchy) ensuring the continuation of the 
logic-of-the-one in practice (Irigaray, 1994:55; Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:72; Stone, 2009:5).  
Of course in a certain sense abstract binary values are purely formal; there is no prescriptive judgement 
attached to them, only a descriptive one. The logic-of-the-one, however, breaks this neutrality by 
insisting that the negated values are inferior, by setting up a systematic hierarchy which denies them a 
voice, presence, or definition on their own terms. This is where what has been an abstract 
epistemological mode of thought up to now, gains its force in practice. By sexing the binary epistemology 
of x/not-x, and universally mapping this binary onto the moral binary of superior/inferior, the logic-of-
the-one is able to deny certain ways of thinking and being in their entirety. The male is that which has a 
voice, has validity, has a presence, has rationality; those concepts which are gendered masculine or 
aligned with the phallic traits of singularity, self-reference, and solidity, are the only concepts appropriate 
for rational, coherent discourse. Thus, Irigaray demonstrates how the rationality of Western metaphysics 
and epistemology is not only binary (favouring one value), but also sexed (favouring the male), and lastly 
normative as applied to all aspects of the metaphysics (establishing the single-value presence of the 
masculine in all categories as the dominant one). To repeat: this underlying male-good-singular/female-
bad-ambiguous binary (shall we call it the ‘master signifier’?) permeates all levels of the Western 
conceptual vocabulary. It is the sexed, normative mechanism underlying the traditional logos, 
metaphysics, and ethics. The binary of “[s]exual difference could now be thought of as a term 
substituting for the thinking of the universe […] an envelope into which Irigaray enfolds reflections on the 
universe, its dimensions and physics, and our capacity to think these things” (Deutscher, 2002:118). Its 
effects, as it maps over language, include equating women with materiality and men with abstract 
reason, women with irrationality and men with rationality, women with darkness and men with light, 
women with nature and men with culture; the pattern, I think, is obvious. In addition to the internal 
content of the logic-of-the-one, whether it devalues materiality or not, its very structure as a 
representation removed from reality (a logos or symbolic), suggests on what we might call a “meta” level 
the large scale privileging of abstract reason over bodily materiality.25 This then is the problem Irigaray 
identifies: the tyranny of the symbolic order over corporeal embodiment,26 the way in which this tyranny 
functions as a hierarchical binary, and the effect it has had in systematically writing the feminine out of 
the Western tradition. We will now begin section 1.1. Metaphysics of Solids and follow Irigaray in 
identifying this pattern in the philosophical literature of the Western canon. 
“The philosopher is now invited to this erasure of the beginning” (Irigaray, 1985a:312). 
                                                 
25 This is perhaps paradoxically epitomised in the separation between symbolic phallus and material penis. I 
call this a paradox because appeals to the material physicality, size, responsiveness, visibility, and presence of 
the actual penis are central to the (arbitrary, socially mediated) construction of male culture beyond simply 
being appeals to an abstract phallic notion of power. 
26 Which is very similar to the argument I will raise against Irigaray herself much later in Part 2, insofar as her 
own solution to the patriarchal logic-of-the-one, the logic-of-the-two also functions as an exclusionary tool. 
For now, we still have yet to define the logic-of-the-one, and Irigaray’s own dual logic or logic-of-the-two in the 
course of this exposition. 
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1.1. METAPHYSICS OF SOLIDS (EMPIRICAL) 
Whereas at the beginning of epistemology, the philosopher was still marvelling at such 
things as air, fire, and water, now they must be submitted to a rigorous scientific analysis so 
that their excessive power can be checked. They must be put in their place, within a general 
theory of being so as to lessen our fascination with them (Irigaray, 1985a:160). 
For these notions have made me see that it is possible to attain knowledge which is very 
useful in life, and that unlike the speculative philosophy that is taught in the schools, it can 
be turned into a practice by which, knowing the power and action of fire, water, air, stars, 
the heavens, and all other bodies that are around us as distinctly as we know the different 
trades of our craftsmen, we could put them to all the uses for which they are suited and thus 
make ourselves as it were the masters and possessors of nature (Descartes, 2006:51). 
It is the Understanding that sets Man above the rest of sensible Beings, and gives him all the 
Advantage and Dominion, which he has over them (Locke, 2008:13). 
Representation comes naturally to human beings from childhood, and so does the universal 
pleasure in representations (Aristotle, 2013:20). 
But what division is being perpetuated here between a language that is always subject to the 
postulates of ideality and an empirics that has forfeited all symbolisation? (Irigaray, 
1985b:107). 
Western logic calls for and relies on a mechanics of solids (Irigaray, 1989:199). 
The self-referential phallic singularity and logic-of-the-one (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:159) with which 
Irigaray is concerned is not a recent phenomenon. Turning to the history of the West and Irigaray’s early 
canonical critiques, it has its roots in the ancient Graeco-Roman world, most notably in the ethics of 
sexual practices and identities. Starting with the ancient Greeks, the old model of bodily sex was 
conceived of within a one-sex model: the identification of sex was not primarily based on the possession 
of “male” or “female” anatomy, since all bodies were regarded as inherently unstable, fluid, and feeble 
(Irigaray, 1993:88; Mottier, 2008:6-7). Rather, a person’s sex was determined by whatever acts they 
performed, narrowly limited to sexual penetration (Mottier, 2008:5). Thus women could risk becoming 
too masculine, or men could risk becoming too feminine as they engaged in acts which either heated, 
cooled, depleted, or excited the various fluids of which the body was thought to be comprised. For 
example, the passive partner in male-male sex was, on this account, therefore considered thoroughly 
feminine, and not merely a male acting feminine, since the act was constitutive of identity, rather than 
the body. The instability of this fluid one-sex model gave rise to the need for the constant assertion and 
policing of masculinity, and initiated the devaluing of the fluid, the feminine, and the corporeal. The 
subsequent emergence of aggressive one-way penetrative sex by a self-identical unified penis 
(symbolically the phallus) set the stage for the valorising of the one and the hierarchy of binary values 
that underpin Western rationality and persist to this day in the form of patriarchy and sexism. 
Additionally it must be noted that this type of one-way sexuality left no room for relationality between 
equal subjects, not only because it denied the existence of two equal subjects, but also because it 
reduced all possible interactions between them to a single, one-way act.  
Nonetheless, the notions of fluidity, change, and materiality remained important to the early Greeks, and 
it is useful to stress this here since, on Irigaray’s reading, it represents a style of thinking that would 
slowly be eroded by the logic-of-the-one and replaced with a metaphysics of solids.27 The Pre-Socratic 
philosophers, whose interest was primarily in the natural world rather than (wo)man’s place in it 
(Ehrenberg, 2011:86), attempted to answer the questions of identity and change not by denying decay or 
change and conceptualising identity as self-referential presence opposed to absence (which would later 
become the logocentric phallus), but by emphasising rhythm and process (Stone, 2009:101). For example, 
we know that Thales, the first scientist-philosopher recorded in the Western tradition, held that the 
                                                 
27 Irigaray sometimes employs the phrase “mechanics of solids” (1985b:107), although the metaphor of 
“mechanics” will only become clearer once we reach the post-Renaissance revolution in science. 
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unifying principle of reality was water (Aristotle, 2004:13; Ehrenberg, 2011:85), and that change was due 
to water being animated with a soul (Diogenes Laertius, 1972:27), rather than mechanically lifeless. 
Anaximenes held that everything was comprised of unlimited or boundless air (Diogenes Laertius, 
1972:133; Aristotle, 2004:13), and Heraclitus claimed that the cosmos was comprised of fire (Aristotle, 
2004:13-14) which resulted in a perpetual ontological becoming (rather than static ontic being) through a 
continuous union of opposites (Ehrenberg, 2011:86). Heraclitus’ position is especially interesting for 
purposes of contrast since he attempted to solve the problem of identity and change by rejecting ontic 
types altogether and positing change as identity. As Popper puts it, Heraclitus found a simple solution by 
claiming that “[t]here are no things that change: it is wrong to conceive the world as consisting of a 
collection of things – even of changing things. The world does not consist of things but of processes” 
(Popper, 2012:247). This position epitomised the Pre-Socratic stance towards the metaphysics of 
cosmology, one that was reluctant to partition nature into rigid, ontic categories according to an abstract 
logos and instead embraced elemental, tactile, ontological becoming.28 The representations utilised in 
understanding reality by the Pre-Socratics were, in large part, imagined in terms of the body as 
appreciable by the senses and not merely to abstract reason. Importantly, in this cosmos filled only with 
becoming, negation was not possible to the extent it acquired in later thought, since negation requires 
classification, separation, stability, and typology. Aristotle summarises the early thought well: “The first 
thinkers [Pre-Socratics] assumed that the principle was bodily (for water and fire and such things are 
bodies), and they divided into those that thought there was a single body, and those that thought there 
were several, but both groups treated them as causes in the form of matter” (2004:22).  
This focus on the cosmos and the idea that everything is constituted of diverse and changing, yet 
contiguous parts, often expressed in natural elements such as water or fire, changed with the 
anthropomorphic shift initiated by Socrates and Plato. Similarly, the one-sex model not restricted to 
anatomy and sexual identity, viewed as fluctuating between “male” and “not-male”, lost its performative 
fluidity and became attached to bodies rather than acts. It is here that Irigaray begins her diagnostic 
analysis of the Western tradition. Chronologically, Irigaray starts with a reinterpretation of Plato’s Cave 
Myth (Irigaray, 1985a:243), however since our structure here is also thematic, we will examine Plato in 
the following section as her rereading is more relevant to understanding the logic-of-the-one and the 
rejection of the maternal body than it is to understanding the metaphysics of solids. Still, as far as 
ontology and metaphysics go, it is worth pointing out for the sake of consistency here that Plato broke 
with the Pre-Socratics by introducing a radical metaphysical dualism with his well-known Realm of 
Forms/Ideas. Put simply, Plato claimed that the sensible material world subject to difference and flux had 
to be an inadequate vessel for the essence of reality; since such an essence must be universal, 
unchanging, and incorruptible. The material world, then, is an imperfect copy of an ideal world of 
“forms” from which all entities derive their essence. This intangible realm of perfect ideas is accessible 
only through the mind’s use of reason, and knowledge of it constitutes knowledge of what is truly “real” 
(Aristotle, 2004:24-25; Diogenes Laertius, 1972:289-291; Popper, 2012:92). Plato’s idealistic account, 
which would become enormously influential alongside Aristotle’s empiricism, thus began the tradition of 
denying becoming, change, and materiality, and instead situating being, essence, and reason outside 
embodied corporeality; meaning that henceforth change (or becoming) would be viewed as an illusion. 
Let us turn our attention now to those Irigarayan rereadings subsequent to Plato that demonstrate the 
way in which Western metaphysics rejected the fluid and potential dunamis29 of the Pre-Socratics and 
                                                 
28 Of course this does not mean all the Pre-Socratics favoured such a fluid ontology. Anaxagoras claimed that 
nous (mind) governed matter (Aristotle, 2004:15; Ehrenberg, 2011:195,300), and that this nous gave “order” to 
all matter:  “All things were together; then came Mind and set them in order” (Diogenes Laertius, 1972:137). 
Similarly, Pythagoras believed that “that the principles of mathematical entities were the principles of all 
entities” (Aristotle, 2004:19). 
29 Also dynamis. Greek for “dynamism”. The word refers not just to power or ability, but moreover to potential 
or capacity, rather than static actuality. 
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developed instead in the direction of mechanisation, representation, division, and solidity, epitomised 
eventually by Classical Mechanics during the Enlightenment.30 
Plato’s negational binary and occlusion of the body has predecessors in the anti-sensualist theory of 
Parmenides,31 and more pertinently in the philosophy of Atomism, developed by Leucippus and 
Democritus, which coincided with the development of (Greek) mathematics and the rise of humanist 
thought (Ehrenberg, 2011:269). The Atomist theory not only proposed that the problem of change could 
be explained by appealing to tiny, indivisible parts that constitute all matter, but that there existed a 
fundamental duality between being and nothingness, or “atoms and the void” (Popper, 2012:102). The 
result was the establishment of a duality between presence and absence, fullness and emptiness, and 
situating that which is real only within that which is present and full (comprised of atoms).32 Thus, for 
instance, “light may be real: there may be light atoms; it is night that is unreal; night is simply the 
absence of light” (Popper, 2012:103). What we see here is not only the origins of a particular worldview 
that is binary and negates one value, but also one which establishes “solid presence” as reality and thus 
gives normative preference to that which is present, solid, capable of division and analysis; in short, a 
strict hierarchy. To quote Aristotle again: “Leucippus, however, and his companion Democritus said that 
the elements were the full and the empty, and that of these the full and the solid were what is and the 
empty was what is not […] and he says that these things are the causes of entities as matter” (Aristotle, 
2004:17-18). This description of a binary logic that establishes a dichotomy between static, present 
“solidity” and emptiness, and privileges the former as the source of not only pure existence (“what is”) 
but also of all forms and shapes of matter arising within existence (“entities as matter”), could very well 
be in Irigaray’s own critically diagnostic voice, albeit without Irigaray’s important insight that this logic is 
also sexed and normative; the equation of “female = matter” functions centrally in the establishment of a 
phallocentric, patriarchal hegemony premised on this binary logic (Stone, 2009:31). 
We know that Plato would take such duality to its extreme and declare even present, solid matter to be 
“unreal”; the essence of being is to be found in the abstract Realm of Forms. His student, Aristotle, had a 
slightly different account, but something of the subjection of materiality to an abstract principle remains. 
Reading Aristotle, Irigaray finds the extension of this tendency to mechanisation, representation, division, 
prediction, and solidity within his theory of actuality and potentiality governed by telos: 
The physis is always already being appropriated by a telos. This is true of the plant, or even 
of its flower, ‘for example’. Even so, isn’t a logos still necessary before the genus and species 
of the plant can be decided? Etc. The plant may indeed conform to her own purpose, but an 
other has to certify this. […] The substance of the plant, like that of any (female) being, 
cannot move, or move beyond, the ontological status assigned to it. […] Matter-potency is 
                                                 
30 All the same, we should not be too quick in dismissing Plato. His Timaeus contains a description of the 
human body saturated with images of pores, fluids, and flesh that drew admiration from early rhetoricians not 
for being an accurate description of something foul, but rather for their excess (Longinus, 1991:43). 
31 Parmenides, who established the tradition of systematically distinguishing between reality/illusion, 
truth/opinion, being/seeming, claimed before Plato that all that exists is “One”, accessible only to reason and 
not the senses, since the senses can only grasp change and decay (Ehrenberg, 2011:90). For this reason, Karl 
Popper calls him “anti-sensualist” (Popper, 2012:183).  This anti-sensualist position would become, with the 
possible exception of Aristotle’s empiricism, entrenched in the Western metaphysics Irigaray seeks to expose, 
feeding into the binary of masculine-reason-good/feminine-body-bad. (Yet even Aristotle’s account ultimately 
gives preference to explanation and understanding over sensation. His Metaphysics opens with an empiricist 
claim but goes on to modify it: “By nature all men long to know. An indication is their delight in the senses […] 
we do not think that any of the senses is wisdom, even those that are the most important forms of cognition 
at the level of particulars. They do not, though, give the reason for anything” (Aristotle, 2004:4-5).) As we will 
see later in 1.3. Historical Patriarchy and 2.3. Ontological Negative, Irigaray will attempt to redeem the notion 
of sensual, tactile knowledge and relationality over abstract reason or the detached “gaze”. 
32 Absence is non-being and therefore non-truth, or in sexed Irigarayan terms in reference to the vagina: “That 
is to say, no sex/organ that can be seen in a form capable of founding its reality, reproducing its truth. Nothing 
to be seen is equivalent to having no thing. No being and no truth” (Irigaray, 1985a:48). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
29 
 
duly corseted in/by rigid categories that are laid down […] The meanings and directions of 
Being are always impervious to change (Irigaray, 1985a:162-163). 
Notice how Irigaray genders the plant with the feminine pronoun halfway through the quote. What 
Irigaray show us, on the Aristotelian (but also Platonic) understanding of matter, is that the essence of 
being lies outside matter in an abstract ideal; whether as a perfect, unchanging, disembodied form, or as 
an overseeing telos (Lehtinen, 2014:5). Phrased differently, representation is privileged over corporeal 
reality, favouring categorisation, analysis, and prediction, and, in this rigid categorisation, a metaphorical 
“hardening” of substance. In Plato, this writes matter as a lack, or imperfect space to be transcended, 
and in Aristotle this writes (female) matter not necessarily as a lack, but as a substance that only achieves 
its essence or purpose under the language of a guiding (masculine) principle.33 Teleology then, which 
always aims toward a particular end, represents a restrictive pattern of coherence. Teleology begins with 
a sacrifice, foreclosure, or death of possibility, since change and ambiguity are always limited to a 
particular overarching goal, whether a Platonic form or an object’s actuality, or in Irigaray’s view, the 
male universal, meaning that anything (or any subject) under a teleology cannot pursue a “life of its 
own”. In the language of our specific interpretive frame, we can call this coherence the suppression of 
conceptual space (insofar as “space” is a concept or metaphor, but also corporeal, bodily space insofar as 
the teleology limits the differentiation of bodies) and therefore possibility, both by limiting the definition 
of the concepts at hand to a particular end, and by negating the possibility of any space for growth 
outside the given set of concepts. In contrast to the Pre-Socratics, for whom the essence of matter was 
constituted by its fluid, rhythmic, becoming, Plato and Aristotle link and therefore reduce being to the 
expression of abstract ideals. Furthermore, where rhythm does occur in Plato and Aristotle, it is 
redefined in strict relation to human endeavours such as dance, music, and representation (Aristotle, 
2013:20; Stone, 2009:101), regimenting the natural process into discernible temporal steps of stasis and 
release. Importantly this metaphysical, ontological description establishes normative parameters that 
Irigaray reads as sexed; music and rhythm can “go wrong”, therefore reality must be one particular way: 
Thus, her [the flower’s] development is subject to definitions coming from another. And if, in 
the unforeseeable future, she happened to unleash some nameless potency, it would not be 
up to her to judge whether or not this unpredictable event had occurred. She would not 
condemn the sudden unchecked appearance of the physis as a monstrosity, an aberration in 
the essence of plant life (Irigaray, 1985a:163). 
Much later, Kant, too (echoing Isaac Newton) tells us that “[e]very change in matter has an external 
cause” (2004:82). The feminine, or matter, is thus the bodily, the material, the natural, surging up with 
potential between the conceptual borders of a specific masculine discourse that treats it as absent or 
otherwise present as an unrepresentable aberration. Therefore, “[w]oman, for her part, remains in 
unrealised potentiality – unrealised, at least, for/by herself […] Ontological status makes her incomplete 
and uncompletable” (Irigaray, 1985a:165).  
This tendency to cut being off from its material ground, subject that materiality to representation, 
establish a binary between mind and matter (and consequently between reason and unreason or 
corporeality), theorise matter as solid, present, and full, and “maintain a complicity of long standing 
between rationality and a mechanics of solids alone” (Irigaray, 1985b:107) finds extension in the 
development of Classical Mechanics in the Enlightenment, with the rise of the modern scientific method 
at the end of the Renaissance. Descartes and Kant, for instance, reinforce the dualism presented by Plato 
between reason and matter: 
I thereby concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature resides only in 
thinking, and which, in order to exist, has no need of place and is not dependent on any 
material thing (Descartes, 2006:29). 
 
                                                 
33 Rather similar to the Lacanian notion that one only becomes a subject upon entering into the (masculine) 
language of the symbolic order. 
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And although perhaps […] I have a body, which is very closely conjoined to me, yet because, 
on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am a thinking and 
not an extended thing, and, on the other, a distinct idea of the body, in so far as it is only an 
extended and not a thinking thing, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and 
can exist without it (Descartes, 2008:55). 
In this meaning, therefore, a twofold doctrine of nature is possible, the doctrine of the body 
and the doctrine of the mind, where the first considers extended nature, the second thinking 
nature (Kant, 2004:3). 
Therefore, again, “[a]s the Cartesian cogito makes apparent, a rejection of the body, res extensa, is the 
condition for man’s existence and ultimate transcendence” (Ingram, 2008:72). Knowledge takes as its 
reference point reason over the body enacting a somewhat paradoxical divide between knowing about 
the “matter” of something, and being also comprised of matter as a body that “knows”, yet denying this 
material root. Moreover, not only does this repeat the binary between reason and body/matter, but it 
also repeats the rejection of multiplicity and fluidity; Irigaray supplies the bridge to solidified Classical 
Mechanics and a rejection of the fluid: 
Nonetheless, the “I” thinks. Or so he thinks. This is the “fixed point” amid the uncontrollable 
vertices. The “I” thinks, therefore it is. A verb, a verbal process/trial serve as premises for 
existence, re-create “being” just as it was about to succumb, drowning in deep water, with 
nothing and no one to hold on to […] Withdrawn into a strict deprivation of all exercises of 
the sensibility and the imagination, the subject will observe the world like the pilot of a ship 
taking to the open sea where nothing determines his perspective but the limitless nothing to 
be seen (Irigaray, 1985a:184-185). 
And, as if to confirm Irigaray’s diagnosis, Descartes appropriates the movement of fluids as mechanically 
predictable: 
Finally, so that those who do not know the force of mathematical proof and are not used to 
distinguish true reasoning from plausible reasoning, should not venture to deny all this 
without examining it, I would like to point out to them that the movement [of the heart and 
blood] I have just explained follows necessarily from the mere disposition of organs that one 
can see with the naked eye in the heart, […] in the same way as the movement of a clock 
follows from the force, position, and shape of its counterweights and wheels (Descartes, 
2006:41-42).34 
                                                 
34 More recently, Klaus Theweleit has explored the same rejection of “feminine” fluidity and supposed disorder 
in favour of “masculine” geometrized, technized, and hardened bodies in the rise of Nazism in his two-volume 
Male Fantasies. Apart from the mechanised scientific worldview and the rejection of soft organic bodies, one 
can trace this general tendency towards a metaphysics of solids elsewhere in humanity’s relationship of 
representation and control with the physical reality around it. For instance Irigaray would no doubt agree that 
evidence of it can be found in the Industrial Revolution, or the attempt to subject nature to rational order that 
culminated in the fashionably geometrical formal gardens of the Enlightenment. Theweleit gives the 
interesting examples of increasingly cumbersome suits of armour in warfare (1989:202), and a ballet 
performed by King Henry III of France and his court (2010:315-316). The former example is useful for our 
purposes because it stands in opposition to the notion of inherent human vulnerability, which I offer as a 
solution to Irigaray’s diagnosis and general questions of embodiment in Chapter 4 below. The latter example 
by Theweleit is useful for elucidating Irigaray’s argument. The theme of the ballet was the domination of the 
enchantress Circe by the forces of reason. The dancers moved in geometrical patterns and grouped into 
shapes such as squares, and at the end of every dance they directed their gaze at Henry III (Jupiter). (We will 
briefly deal with the notion of the gaze in section 1.3.) The stage consisted of streams canalised into a fountain 
where desire was restrained, Theweleit notes, “to please man in his own garden” (2010:316) and irrigate the 
newly subdued land. A similar passage occurs in Irigaray’s An Ethics of Sexual Difference (Irigaray 1993:52). The 
feminine thus became a negated and sterilised commodity; mechanised production replaced organic, sensual, 
and bodily reproduction. 
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Inferior matter, and all its properties of motion, change, and potential, are figured in terms of time and 
space, and thus rigidified into an analysis. Importantly, this space-time analysis is linear (Classical 
Euclidean space is not curved) and thus suggests progression or improvement (Irigaray, 1985a:284,305) 
in motion towards some end, unwittingly echoing the idea of teleology. Thus, matter, space, and “[t]ime 
[are] cut up, over and over again, and lost in all kinds of caesuras and scansions that will be forced to toe 
the party line by deceptive plays of relationships” (Irigaray, 1985a:290). 
In short, Irigaray shows us how the Western rationalist tradition has systematically denied that reason is 
bodily reason; or as Schmitt (2002:43) puts it: “The European conception of reason constantly and 
insistently denies that it is the reason of a sexual being”.35 This denial of sex, the body, the ambiguous, 
the void, and the fluid in favour of disembodied reason, the present, the rigid, the divisible and 
extendable, constitutes the historical construction of the universal subject (the covertly male subject)36 
and the representation of the cosmos as a measurable reality with no dark corners beyond the 
mechanised reach of reason. This metaphysics of presence and solidity, which is built upon the negated 
lack of the body and its attributes, plugs very well into the epistemology of the logic-of-the-one, which 
functions according to precisely such binary negation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 In 2.1. Metaphysics of Fluids, we will see how Irigaray derives a gendered subjectivity and rationality from a 
sexed body. 
36 It is certainly interesting to note that since the negation is not only of the female body, but of the bodily 
messiness of sex in general, there exists a paradox in the male subject’s “disembodied” status as sexless or 
universal, and yet the identification of a metaphysics and rationality that corresponds to certain features of its 
sexual anatomy, such as rigidity and self-identity. I do not intend to explore this here, since it can be taken up 
on its own as an entirely separate critique of patriarchy. 
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1.2. VERTICAL LOGIC-OF-THE-ONE (EPISTEMOLOGICAL) 
In the beginning, the Word already existed, and the Word was with God, and the Word was 
God. From the very beginning the Word was with God. Through him God made all things; 
not one thing in all creation was made without him. The Word was the source of life, and 
this life brought light to humanity (John 1:1). 
Far too little attention has been paid to the fact that our age, for all its irreligiousness, is 
hereditarily burdened with the specific achievement of the Christian epoch: the supremacy 
of the word, the Logos [..] the moment the word, as a result of centuries of education, 
attains universal validity, it severs its original link with the divine person (Jung, 2014:54-55). 
Required by every figure in the ontology, the a priorism of the same was able to maintain 
itself only through an expatriation, an extrapolation, an expropriation of a quasi-theological 
nature. Under the direction of man, but not directly attributable to him. Referred back to 
some transcendence (Irigaray, 1985a:27). 
[I]t is indeed precisely philosophical discourse that we have to challenge, and disrupt, 
inasmuch as this discourse sets forth the law for all others […] One way is to interrogate the 
conditions under which systematicity itself is possible: what the coherence of the discursive 
utterance conceals (Irigaray, 1985b:74). 
Irigaray is investigating the passional foundations of reason (Whitford, 1991:1). 
According to the traditional logic, identity refers to self-identity, to identity to the same. It 
designates a reality which is if possible fixed, not subject to change, not modifiable by the 
event nor by the other. In this way it has something in common with the Platonic idea. 
Relational identity goes counter to this solipsistic, neuter, auto-logical ideal (Irigaray & 
Lotringer, 2000b:159). 
Passing from the fluid darkness, from the shimmering imprecision of reflections, from the 
phantasmagorias of the doxa to the neat, clear-cut, immutable, unambiguous categories 
that characterise, divide up, classify, and order everything […] For the passages through 
which he might have been introduced or inserted have been eliminated, obliterated, 
stopped up, in order to ensure the domination of the Truth (Irigaray, 1985a:281). 
Despite the alignment of the feminine with space, and with the fallible matter extended into space, this 
alignment only exists in the Western logos in order to establish the feminine as the ground to be 
transcended. Starting here with the work of Plato, Irigaray explores how Western rationality creates a 
subjectivity of negation starting with self/not-self (or male/not-male) (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:116) in 
which “the subject identifie[d] with the universal by disavowing any relation to the material or particular, 
and by projecting this rejected detritus onto others who become the limit” (Caldwell, 2002:19). The fact 
that this binary, vertical37 hierarchy maintains at its head the distinction between male/not-male and 
reason/body means that, firstly, feminine identity is devalued in relation to men, secondly, feminine 
identity is only defined in relation to men, and thirdly, this negation results in a lack of feminine 
subjectivity developing on its own terms (Stone, 2009:26-27). It might be suggested Irigaray’s diagnosis 
here shares some common ground with Beauvoir’s own earlier investigations in The Second Sex. Both 
agree “it is male activity that in creating values has made of existence itself a value” in a positive, singular 
sense (Walters, 2005:98), since as we saw earlier, presence (or positive existence, as opposed to the void 
or absence) is given preference as a distinctly masculine value. Feminine embodiment is negated and 
seen only as important with regards to what it negatively represents – the not-male, the messy, natural 
world – and not with regards to what it itself positively is. Beginning with Plato’s vaunted Allegory of the 
Cave, Irigaray notes how this allegory is premised upon not only an overcoming and negation of the 
original material/maternal cave/womb in favour of the rational/paternal external world of ideal forms, 
                                                 
37 “Vertical” here refers to the fact that the binary function of the logic-of-the-one suppresses or “places 
underneath” itself negated values. It also refers to the privileging of abstract, transcendent reason (recalling 
Plato’s forms), and representation over bodily matter “down here”. 
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but more importantly upon a denial of the uterine passage (space, intermediary) between the two, the 
medium which connects both realms yet cannot clearly be expressed in the vocabulary of either (Irigaray, 
1985a:247,266,319-320; Caldwell, 2002:24). In other words, we see again how the denial of intermediate 
space results in the rigidity of a binary maintained on either side of that “dead” (negated) space (Irigaray, 
1985a:283,285). In a similar fashion, this denial is also visited upon the middle stage: the external, 
material sensible world (the second of the three stages in the Allegory) exists as a condition of denial 
(“forgetting you have forgotten” (Irigaray, 1985a:296)) that prevents communication between the Ideal 
(third stage) and the Cave (first stage) (Irigaray, 1985a:284), and also loses its own value despite being 
the condition of possibility for apprehending the Ideal (Whitford, 1991:108-109), since you must stand 
outside to see the sun. Moreover, in denying value or even existence to the maternal and mediating 
stages (that is, the Cave itself, the passage to the entrance, and the outside world excluding the sun), the 
Allegory of the Cave replicates the self/not-self logic of identity which we have come to know as the 
logic-of-the-one: the Ideal is the Self, the World is the other of the Self, and the Cave is the other of the 
other (Whitford, 1991:104), where the latter (and most feminine) is utterly devoid of the possibility of 
representation as it does not even exist in relation to the Self (the originator of meaning), not even as a 
negation. In a sense, the exit from the cave thus represents the death of the mother (Irigaray, 
1985a:355), insofar as Plato’s myth requires the rejection of that womb or space from which the 
“prisoner” emerged, in favour of the sun, thereby leaving traces of the erasure with this rejection. 
The central negation enacted by the logic-of-the-one, which is the core mechanism of traditional Western 
logos, manifests itself in different ways; whether as the sacrifice of the maternal body, the universal 
valorisation of the masculine sex, the rejection of alternative rationalities and concepts, or the 
metaphysics of solid singularity. Drawing on the work of Rene Girard, Irigaray notes that the function of 
the logic-of-the-one can also be described as violently sacrificial (Caldwell, 2002:18; Du Toit, 2015:15).  By 
establishing a logocentric system of binaries, not only does the logic-of-the-one exile or sacrifice and 
devalue the negated value and draw a symbolic boundary, but it also creates an acceptable and highly 
localised space for the concentration of violence, policing, and oppression in the process. That is, because 
the feminine has no terms of its own, and indeed no existence of its own, there is no moral limitation to 
what can be done to the female body. It represents the space in which in/justice can “never” occur, and 
thus can be acted upon with impunity. Moreover, this (non)space must be continually policed to ensure 
that the oppressed subject does not produce resistance (Ainley, 1997:23). This is made especially clear by 
Irigaray’s observation that, since the male order signifies presence, being (Irigaray, 1985a:165), and its 
own self-referential replication/reproduction, and since it denies and negates anything outside this order, 
the space inhabited by the feminine represents non-being, or death (Irigaray, 1985a:27).38 In a certain 
sense, we might say that for Irigaray this denial of female subjectivity and relationality results from a 
conceptual suppression of space, whether ethical, ontological, or symbolic, and subsequently a 
suppression of the possibility of change and “becoming”: space for women to extend their own bodies 
and not simply be bodies, space free of descriptive representations, space free of normative 
prescriptions, the disjunctive space between representation and reality, symbolic and real, for them to 
have a life of their own.39 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Recall here also the “void” of the Atomists discussed earlier. 
39 I would like to briefly make the independent suggestion that insofar as the Western logos enacts a sacrifice 
or negation of the fluid, dark, material ground in order to transcend to an abstract, self-referential ideal, the 
image and act of male circumcision might prove useful. This act of “transcendence”, performed through the 
mechanism of the logic-of-the-one and manifested in the metaphysics of solids and social practice of 
patriarchy, relies as we have seen on the negation of the maternal body. Perhaps, then, the act of circumcision 
represents a final attempt at severing excess corporeality and exposing the dark, masculine womb of the 
foreskin to the light of uniformity. Perhaps this is the act of “castration” the male performs in order to avoid 
being Castrated; a dilemma of his own making. 
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Irigaray traces the way in which sacrifice of the Platonic Cave Myth is enacted over and over in canonical 
philosophical texts, in response to anxieties about the female/maternal body. The resulting 
contradictions and gaps identified by Irigaray40 suggest that there are inadequacies in the phallocentric 
language beneath these positions. One could, for instance, tentatively suggest that something like the 
Sorites Paradox is a direct symptom of monological, binary rigidity, one which denies intermediate spaces 
or third values “outside” the binary negation, and subsequently unwittingly sets up the conditions for 
paradoxes existing in the first place. Irigaray references this issue in the following: 
If the prime mover didn’t install a brake on the wheel of infinite regression, for instance, 
might not all substance risk hurtling into some formlessness of prime matter? It might be 
seduced into returning to the womb of the mother-earth […] Therefore access to the earth 
must be barred by developing an onto-theology at the very outset. […] all must share the 
place that has been marked out and keep each other in place (Irigaray 1985a:164). 
As discussed earlier, Irigaray demonstrates how Aristotle’s teleology of actualities and potentialities acts 
as a restriction upon growth that not only specifies clear ends (determined by a universal philosophy) but 
also prevents deviations from these ends. In addition, the fear of fluidity or messiness manifests itself as 
a denial of an infinite regression with the introduction of a first cause, rather than letting thought and 
substance regress to the “prime matter” of the maternal body. In other words, development-through-
teleology or “[t]he same re-marking itself – more or less – would thus produce the other, whose function 
in the differentiation would be neglected, forgotten. Or else carried back into mere extrapolation, into 
the infinity” (Irigaray, 1985a:21). 
Many of these most important points are drawn together in a massively dense yet short one-page essay 
in Speculum, titled The Cards Turned Over, almost all of which is quoted here: 
Thus Freud discovers – in a sort of blind reversal of repressions – certain variously disguised 
cards that are kept preserved or stored away and that lie beneath the hierarchy of values of 
the game, of all the games: the desire for the same, for the self-identical, the self (as) same, 
and again of the similar, the alter ego and, to put it in a nutshell, the desire for the auto…the 
homo…the male, dominates the representational economy.41 “Sexual difference” is a 
derivation of the problematics of sameness, it is, now and forever, determined within the 
project, the projection, the sphere of representation, of the same. The “differentiation” into 
two sexes derives from the a priori assumption of the same, since the little man that the 
little girl is, must become a man minus certain attributes whose paradigm is morphological – 
attributes capable of determining, of assuring, the reproduction-specularisation of the same. 
A man minus the possibility of (re)presenting oneself as a man = a normal woman. In this 
proliferating desire of the same, death will be the only representative of an outside, of a 
heterogeneity, of an other: woman will assume the function of representing death (Irigaray, 
1985a:26-27). 
In Freud, Irigaray discovers the function of the origin as a void or lack – the exit from the maternal womb 
and the break from maternal mucous, membranes, and darkness (1985a:40). Since a lack cannot suffice 
in the traditional order as an origin, the notion of “lack” must represent a fault in representation 
(1985a:42), that must be filled and replaced with the masculine phallus. The phallus, the symbol of male 
law and language since it represents self-identity, self-reference, and by extension conceptual coherence, 
thus appropriates the very idea of “origin” and replicates itself there. Women cannot desire a return to 
                                                 
40 Resulting from the patriarchal assertion of binaries without “spaces” or “intermediaries”; consider the Law 
of Non-contradiction or the Excluded Middle. 
41 I will reserve comments on Irigaray’s treatment of homosexuality for section 3.1. Ethical Implications. Suffice 
it to say here that Irigaray does not draw a distinction in her own writings between homosexuality as a sexual 
and romantic orientation, and homosexuality in the sense of patriarchal homosociality, or monosexuality. The 
only comment I could find by Irigaray on this distinction appears, revealingly I think, outside her work in an 
interview when asked about the matter. Here Irigaray does in fact distinguish between homosexuality and 
homosociality as defined above, and she states the use of “hom(m)osexuality” as her preferred term for 
homosociality or monosexuality (Hirsh et al., 1995:112). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
35 
 
the mother or origin because they themselves are the space where such reproduction and return 
happens, at the disposal of men; and moreover, since to desire is to desire the phallus, women can have 
no relation with their mothers because their mothers are castrated or inferior men (on the male model) 
(1985a:68). 
Irigaray thus finds binary differentiation and the expression of female sexuality in terms of the masculine, 
in the Western tradition. For instance, the notion that sperm actively seeks out the egg, and that men 
actively penetrate women in mimetic reference to this biological event (Irigaray, 1985a:15), that any 
aggressive activity on the part of the female is always limited to the facilitation of procreation, or else by 
permission of the male (1985a:17-18), that valorised female traits such as breastfeeding and motherhood 
are in service of “restoring the man” or caring for his child, and that girls therefore have no value before 
sexual maturity (1985a:25), and that women are men without penises (1985a:26). The conclusion Irigaray 
identifies and critiques in the Freudian theory is that any “unfeminine” active behaviour on the part of 
women is relegated to masochism and hysteria without receiving such negative treatment when it is 
displayed by men (1985a:20). In other words, sexual differentiation (and the notion of differentiation in 
general) is covertly premised on the value of sameness, of one; or as Irigaray so succinctly puts it, “the 
other is always the other of the same” (1995:10). The male, then, is at once both the one (the masculine 
universal) and the bisexual, or indeed everything, since all other values are subsumed under it.42 
The singular at one point, at this point, has become necessary in reconstructing the whole, 
and lays down the general grounds whereby the universal may be reaffirmed within a 
system […] But the singular, it must be admitted, is of a particular kind here: it is the thinking 
substance that, moreover, turns back upon itself and fastens up the circle of its subjectivity 
(Irigaray, 1985a:180). 
Reading Descartes in the extract above, Irigaray finds, again, the self-referential logic-of-the-one which 
seeks to reaffirm universal truth through a circular appeal to itself as the originator of meaning. Yet she 
also finds an apparent contradiction in this case of petitio principii insofar as the masculine subject 
attempts to speak in universal terms when it can only speak from the perspective of a corporeally 
particular subject, and one that moreover tries to deny its own particularity. 
To build this construction [a scientific representation of nature], man was, of course, obliged 
to draw on reserves still in the realm of nature […] But this initial period of cooperative 
creation is forgotten in an arrogant claim to sovereign discretion over everything (Irigaray, 
1985a:204). 
Turning her attention to Kant in the above quote, Irigaray notes how the categories of mind imposed 
upon the world as an appeal to human/male/universal order over nature, must themselves, 
paradoxically, come from nature and ultimately represent a rejection of the natural/maternal at the 
hands of the classifying philosopher; yet again there is an erasure of the corporeal origin of “purely” 
intellectual categories. This is in keeping with her reading of the “forgetting of origins” we encountered 
with Plato’s Cave. 
Elsewhere, Irigaray also identifies, and strongly resists, the logic-of-the-one in the work of Lacan, where it 
manifests as the negation or sacrifice of materiality and difference in favour of organised discourse 
(Caldwell, 2002:22). For Lacan, chaotic differences in materiality must be subjected to a single “master 
signifier” (the symbolic, or law of the father) in order for intersubjective spaces of signification to arise. 
This “castration” amounts to not only a denial of valuable corporeal differences, but also to the 
dominance of masculine speech, a situation which is clearly not conducive to the expression and 
development of female subjectivity Irigaray desires. This is a prime example of the manner in which the 
psychoanalytic and linguistic nature of the symbolic order as theorised by Freud and Lacan, and as 
instantiated in the history of Western politics, denies the possibility of being a woman and rationally 
                                                 
42 With the exception, Irigaray notes, of masochism and passive homosexuality (1985a:23) since these too 
closely resemble the function of the female. 
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speaking subject at the same time.43 Importantly, Irigaray does not claim that the woman is 
unrepresentable or unspeakable here out of constructionist or eliminativist concerns (that is, because the 
referent does not exist, as is the eventual argument of this thesis), but rather for the opposite reasons. 
She claims that the referent does exist within the fluid “specificity of unspecificity” of the liminal and 
negated. The woman remains unrepresentable in the original phallocentric logos because there she is a 
mere negation of the male universal and a means of exchange; she occupies a position that cannot be 
spoken in current language (Irigaray, 1985a:140) because she has no terms of her own, to adapt Virginia 
Woolf’s phrase. We cannot speak about women with any accuracy in our present language, and women 
themselves cannot speak or attain positions of cultural authority (Irigaray, 1985a:43; 1993:107; 2007:98) 
without sacrificing their feminine subjectivity. In short, there are no symbolic spaces (and therefore 
linguistic, legal, cultural spaces) where women44 can grow to the full extent required by their processual, 
rhythmic nature (embodiment). Psychoanalytically, we might say that unlike Lacan, Irigaray does not view 
symbolic categories as inherently limiting and repressive, and sexual identity as necessarily problematic 
and inconsistent (Stone, 2009:12); hence she sees no problem in principle with the need for and use of 
symbolic categories as means of developing and expressing sexual identity. 
Perhaps most fundamentally, Irigaray identifies the fact that the logic-of-the-one destroys the difference 
between being and thinking, being and talking: “Our culture is grounded entirely on logic, where being 
and thinking coincide and there is no room for a knowledge of life and of the relation” (Irigaray & 
Lotringer, 2000b:137), where “relation” refers to an intersubjective exchange not limited to the 
patriarchal subject(male)-object(female) model. By treating abstract representations as synonymous with 
(or at least as truer than) phenomenological embodied experience, the logic of the one (best typified as 
the male universal, or the singular self-identity of the penis) destroys the space between word and 
referent necessary for critical distance. In other words, the traditional logic does not draw a neat 
distinction between representation and reality (that critical distance necessary for any representation or 
proposition to be falsifiable or verifiable) since it sets up phallic appropriation as the very condition under 
which truth is enacted, by equating specific phallic attributes with the truth and validity of concepts and 
denying the variable materiality beneath those concepts.45 Language is thus phallic. In some ways then, 
patriarchal logic directly denies the possibility of being wrong. Discussing the Ancient Greek mind-set, 
Siedentop concurs with our reading of Irigaray and arrives at a very similar conclusion in near identical 
language to Irigaray’s, although for slightly different reasons. As Siedentop puts it: “Hence there was no 
ontological gap between thought and action” (2015:36). But “[o]f course, the faculty of speech and 
reason – logos – carried with it another possibility: disagreement […] men could disagree about how 
words were to be used” (2015:38). By its very nature representation (in whatever form, whether images, 
letters, or mathematical symbols) constantly challenges us with the possibility of being wrong or 
incomplete, and therefore threatens to shatter the illusion of a total isomorphism between logos/nomos 
and physis, and thus also to shatter the power of phallocentric rationality. Yet starting in Ancient Greece, 
Siedentop notes how such a threat was construed not necessarily as a matter of truth or of the logos 
indeed being incorrect, but rather as one of character and virtue: “When such things happened, the polis 
had become corrupt. The domestic sphere had come to overwhelm the public sphere, alone the sphere 
of nobility” (2015:38). Historically, the nomos of the Western tradition thus protected logos by branding 
                                                 
43 As seeming proof of her claim, Irigaray was ostracised from the Lacanian community for her (feminine) views 
and relieved of her university post by committee members named by none other than Jacques Lacan himself 
(Irigaray, 1985b: 158,167; Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:187). 
44 Or any sexuate being, I would like to argue. I will make the point in section 3.2. that the patriarchal ideal of 
masculinity does not grant men the possibility of fully realising their subjectivity either, by limiting it to clichés 
of aggression and competition, and moreover cisgender, heterosexual stereotypes. 
45 Let us remember the privilege accorded to concepts that denote presence, rigidity, and self-identity, 
drawing, in both the patriarchal model and Irigaray’s own view (as we will see in section 2.1.), on the 
phenomenology of the penis, which displays similar traits. That is, a language and logic derived from bodily 
specificity. Irigaray identifies this feature within the patriarchal logic, but as we will see, she retains it in 
developing her own theory of two sexed subjects, where each has a language and subjectivity derived from 
the features of their body. 
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“misappropriations” of language, norms, and reason as an isolated failure on the part of the individual 
who lacked virtue rather than an indication of a larger problem with the standard of reason itself. 
This is not only an epistemic and empirical problem, but also an ethical one. Irigaray also finds evidence 
of this solipsistic isomorphism46 in Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”, which as we saw in 1.1. traces its 
origins to Plato, and in this section, follows Plato and Aristotle in denying the return to a darkened, 
mysterious, maternal body, represented in Plato as the rejection of the Cave (womb) and in Aristotle as 
the rejection of infinite regress (disruptive fluidity). 
If the premises of reasoning are necessary in the work of Aristotle, if the infinite has to be 
cancelled in favour of the prior status of a substance that ensures that the relation of 
subjectum to predicate is applied across the board, with no space left for indeterminacy, it is 
the conclusion that emerges as irrefutable in Descartes (Irigaray, 1985a:180). 
Irigaray argues that Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” is the denial of distance and difference between 
thinking and being, representation and reality, that establishes the singular male subject as the thinking 
subject and, by means of that relation, as that which exists. Being, thinking, and (masculine) self-identity 
are thus tied together at a single point:  
Everything can be put in doubt, (it is) I (who) doubt(s), therefore (it is) I (who) am. The 
relation to the universality of being of the thinking subject and speaking “I” is then assured. 
[…] Representation here is auto-affective, auto-affecting solipsism. It embroiders its dream 
of potentiality alone in its chamber, indifferent, at least for a while, to the rest of (its) history 
that is still being woven. All alone with an ever cautious negativism, it cuts up and reworks 
the subject’s links to his archives (Irigaray, 1985a:181-182). 
Meaning that, on Irigaray’s reading, the logic-of-the-one achieves such a level of singularity, folded in 
upon itself, that it erases the origin of its own mechanism (the maternal body), the other value on its own 
terms, through its binary negation thereof. In other words, it conceals the act of negation which allows it 
to function, by assuming the existence of the disembodied, rational, male subject, and only that subject. 
This erasure is more profound than simply keeping the other as a negation within the binary. In his 
Meditations Descartes writes the following:  
Nor should I think that I perceive the infinite not by a true idea but only by negation of the 
finite, as I perceive rest and darkness by the negation of motion and light; for on the 
contrary, I manifestly understand that there is more reality in infinite than in finite 
substance, and that therefore the perception of the infinite in me must be in some way prior 
to that of the finite (Descartes, 2008:32-33). 
And Kant after him concludes his definition of matter in Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science with 
a rejection of the notion of empty space or vacuum: 
And so ends the metaphysical doctrine of body with the empty, and therefore the 
inconceivable, wherein it shares the same fate as all other attempts of reason, when it 
strives after the first grounds of things in a retreat to principles – where, since its very nature 
entails that it can never conceive anything, except insofar as it is determined under given 
conditions, and since it can therefore neither come to a halt at the conditioned nor make the 
unconditioned comprehensible, nothing is left to it (Kant, 2004:104). 
Kant ends his discussion on the possibility of “empty space” in any absolute sense existing with a negative 
indication.47 For Kant, empty space in any absolute sense is something reason cannot grasp; note too his 
use of “first grounds” being inaccessible, which should remind us again of Irigaray’s reading of Plato’s 
Cave and the rejection of the “first grounds” of the Cave/maternal womb. In Irigaray’s words, 
“[e]verything has to be (re)invented to avoid the vacuum” (Irigaray, 1985a:228), where the “vacuum” can 
be taken to refer to the notion of the interval or “space between” subjects who are different. The logic-
                                                 
46 Again, “solipsistic” referring to self-identity and self-reference within the logic of the patriarchal language 
(and the male subjectivity), and “isomorphism” referring to the conflation of being and thinking. 
47 Pun intended. 
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of-the-one erases any authentic origin (such as the maternal/womb/space/vacuum) and replaces it 
immediately (since there can be no gaps or vacuums) with itself, replicated over and over (the “I” of pure 
reason who perceives himself thinking and thus, by knowing rather than experiencing a body, exists). This 
then is perhaps Irigaray’s most important point and the key to understanding her diagnosis in this 
exposition: matter or corporeality is not merely represented as the opposite of masculine reason, nor for 
that matter (pun intended) is it merely represented as the absence or lack of masculine solidity; it is 
erased entirely as a point of reference to the extent that the Western logos need only ever refer to itself. 
In the Western binary tradition then, values sometimes exist as hierarchical opposites (for example 
reason/body), more often as negations (reason/not-reason), and most cruelly as unrepresentable 
absences (reason/the void), figured as feminine. Irigaray describes this leap away from material ground 
toward abstracted self-referential universality in evocative language, highlighting the old question of 
representation and reality, and the neglected position of the other: 
And even as man seeks to rise higher and higher – in his knowledge too – so the ground 
fractures more and more beneath his feet. “Nature” is forever dodging his projects of 
representation, of reproduction. […] Where will the other spring up again? Where will the 
risk be situated which sublates the subject’s passion for remaining ever and again the same, 
for affirming himself ever and again the same? (Irigaray, 1985a:134-135). 
In summary, the traditional Western worldview consists of a representational order of binaries in which 
negated terms are (de)valued by being presented in terms of sameness. The traditional logos is thus 
premised upon an overlooked lack, and as we have seen this lack is figured as the feminine. But it is not 
simply a lack of the feminine, but an insistence that lack itself is the feminine; and since the metaphysics 
of solids “abhors a vacuum” and therefore the feminine, the ambiguous, the unrepresentable, figured as 
the negated lack (or other) of the masculine, the “other of the same”, such a lack must be written out 
and replaced with repetitive self-identity. The order thus perpetuates itself, and erases its genesis, which 
for all men is nonetheless the maternal womb. Furthermore, these binary categories of reality are sexed 
and thus appropriate the feminine body and experience, the female subjectivity, as a variation of the 
masculine universal. We might then say that the traditional Western logic is based on the suppression of 
space – vacuum or space between matter in Classical Mechanics, space between human bodies 
necessary for them to be different rather than the same, ethical space between presuming to know the 
other as other and speaking for them instead, space between the possibility of anything outside the 
bivalence of x and not-x, and space between word and object. 
For ease of reference, from now on we will call the traditional Western epistemology (and the language it 
is encoded in), which is only capable of self-reference, can describe the rules of its own consistency,48 and 
operates according to the logic-of-the-one, “Epistemology W” (“W” for “Western”). We shall use this 
term to refer to Irigaray’s notion of binary, self-identical, phallocentric, and negational rationality; and we 
shall also use it to refer to the particular metaphysical worldview generated and accessed by this logic. 
That is to say, “Epistemology W” refers not simply to the epistemic method of representation, but also to 
the list of representations and their content as well; the conception of the cosmos (“reality”) as much as 
the conception of logos producing it (“representation”). 49  
                                                 
48 We shall leave aside Gödel’s mathematical proofs of inherent incompleteness and Tarski’s introduction of 
disquotation and metalanguages to deal with truth predicates. 
 
49 Rather than insert this very long note into the main text, I decided to keep it as a footnote (at least 
ceremonially if not practically) since the purpose of Chapter 1 is to provide a sympathetic exposition of Irigaray 
rather than raise objections. Yet the points raised in this note are immediately relevant to her historical 
treatment of Western philosophers and therefore do not belong elsewhere in the thesis. Here, then, these 
supplementary points must be placed. 
 
Not all thinkers were consistent or unwitting performers of the patriarchal logic-of-the-one, and it would be 
unfair to paint them entirely with the same brush. Locke was at least aware of the solipsistic, self-
referentialism and erasure of the origin of the hegemonic logos as an object of its own critique. Locke opens 
his Essay Concerning Human Understanding with the following: “[I]t is the Understanding that sets Man above 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
the rest of sensible Beings […] The Understanding, like the Eye, whilst it makes us see, and perceive all other 
Things, takes no notice of itself: And it requires Art and Pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own 
Object” (2008:13). This is not to say Locke identified the logic-of-the-one, but he was certainly aware of the 
circularity involved in cognition reflecting upon itself; Irigaray simply takes this circularity further for us by 
identifying it as the basis of a social order. The imagery used by Locke in this quote is also important, since we 
will be exploring the role of sight in the next section. 
 
Similarly, returning to the Cartesian cogito and arguably the crux of Irigaray’s diagnosis, Descartes’ Meditations 
was the target of several objections by such luminaries as Hobbes and Gassendi. Hobbes objected, on what we 
might now recognise as surprisingly Irigarayan terms, that “the thinking thing is something bodily; for it seems 
that the subject of any act can be understood only in bodily or material terms. […] For ‘I am thinking’ is not 
inferred from another thought […] Since, therefore, the knowledge of this proposition ‘I exist’ depends on the 
knowledge of this one, ‘I am thinking’; and the knowledge of the latter on the fact that we cannot separate the 
act of thought from the matter that thinks, it seems that the inference should be that a thinking thing is 
material rather than immaterial” (Hobbes, in Descartes, 2008:108-109). Hobbes here not only insists that the 
thinking being is first a thinking body, but also objects to precisely the same circular, solipsistic self-
referentialism as Irigaray does (“‘I am thinking’ is not inferred from another thought”). For Hobbes, existence is 
not demonstrated by an endless ratiocination (“how do you know that you know that you know that you are 
knowing?” (2008:108)), but rather from the apodictic experience of the act itself. Of course, Hobbes’ “body” is 
not Irigaray’s “body”; he was a deterministic materialist and his objections to the logic-of-the-one still fall prey 
to the metaphysics of solids. But it would be worth Irigaray’s time to consider the possibility that the Western 
tradition cannot be treated as entirely uniform and phallocentric at all points, and that some of her objections 
may have been raised by earlier thinkers (men, no less) despite this not being sufficiently acknowledged in her 
work. 
 
Lastly, we should certainly remember that in more recent times the Munchhausen Trilemma has also raised 
the problem of epistemology being self-referential and universal truth unattainable (among other issues). For 
an early treatment of the Trilemma, see Popper (2002:86-87). Indeed, canonical work published decades 
before Irigaray by analytic logicians such as Gödel (incompleteness and inconsistency of mathematics), Tarski 
(undefinability of truth), and Quine (inscrutability of reference), unsettled the formalism of Epistemology W 
from within and unseated the dream of coherence. (These dramatic changes have received no 
acknowledgement from Irigaray, however.) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
40 
 
1.3. HISTORICAL PATRIARCHY (ETHICAL) 
Woman, for her part, remains in unrealised potentiality – unrealised, at least, for/by herself. 
Is she, by nature, a being that exists for/by another? (Irigaray, 1985a:165). 
I remember four women of my boyhood: my mother, my cousin Inez, Emma, and Ide Fuller. 
They represented the problem of the widow, the wife, the maiden, and the outcast. […] They 
existed not for themselves, but for men: they were named after the men to whom they were 
related and not after the fashion of their own souls. They were not beings, they were 
relations and these relations were enfilmed with mystery and secrecy (Du Bois, 2016:95). 
As we have seen, Irigaray demonstrates how the phallocentric universalism of self-identical, positive 
presence, expressed in the metaphysics of “solids” and the logic of the “one”, permeates the Western 
tradition and systematically writes an entire set of values epitomised by the female body, such as nature, 
darkness, ambiguity, and fluidity, out of the symbolic order and ultimately out of legitimate lived 
expression. The creation of this lack, then, is really the creation of an attempt to negate the female.50 
Irigaray thus shows us how that which starts off as a seemingly innocuous system of neutral descriptions 
ranging from language, reason, and culture to ontology, physics, and nature evolves into a set of 
normative prescriptions, since its supposed neutrality is premised on the selective and arbitrary negation 
of certain embodied values and the creation of a devalued lack or non-space. These empirical and 
epistemological assumptions invade the last and most human of categories, the ethical; and so we arrive 
at the institution of patriarchy. 
We have already seen how the elemental, changing cosmology of the Pre-Socratic philosophers was 
superseded by the rationalist discourse of Plato, with an emphasis on mind over matter and reason over 
sensation, and the way this manifested in Classical Mechanics. In those discussions, we followed Irigaray 
in exploring the Western treatment of both the concrete and the abstract, but only as pertaining to 
objects; in other words the cosmos, and the mind, language, and reason capable of describing the reality 
of the cosmos; respectively, the metaphysics of solids and the logic-of-the-one. Yet we must remember 
that for Irigaray this tradition is sexed and enacts the disembodiment of human subjects.51 The binary 
logic-of-the-one treats the (feminine) negated value as a relation of the first, original, “One”, and 
establishes (masculine) solidity and presence as the essence of being, as opposed to ambiguity, fluidity, 
and becoming (as the lack of masculine order and reason).52 It is now time to turn from objects to 
subjects and identify the ways in which this phallocentric tradition treats a different kind of matter, the 
matter of the human body, and the way “[t]elos, finally, [is] inscribed in the psyche” (Irigaray, 1985a:320). 
The advent of the Christian tradition, no doubt drawing on Plato’s metaphysical dualism, shifted 
discourse away from the matter of the cosmos towards the matter of the human body, and with the 
introduction of a new normative concept, established the body as the site of sin, and thus as something 
solely to be transcended53 (Mottier, 2008:19), usually through abstinence or finally through death.54 
                                                 
50 We will see in Chapter 2 that Irigaray aims to overcome the issue of negation by introducing a female 
subject. Though she does not merely repeat the desire of the (male) metaphysics of solids in constructing a 
present, self-identical female, she nonetheless attempts to define the female subject according to specific set 
properties. 
51 Sexed insofar as the logic-of-the-one aligns certain concepts with the male or female, and moreover derives 
its valued concepts from a predominantly male body. “Enacts disembodiment” insofar as it uses these 
concepts, or the negation of the concepts, to deny a voice and lived expression of certain bodies, especially 
the female body. 
52 All the while, paradoxically, denying that the male reason and language is tied to the messiness of the male 
body. 
53 Interestingly, in line with Irigaray’s thought it could be argued that all eschatological modes of religious 
reasoning presuppose metaphysical dualism of some sort, starting perhaps with the expendability and sacrifice 
of the “inferior” material body. This binary division is after all necessary for setting up one realm as preferable 
to another, and for bringing about a fundamental cosmological change or attainment of something else. 
Change and possibility here are dependent on the divine (masculine?) prerogative (the apocalypse), and the 
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Nonetheless Foucault points out that the passage between paganism and Christianity is not simplistically 
marked by a change from excess to asceticism (Foucault, 1992:15-16). Even so, in the Christian tradition 
there was indeed “a codification of sexual acts that would become more and more specific, and the 
development of a hermeneutics of desire” (1992:92). 
Tying in with the death of the body over the course of Western philosophy, so to speak, we can now 
answer an urgent question that has only received brief mention in the previous two sections with such 
words as “sacrifice” and “death”: since the two main trends Irigaray identifies (solid metaphysics and 
binary logic of sameness) are merely descriptive,55 how do these translate into normative practices? We 
would after all not be justified in condemning the Western tradition unless we could demonstrate that its 
outlook is ethically problematic and not just empirically incomplete. One answer has already been 
discussed, and it is the fact that the “neutral” descriptions of Epistemology W are sexed. Thus by 
classifying reality and hierarchizing those types (bodies),56 it implicitly devalues certain bodies, such as 
the female body, meaning that ostensibly neutral descriptions of reality are often coded prescriptions 
about human subjects, since the language is sexed and devalues the female sex. But there is a more 
compelling answer, and we must briefly state it explicitly. The answer lies in the fact that Epistemology W 
aligns itself with presence (consider the erect penis), being, and life; and sets up the female as absence 
(consider the vagina as a ‘hole’ (Irigaray, 1985a:71)), non-being, and death (1985a:26-27,141). Therefore, 
because woman is the “No Thing” and occupies a space on the other side of being – death, or simply a 
non space – anything can be done to her firstly because she is already “dead”, and secondly, since the 
reigning representational order cannot describe her body, her desires, or any injustice that may be done 
towards her.57 As Irigaray puts it, “[t]he death of consciousness (and) of sex is necessary to achieve a 
dialectical progression through phallic sublimation” (1985a:111). Irigaray suggests that the death or 
removal of any means of being able to think or be conscious about one’s own body in its sexual specificity 
(achieved by devaluing, negating, and “forgetting” the concepts and language capable of describing such 
a body), is necessary for the phallic order, or patriarchal logic-of-the-one, to complete its appropriation of 
the subject as only a male subject. The concept of man as being, life, and ontology itself, and woman as 
death, therefore supplies the bridge of conceptual architecture that links the abstract descriptive to the 
socially prescriptive and gives the phallic tradition its force in practice.  
The anthropological question now is: how do men and women relate to one another within the 
patriarchal confines of Epistemology W that not only describes but prescribes and proscribes? How does 
Epistemology W map over subjects in practice? Irigaray notes how, from the outset, society is organised 
according to phallic self-referentialism in a way that excludes women except as commodities. Classic 
contract theory, which describes an escape from “the anarchy (?) of the natural world, the randomness 
(?) of the animal kingdom [requires] passage into the social order, into the symbolic order” (Irigaray, 
                                                                                                                                                       
ascending redemption of the disembodied soul from the sinful body. Eschatology is based on the end of the 
body. 
54 As a contrary study, it would be interesting to investigate the role of the body in religious ecstasy. It has 
been recorded that women (and men) who displayed “ecstatic visions, mystical lactations [and] stigmata” 
were revered by the Church in Medieval times (Shilling, 2016:30). Here then we have a convergence of the 
female, the flesh, the fluid, the (masculine?) divine, and respect, in contrast to the traditional devaluing of the 
body as read by Irigaray. Modern day accounts of weeping and bleeding statues are no less common. 
Certainly, sensuality occurs in famous examples such as Bernini’s sculpture Ecstasy of St Teresa (which depicts 
divine revelation as, essentially, orgasmic; Irigaray herself mentions and contests this (1985b:90-91)), and 
Caravaggio’s painting St Francis in Ecstasy (which depicts homoeroticism respectably coded in vulnerability and 
tenderness). The rigid logic and metaphysics of the Western tradition (masculine) sometimes viewed 
(ambiguously sexed) excesses of the body (feminine) as the surest indicators of, paradoxically, the presence of 
the male god. One Irigarayan way to dismiss this counter-reading would be to describe such instances as the 
fetishisation of bodily experiences (the commodification of pleasure) or the employment of the female orgasm 
in service of the masculine. 
55 One being a cosmology (reality) and the other an account of reason (representation). 
56 And all other concepts as well. 
57 One could argue that this mechanism sheds some light on the epistemology of rape. However I do not think 
it can account for male-male rape. 
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1985b:170), which, as we have already seen at length, is sexed male in its concepts and so responds only 
to male desires.58 The unpredictability, fluidity, and corporeal animality of the “state of nature” 
represents the feminine that is negated in favour of the ordered, rational, and disembodied masculine 
state, under the binary logic-of-the-one. “[T]he passage from nature to culture thus amounts to the 
institution of the reign of hom(m)o-sexuality” (Irigaray, 1985b:171). Within this representational order, in 
which women have no symbolic position, no acknowledged lived experience, and ultimately no voice, 
they are reduced to the functions of male desire and the male template of sexuality; since they cannot be 
subjects on their own terms, the prevailing discourse begins by setting up an economy in which they can 
only be objects. In such a homo/monosexual “society of men among themselves” (1985b:161), women 
become nothing more than “the matter used for the imprint of forms” (Irigaray, 1985a:141)59 and thus 
the self-perpetuation of the male genealogy. Consider, for instance, the tradition of marking the wife 
with the male name, passing on only the male name to children, and passing privileges such as 
inheritance and titles to only male children. Hence also the unspoken desire for “the male heir” to 
continue this ad infinitum. The mechanised, industrialised, capitalist society (metaphysics of solids) 
established by the linear, univalent patriarchal order (logic-of-the-one) means that man “will mark the 
product of copulation with his own name. Thereby woman […] becomes the anonymous worker, the 
machine in the service of a master-proprietor who will put his trademark upon the finished product” 
(Irigaray, 1985a:23).60 In such a system, the most important role accorded to women, marriage, becomes 
(firstly) an exchange of commodities in an economics that takes place (secondly) between men (thirdly) 
for a price, the dowry (1985a:121-122). When women are thus “exchanged” between men, they must be 
further reduced to the male paradigm by being abstracted as values in order to be commodified. As 
Irigaray states, 
[t]he exchange operation cannot take place in terms of some intrinsic, immanent value of 
the commodity. It can only come about when two objects – two women – are in a relation of 
equality with a third term that is neither the one nor the other. It is thus not as ‘women’ that 
they are exchanged, but as women reduced to some common feature –their current price in 
gold or phalluses (Irigaray, 1985b:175). 
The erasure of subjectivity is complete. Women become objects or numbers within an already 
mathematised social schema in which the terms are set by men, denying the possibility of agency for 
women. Moreover, this “abstract and universal value preserves them from use and exchange among 
themselves” (1985b:181), because they are given value by men, and otherwise-valueless commodities 
cannot form between themselves a community. Notably, this denies the possibility of relating among 
themselves, which would no doubt be particularly problematic for, say, female homosexuals. In the face 
of all this, Irigaray dryly notes that “’[p]enis-envy’ would represent, would be the only effective 
representation of woman’s desire to enter into symbolic exchange as a ‘subject’ and raise woman from 
her status as a mere ‘commodity’” (1985a:56), since this would grant her some agency and desire of her 
“own”. Yet it means, again, that she is engaging in a masculine discourse that (incorrectly) describes her 
desire only as a lack of the masculine. Here then, is Irigaray’s diagnosis of the way the Western worldview 
manifests in a patriarchal society: “This type of social system can be interpreted as the practical 
                                                 
58 “[D]esire will henceforth pass through the discourse-desire-law of men’s desire. “You will be my woman-
mother, my wife […] You will be for me the possibility of repeating-representing-appropriating the/my relation 
to the origin”” (Irigaray, 1985a:42). 
59 The procreative imprint of male forms; that is, bearing children. “Forms” here also echoes Plato. The 
“matter” (earth) of the female body is merely a shadow or space where the superior “forms” (functions of the 
male order) can find expression. 
60 This should remind us of our discussion of the logic-of-the-one, especially with regards to Plato and 
Descartes. It represents the erasure of the origin – the earth, womb, cave, or mother – in favour of self-
replication by the (masculine) subject. Theweleit (1989:160) gives a description of this mechanised, replicating 
economy in very similar terms: “The ‘new man’ sired in the drill […] owes allegiance only to the machine that 
bore him. He is a true child of the drill-machine, created without the help of a woman, parentless. His 
associations and relationships bind him instead to other specimens of the new man, with whom he allows 
himself to be united to form the macromachine troop. All others belong only ‘under’ him – never alongside, 
behind, or in front”. 
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realisation of the meta-physical” (1985b:189). But there also exist other exchanges and relations 
between subjects where Irigaray traces the function of Epistemology W, for instance in the act of the 
gaze, which we will deal with after the following quotes on the importance of the gaze in the (male) 
philosophical tradition: 
By nature, all men long to know. An indication is their delight in the senses. For these, quite 
apart from their utility, are intrinsically delightful, and that through the eyes more than the 
others. For it is not only with a view to action but also when we have no intention to do 
anything that we choose, so to speak, sight rather than all the others. And the reason for this 
is that sight is the sense that especially produces cognition in us and reveals many 
distinguishing features of things (Aristotle, 2004:4). 
Lastly, to leave where Love beginneth, who discerneth not that the eye is the most affecting 
sense?  (Bacon, 2008:33). 
Because Sight, the most comprehensive of all our senses, conveying to our Minds the Ideas 
of Light and Colours, which are peculiar only to that Sense; and also the far different Ideas of 
Space, Figure, and Motion (Locke, 2008:85). 
First – The Other looks at me and as such he holds the secret of my being, he knows what I 
am. Thus the profound meaning of my being is outside of me, imprisoned in an absence 
(Sartre, 2003:385). 
In tracing the universalised logic of negation within the ethical context of bodily inter/subjectivity, 
Irigaray finds further examples of the lack (or negation and denial of space, ambiguity, change) within the 
visual field (Grosz, 1994:106; Whitford, 1991:108). The gaze epitomises, for Irigaray, the phallocentric 
relation between subjects and bodies resulting from the metaphysics and epistemology outlined in the 
previous two sections. 
In Freud for example, Irigaray traces the relationship between subjectivity and negation/lack to the gaze 
in penis envy. The young girl’s awareness of herself and of sexual (in)difference begins with the visual 
realisation of an absence in her body and a presence in the other (the male). In return, for both herself 
and others, “[s]he exposes, exhibits the possibility of a nothing to see” (Irigaray, 1985a:47), importantly, 
because she is not like man (1985a:48); sight paradoxically exposes her as the absence of anything worth 
gazing upon (in male, patriarchal eyes at least), and thus the gaze (un)makes her. It should be clear how 
this ties in again with the functioning of the metaphysics of solid presence and the binary, negational 
logic-of-the-one. It should also emphasise again the fact that, being an unrepresentable absence in the 
traditional order, Irigaray demonstrates how women have both no medium in which to represent 
themselves (no language, concepts, or law) and no/thing to represent to begin with (since they represent 
a vacancy).61 “Thus woman’s lack of penis and her envy of the penis ensure the function of the negative, 
serve as representations of the negative, in what could be called a phallocentric – or phallotropic – 
dialectic” (1985a:52), ultimately exposing a “defect in this systematics of representation and desire” 
(Irigaray, 1985b:26).62 The result is an erasure of female sexuality, desire, and agency. 
Tying in with Irigaray’s claim about male insularity and autoeroticism, I would like to ask: does man not 
make love to himself if “he will mark the product of copulation with his own name” (Irigaray, 1985a:23)? 
This tendency also demonstrates the functioning of the logic-of-the-one and the erasure of any authentic 
or diverse origin engendered by female motherhood, and the circular self-determination and linear self-
perpetuation of a “new” masculine origin into the future. Moreover, it also suggests that a woman “will 
not masturbate “herself”, but rather a penis equivalent” (Irigaray, 1985a:30), since the clitoris is regarded 
as an inferior penis in the prevailing male (Freudian) paradigm. On Irigaray’s view then, women cannot 
speak or touch themselves as women, and men make love to variations of themselves. 
                                                 
61 For example, the very idea of penis envy already “describe[s] female sexuality as merely the other side or 
even the wrong side of a male sexualism” (Irigaray, 1985a:51). 
62 Irigaray also points out that Oedipus put out his eyes in the myth after sleeping with his own mother. 
“Because it has netiher ‘truth’ nor ‘copies’, nothing of its ‘own’, this (so-called) female sexuality, this woman’s 
sex/organ will blind anyone taken up in its question” (1985a:80). 
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To return to the power relation of the gaze between subjects, Irigaray does not, as far as I am aware, 
anywhere explicitly develop her critique with reference to Jeremy Bentham, but it seems to me, as a 
supplementary contribution to her analysis then, that Bentham’s Enlightenment Panopticon exemplifies 
not one but several of Irigaray’s key diagnoses: the dominance of the visual, of the objectifying 
impersonal, of non-reciprocity, of rationality over irrationality, of self-referentialism, of sanitising and 
omniscient light,63 of uniformity, and of the solipsistic erasure of the hegemony’s working mechanism. 
Here, then, are several key things to note about both the gaze in general, and the gaze as applied to 
Bentham’s famous prison: firstly, the gaze cannot locate or see itself; secondly, the gaze is always 
directed at something rather than with something and cannot be reciprocated in any simple, immediate 
sense (as in, for instance, the caress) (Grosz, 1994:105); thirdly, by acknowledging its own power the 
solipsistic gaze is by definition threatened by the other gaze, or the interiority such a gaze implies, and 
thus denies or avoids other gazes;64 and lastly and perhaps most crucially, the gaze does not require 
contact (Irigaray, 1985a:148). It does not require intimacy with that bodily messiness to which the 
masculine is allegedly so averse, sustaining a (binary) distance between the bodily, fluid, and feminine, 
and the disembodied, analytical, and masculine. 
The essence of it consists, then, in the centrality of the inspector’s situation, combined with 
the well-known and most effectual contrivances for seeing without being seen […] a spot 
from which, without any change of situation, a man may survey, in the same perfection, the 
whole number, and without so much as a change of posture (Bentham, 1995:41).65 
By excluding the gaze of the other, or others, this extrapolated point of view organises and 
projects the world into a paralysed empire. Formalisations of laws laid down in perpetuity, 
logos of the Father (Irigaray, 1985a:339). 
The design of the Panopticon, a circular building containing rows of cells, a central guard post, and a light 
illuminating the cells from the centre, is well-known. By way of explanation then, the Pantopticon 
represents a neat physical manifestation of the various mechanised “design principles” of Epistemology 
W identified by Irigaray, perhaps most tellingly the central, phallic point from which all lines of 
perspective are drawn, yet which erases or denies itself as the one point not subject to scrutiny in much 
the same way as the solipsistic author in Wittgenstein’s thought experiment cannot write himself into the 
book of the world – he is the very condition of possibility and therefore does not exist in the category 
“world” itself (Wittgenstein, 2001:69); which, as we saw earlier, was the defining feature of the anti-
genesis enacted by the logic-of-the-one. The Panopticon is thus the consummate manifestation of 
detached and sanitised oversight,66 and a useful summary of Irigaray’s diagnostic analysis: the regulation 
of bodies and relations through the gaze of surveillance and the structuring of space.67 
 
 
                                                 
63 Both as light within the prison, and an allusion to Enlightenment “light of reason”. 
64 “[T]he relationship to the others of the other […] to the other of the other, anyone who ventures near it will 
be threatened with loss of self (as same) […] the other is the reverse, the negative of the properties of 
sameness; it overflows the unit of self-identity” (Irigaray, 1985a:335). The other as an authentic subject on 
their own terms thus represents a blind spot, and the threat of unknowingness. The (masculine) gaze must 
therefore reject the other and project only itself. 
65 I refer the reader to Bentham’s Panopticon Writings (1995). The descriptions of the Pantopticon are too 
lengthy, and too scattered across his many letters, to quote here. Concluding with Bentham here is at any rate 
intended only as an additional illustration, not as a central exposition. 
66 “Oversight” intended as a pun here: both to “overlook”, “ignore”, or “forget” its messy material origins, and 
to “oversee”, “maintain”, or “supervise” this detachment as a reigning descriptive and normative order. 
67 Theweleit, quoting Rudolf zur Lippe’s account of the aforementioned historical Henry III ballet, refers to the 
increasing regulation of sight as the “geometricization of perception” (2010:317), which should in turn remind 
us of the modern “mechanisation” of the gaze by the sets, tracks, zooms, and cameras of cinematography. 
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In summation, Irigaray’s investigation of the Western tradition demonstrates how its concept of reason is 
covertly self-referential and intolerant of absence or ambiguity, logocentric in its denial of the body, 
monological in its denial of “other” logics, and ultimately monosexual; and how this binary logic of 
negation operates in practice as the underlying logic of discrimination in the metaphysics of positive, 
solid substance and the ethics of male universalism. Her diagnosis thus identifies the pervasive and 
covert structuring of society on the basis of the logic-of-the-one, resulting in a monosubjective (Irigaray, 
1995:12) world of men-amongst-themselves, in which the feminine is sacrificed as a subject with 
speaking terms, the maternal origin is erased in favour of self-identity and self-replication, and women 
only exist as commodities within a masculine economy of exchange. This concludes the first chapter, 
which served to contextualise and introduce her work both by grounding it historically and by providing 
the diagnostic reasons for her solution to be discussed in Chapter 2 below. We will again apply our three-
pronged method in organising the material ahead. For ease of reference, we shall call Irigaray’s solution, 
still to be defined, “Epistemology I” (“I” for “Irigaray”) in contrast to Epistemology W. 
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2. CHAPTER 2: A SOLUTION: IRIGARAY’S SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 
Deconstructing the patriarchal tradition is certainly indispensable, but it is hardly enough. It 
is necessary to define new values directly or indirectly suitable to feminine subjectivity and 
to feminine identity (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:10). 
Social justice, and especially sexual justice, cannot be achieved without changing the laws of 
language and the conceptions of truths and values structuring the social order (Irigaray, 
2007:14). 
First the level that requires both a long-term perspective and an immediate response: 
changing the forms of symbolic mediation. This means, for example, changing not only the 
rules of speech and language […] but also the habitual use of images that tend to portray 
men as respectable citizens […] and consider women to be sexual property at the disposal of 
men (Irigaray, 1994:xvi). 
In the second phase comprising her later work, Irigaray develops an alternative cosmology or theory of 
nature as a response to the ontological shortcomings in the metaphysics of solids found from Plato 
onwards, and as a response to the additional tendency to favour abstract rationality and representation 
over the corporeal substance of lived experience under the logic-of-the-one, both of which favoured a 
world of masculine mono-subjectivity. Her aim is to rehabilitate and redeem the negated, devalued 
feminine attributes written out as a lack under patriarchy, and positively reassert them not as 
replacements for men’s own values, but as revalued attributed for women on equal footing in a duality, 
rather than a binary68 – “A and B” rather than “A and not-A” (Deutscher, 2002:31-32). In doing so, she 
finds some common ground with the Pre-Socratics and, Alison Stone has argued, with German Romantic 
thinkers such as Hölderlin (Stone, 2009:8,41), the former of which is understandable given their emphasis 
on change and tactility, and the latter given the Post-Enlightenment emphasis on sentiment, the sublime, 
nature, and holism. Through Irigaray’s diagnostic critique of Epistemology W, we have seen that the 
various social injustices women have been subjected to are the result of a symbolic (and consequently 
practical, lived) denial of intermediate and potentialising space. Since the potential presence of a 
disruptive, insurmountable “space” or negative between subjects in turn directly denies the possibility of 
oppressive binaries and sameness, and since the most direct way to realise space is through an assertion 
of different subjectivities, Irigaray’s solution is to set up a system of absolute difference where such 
difference is non-hierarchical (non-vertical) and non-binary, and thus horizontal and dual instead – a 
negative between subjects that cannot be collapsed into one in a Hegelian synthesis. This would 
overcome the binary sameness of the logic-of-the-one, open a second space for ontologies and 
metaphysics that are not limited to solids, and of course provide a dual subjectivity that can account for 
the feminine experience as well.  
However, in order for Irigaray to seriously maintain such a claim to subjective difference and duality, 
instituted as a symbolic and consequently cultural, social, political, ethical, and aesthetic system, she 
requires an appeal to bodily specificity69 and duality, and as we shall see shortly, Irigaray believes this 
“bodily” specificity is best grounded in the “natural” difference of sex. Irigaray maintains that the natural 
and irreducible difference between men and women provides the most prevalent and primal example of 
that pure difference which is lacking in all current linguistic and socio-political systems, and is therefore 
the most suitable tool for rethinking social difference as a whole. Yet Irigaray is not interested in 
conventional understandings of “difference” which, for the most part, have functioned in a binary 
fashion; instead she requires radical alterity. The standard method of thinking difference is simply to say 
“I am different from you”, yet this is a problem precisely because it assumes a point of comparison 
(Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:86; Irigaray, 2007:4) and that point of comparison has, historically, always 
been the male universal. For Irigaray, “I am different from you” is simply the first stage of rethinking 
                                                 
68 Irigaray’s duality, in opposition to the binary of the patriarchal logic-of-the-one, supports the existence of 
two subjects on their own terms, as opposed to one subject (historically, the male subject) taken as a point of 
reference, with the other as the negated not-male. In a duality, each subject has his and her own set of 
attributes not reducible to the other. 
69 Including the paradoxical “specificity” of fluid feminine unspecificity. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
47 
 
difference, and not a very satisfactory one. What is therefore sorely needed, Irigaray thinks, is a new 
language and system of symbolic-cultural exchange that allows us to firstly recognise the other as 
different qua other on their own terms (and thus ourselves authentically as well), and secondly, that 
allows us to engage the other in a respectful and productive manner. Furthermore, this proposed change 
in subjectivity and intersubjectivity needs to happen beyond mere negation, meaning it cannot simply 
offer the opposite or negated terms of that which it seeks to replace. In considering the transition 
towards her solution, Irigaray repeatedly reminds us that we cannot move from one system of cultural-
symbolic exchange to another simply by negating or inverting the old one (Irigaray, 1985b:68,129-
130,159; 2007:15; Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:11,64; Whitford 1991:12). Any such negation is dangerous 
because it resembles too closely that which we are trying to remove: the patriarchal logic-of-the-one 
which constructs binary values through negation. Put differently, a simple negation denies the 
intermediate space necessary for change and communication in Irigaray’s new system. It runs the risk of 
nihilism, or cynical inaction under a lack of meaning-giving ideas, by not providing an adequate 
replacement (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:147) and thus leading to a vacuum of values. Moreover, any 
system without a new, productive two-way dialectic has the potential to produce only solipsistic subjects 
(2000b:156); one could easily read such a warning as a critique of Descartes. In light of this, Irigaray 
hopes that a restatement of the value of sex, being the primary source of radical difference, will provide 
an adequate solution. 
For such an appeal to sexual bodily specificity, Irigaray’s later constructive work is considered more 
problematic than her initial diagnostic work (Stone, 2009:2), following her shift towards what seems to 
be naïve realism and biological determinism, in contrast to her earlier more metaphorical disruptions 
which seemed to operate symbolically and mimetically. Indeed, her later work is the source of much 
criticism, especially with the accusation of essentialism levelled against her (Butler, 2007:41; Lehtinen, 
2014:7-8; Stone, 2009:24-25; Whitford, 1991:14). The question of essentialism will be taken up after the 
exposition of Irigaray’s subjects, towards the end of 2.1. Metpahysics of Fluids. The gulf between both 
the style and conclusions of Irigaray’s earlier diagnostic work and her later constructive work is so 
marked that readers only familiar with the earlier Speculum, This Sex, and, to an extent, Ethics, will likely 
find it difficult to imagine why questions of essentialism, homo/transphobia, and polemicism can be 
raised.70 However, in her later work Irigaray exchanges her initial poetic, disruptive style for language 
that is direct, free of metaphors, and often polemic in its insistence upon the truth of certain sweeping 
statements.71 Irigaray also foregoes the habit of providing extensive quotes, close readings, and mimetic 
imitations of previous philosophers in her later work. Consequently, texts such as Je, Tu, Nous and 
Democracy Begins Between Two resemble manifestos rather than investigations, as a series of 
“increasingly blunt” (Stone, 2009:43), punctuated conclusions to her earlier work, presented in 
universalising conclusions without the context or substantiation of prior premises. This is unfortunate 
since it means that her later work, read on its own, can easily be misunderstood without the disruptive 
context of her earlier texts. Yet such “misunderstanding” is not entirely without reason, since her later 
work sets about providing new, specific generalised72 definitions of “male” and “female”, and only male 
and female, in heterosexual and only heterosexual terms, in the face of whatever scientific evidence may 
exist to the contrary, and in the face of homosexuality, transgenderism, and intersexuality.  
 
                                                 
70 Note that arguably the most influential introduction to Irigaray’s work, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the 
Feminine by Margaret Whitford, was published in 1991 and only uses sources from the 1960s to 1980s. Of the 
thirty-seven odd primary sources used in that introduction, only four are from 1990 and 1991 together. 
71 The difference is so extreme that I initially considered ordering the indexed compendium (Appendix, page 
116) according to these two chronological periods rather than concept, but I ultimately chose the latter. For 
those interested in exploring the dramatic contrast themselves, I recommend reading Speculum first and then 
Je, Tu, Nous. The latter sometimes reads like a defamatory diatribe against post-sex and transgenderism: “men 
engendering futuristically (in their intestines?): what next?” (Irigaray, 2007:127). 
72 This may seem to be a contradiction, but it is not. “Specific” refers to the selection of a specific property as 
an attribute of a “set” or individual, such as “women” having vaginas. “Generalisation” refers to the extension 
of this property to all individuals identified as “women”. Written differently: “As a generalised rule, all women 
have the specific property X”. 
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Nonetheless, before we explore the troubles and virtues of essentialism, let us first offer an account of 
how Irigaray defines her solution of “sexual difference”; that is, what she understands to be sexed and 
different between “men” and “women”. We will begin by briefly following Stone’s introduction to 
Irigaray’s sexed cosmology, before giving an account of men and women as manifestations of that 
cosmology. Thereafter, once the material has been introduced, I will provide a justification for my 
reading of Irigaray’s solution, in her later works, as realist and essentialist, insofar as her solution 
assumes the existence of two, and only two, types of sexed bodies with specific bodily (material) traits, 
and specific psychological or subjective traits derived causally from those bodies. This is important, since 
the greater portion of Part 2 (following the end of this chapter) will be dedicated to critiquing both 
Irigaray’s definition of sexed men and women, and the heteronormative consequences of such a 
definition. For now, suffice it to say that the account that follows will be treating Irigaray’s ontology as 
essentialist. 
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2.1. METAPHYSICS OF FLUIDS (EMPIRICAL) 
[I]t seems to us, in fact, that we know all there is to be known about Classical knowledge if 
we understand that it is rationalistic, that, since Galileo and Descartes, it has accorded an 
absolute privilege to Mechanism, that it presupposes a general ordering of nature, that it 
accepts the possibility of an analysis sufficiently radical to discover elements or origins, but 
that it already has a presentiment, beyond and despite all these concepts of understanding, 
of the movement of life, of the density of history, and of the disorder, so difficult to master, 
in nature (Foucault, 2002:330). 
Now if we examine the properties of fluids, we note that this “real” may well include, and in 
large measure, a physical reality that continues to resist adequate symbolisation and/or that 
signifies the powerlessness of logic to incorporate in its writing all the characteristic features 
of nature (Irigaray, 1985b:106-107). 
How can we work out a problematic of place that would involve not cutting or annihilation 
but a rhythmic becoming in relation to place? (Irigaray, 1993:42). 
Solid mechanics [metaphysics of solids] and rationality [logic-of-the-one] have maintained a 
relationship of very long standing [Epistemology W], one against which fluids [Epistemology 
I] have never stopped arguing (Irigaray, 1985b:113). 
As we saw in 1.1. above, the Pre-Socratic philosophers favoured descriptions of ontological fluidity and 
tactile sensation in their cosmologies. For them, matter is comprised of “bodies” that are “hot”, or 
“moist”, and constantly in flux. Change therefore indicates not a failure on the part of material, earthly 
bodies (as in Plato), but rather indicate the processual nature of reality itself. It could be argued that 
Irigaray derives inspiration from this tradition (Lehtinen 2014:100; Stone, 2009:41) in developing her own 
processual cosmology. Stone reads the later Irigaray as presenting a theory of nature and the cosmos 
that relies on rhythm and an alternation between double poles; resulting in an ontology of process rather 
than a collection of static, ontic substances. For instance, consider the following direct allusions by 
Irigaray: 
[T]here is a rhythmic pulse which beats between going out towards the other and returning 
to the self, between extending oneself as far as the other and returning to dwell within the 
self, between coming out into the light and going back into the darkness, into the invisibility 
of interiority, into the mystery of alterity. This movement resembles that of the heart, of the 
circulation of blood, but also that of the cosmos itself which exists between expansion and 
concentration. It is true of the entire universe, but can already be seen in the sap of the 
plant world, in the behaviour of animals, just as in the movement of the sea, in the 
alternating of the seasons, in the respective intensities of the light and of the heat of the 
sun, in the cycles of humidity and dryness, of the winds, of the cyclones (Irigaray, 2000a:111-
112). 
We live in a different world in which the relation with oneself, with the other, with the 
universe is not the same (Irigaray, 2002a:84). 
[W]omen cannot submit to the same rhythms as men (Irigaray, 1994:62). 
The result of this constant bipolarity, which, importantly, pervades all of nature in Irigaray’s view, is a 
state of constant fluidity and exchange between the two poles, where neither pole engulfs the other, yet 
constantly creates new shapes between them. Consequently, “[i]nsofar as this rhythmic bipolarity 
inherent in all natural processes and phenomena makes them “sexuate”, this is because this bipolarity 
approximates in structure to human sexual difference” (Stone, 2009:90); that is, “[h]umans must 
naturally be sexually dual, then, because nature’s overall organisation requires this” (2009:89). The 
“natural” difference between poles is thus expressed in the “natural”, and most productive, difference 
between the two poles of human sexuality, male and female, in sexual difference. In humans, Irigaray 
refers to this as “rhythmic becoming in relation to place” (Irigaray, 1993:42), citing the “rhythms of the 
flesh” (1993:162), and especially “[woman’s] relation to the cyclical” (1993:64). The result of this 
processual cosmology in which a natural, universal rhythm ensures the exchange of substances such as 
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air and water between two irreducible poles, is a view of bipolar, dimorphic human bodies and sexuality 
as causally determined by the cosmos at large, being a small-scale manifestation of larger rhythms and 
processes (Stone, 2009:91). The cosmos then is a cyclical ontology of returns and exchanges, and because 
of this constant development it can sustain life – it is not inert or reducible to “one”. The preference for 
double poles, and the necessity of both for the cosmos to function, provides a solution to the binary 
logic-of-the-one in which certain values were negated or denied.73 With the notion of the “process”, 
however, those values can be redeemed and reinstated, as in, for example, night, darkness, and fluidity: 
day follows night, again followed by day, and so on; both are necessary and exist equally. This processual 
becoming also allows Irigaray to situate growth (necessarily the product of a process) in the interactive 
space between two different poles, or in humans, between men and women, since, again, nothing can 
emerge from the domination of any one element, or from a lack of process or becoming. Out of this 
cosmology, Irigaray develops a theory of human subjectivity as split between men and women. 
At this point I strongly urge the reader to scan through the “Definition of ‘Man’” and “Definition of 
‘Woman’” sections in the appended Irigaray index (Appendix, pages 117-119), before proceeding. 
 
[M]an and woman: we are two. How is this two to be articulated in the relationship with 
these natural rhythms? (Irigaray, 2000a:112). 
I start from reality, from a universal reality: sexual difference (Irigaray & Lotringer, 
2000b:146). 
[I]n humanity at large, there are only men and women of different ages (Irigaray & Lotringer, 
2000b:181). 
In the entire world, there exists only men and women (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:167). 
[H]e means he, she means she. He and she cannot be reduced to complementary functions 
but correspond to different identities (Irigaray, 2007:42). 
 
Insofar as sexed humans are simply sexed expressions of a larger sexed cosmos, and therefore must 
conform to this sexed and dynamic dual ontology as microcosmic manifestations of macrocosmic 
processes, Irigaray’s thought here might remind us, with brief irony, of Plato’s forms in which earthly 
copies “participate” in ideal forms. Of course the comparison is not entirely accurate since Irigaray’s 
thought does not make use of Plato’s metaphysical dualism and rationalism. Instead Irigaray’s cosmos is 
one of physical process rather than abstract order, harking back to our earlier discussion of Heraclitus in 
which there are no separate ontic beings, but only ontological becoming. In Irigaray’s theory then, we 
might imagine the sexed “becomings” of humans as spinoffs of natural processes in much the same 
manner as smaller, secondary turbulent vortices form in the wake of fluids as an object passes through 
them. She does not however present us with a clear step-by-step schema for understanding the 
derivation of sexed subjects from this conception of nature (Stone, 2009:89), but I would like to suggest 
that it is reasonable to assume that it follows roughly three steps: the first is the existence of a 
processual, rhythmic (and in that sense, sexed) cosmos, from which we may derive, secondly, sexed 
bodies that imitate this reality, which in turn, thirdly, directly cause sexually-dual subjectivities, 
behaviours, and relations to the world, as we will see below. The symbolic order exists at the end of this 
corporeal chain as a representational order established by one or both of the subjects so as to encode 
and enforce their particular subjectivity in culture and society. For Irigaray, the presence of such a 
cultural order is of great importance since, unlike the rest of nature, it is here that humans, as creatures 
                                                 
73 Since, as we saw in Chapter 1, the logic-of-the-one, which privileged self-identity, self-reference, and the 
male subject(ivity) did not allow for such exchange and development, perpetuating only itself; similar to 
Plato’s “forms” which sought to establish a single, immutable, self-identical “master-copy” of a multiplicity of 
imperfect earthly forms. Irigaray’s duality not only disrupts the privilege accorded to the model of singularity, 
but also institutes a more fluid understanding of change as a relational interplay rather than the striving 
toward a single, abstractly defined goal. 
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that can actively shape their environment, are able to express and therefore preserve their sexually-dual 
identities (Stone, 2009:89,91). For instance, as we saw previously in Chapter 1, this bipolar process went 
awry when sexed men with subsequent masculine subjectivities produced the logic-of-the-one as a result 
of, and as a reflection of their own embodiment;74 denying the same process for women and their 
feminine subjectivities, and thus enshrining in the dominant (patriarchal) culture only one half of the 
sexed, processual, dual cosmos, ostensibly resulting in stasis and death. We have already briefly outlined 
the first stage, the cosmos of objects. Of the last two stages for subjects, the second consists simply of 
human subjects being bodily dimorphic, leaving the third stage to be outlined. 
Irigaray’s move from the second to third stage, from bodily shape to subjectivity (or shall we say from sex 
to gender), is again causal, insofar as it generalises a set of different subjective tendencies (certain types 
of relations, such as caring subject-subject relations, or behavioural patterns and preferences) as the 
result of a particular anatomy (being, for instance sexed as “woman”); Butler (2007:41) describes it as an 
“effort to derive a specific female sexuality from a specific female anatomy”, and Stone (2009:95) also 
points out that “although Irigaray claims that these differences in ‘relational identity’ fundamentally 
comprise a sexual difference and, therefore, that this difference is not biological, she always traces 
differences in relational identity back to differences between men’s and women’s bodies”. In contrast to 
most modern understandings of sexual identity, Irigaray does not draw a neat distinction between sex 
and gender here (the biological anatomy of the body, and the behavioural, social, relational roles 
expected of that specific body), instead calling openly for “a theory of gender as sexed and a rewriting of 
[…] rights” (Irigaray, 2007:5). In calling for gender to be sexed, rather than the other way about, Irigaray is 
calling for the return of categories of subjectivity to their material roots, or for the materiality of a 
particular set of bodily features to be the determining factor in defining subjective relations with the 
world and other subjects.75 Here Irigaray also tells us that “the brain is sexed” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 
2000b:44), and that “[i]t is interesting to note that the manifestation of gender is assured by particular 
chromosomes, different in women and in men, whose effect is not exclusively somatic. The safeguarding 
of life would be in some way dependent on chromosomes” (2000b:153).76 As the most direct proof, 
Irigaray informs us that “[m]en and women are corporeally different. This biological difference leads to 
others: in constructing subjectivity, in connecting to the world, in relating” (2000b:95), tying psychology 
to the body in a deterministic fashion. In other words then, following the move from a bipolar cosmos to 
dimorphic bodies, Irigaray draws a directly causal and deterministic link between bodily anatomy and 
subjectivity, which can be seen most clearly where such subjectivity manifests itself in a particular 
symbolic, or representation of reality. 
For instance, Irigaray tells us that “[o]ur culture is entirely grounded on logic, where being and thinking 
coincide” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:137), establishing a direct link between the patriarchal order, and 
the body of the patriarchal subject, the man, in which they stand in a direct relation to one another. For 
men, the anatomical penis, since it is rigid, linear (unidirectional), and self-identical (unlike the labia, 
which are two despite being considered one feature), translates symbolically into the phallus, and 
mediates relations through its binary logic. This self-identity, taking the subject-penis as the only point of 
reference, means that the penis, by determining the shape of experience to be self-referential and rigid, 
causally determines that the subsequent relations and behaviour men have towards the world will 
necessarily be of the unequal subject-object type, with the man-penis as the subject and everything else, 
including the woman, as the object. Thus the male world, determined by the penis or lack thereof and 
then mediated through the binary, self-identical phallus derived from the penis, is everywhere tainted by 
this particular bias. In classical logic, the principle of identity is taken as problematic by Irigaray, since it is 
                                                 
74 Irigaray does not consider the possibility that men may have been disadvantaged by their own patriarchal 
logic-of-the-one, as women have been. This is a topic I will briefly address in Chapter 3.3. Ethical Implications 
of Part 2, in the critique of Irigaray. 
75 Importantly, this means that the sexed term “woman” (or “female”) and gendered term “feminine” are 
relatively interchangeable for Irigaray, since gendered subjectivity is tied to a sexed body in a close 
relationship. 
76 Immediately invalidating Stone’s claim (2009:107) that “[a]fter all, for her, being (say) female does not 
require having XX chromosomes, ovaries, and female genitalia”. 
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a metaphor of man’s flight from his mother (that which is other than the self) (Irigaray, 1989:194), and 
similarly the principle of non-contradiction ostensibly maintains the suppression of the other by insisting 
that nothing exists outside the “man or not-man” binary (1989:196). Drawing subjective relations again 
from the penis, since “man needs an instrument to touch himself with: a hand, a woman” (Irigaray, 
1985a:232), it follows that “contact between ‘things’ is of very little importance to the […] man” 
(1985a:349), resulting, again, necessarily in the fact that “[m]en […] prefer the subject-object relation, the 
production of pieces of work rather than respect for the world as it already exists, the use of instruments, 
the relationships between one and an imprecisely defined multiple” (Irigaray, 2000a:15). Since this 
representational order is one of binaries, objects, and production, it also follows that “what they are 
interested in above all is money, competition for power” (Irigaray, 2007:51) since they naturally have 
“war instincts, the desire to possess and capitalise in order to assert their power” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 
2000b:65). In short, “[m]ost of them are only finally satisfied once they can play about with noisy 
machines” (Irigaray, 2007:57). By virtue of their relation to their own self-identical, protruding, rigid 
anatomy, which determines their view of the world and subsequently their relation to others, these 
“warlike” (Irigaray, 1994:5) men, and all such men, and only men, are thus interested solely through their 
“war instincts” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:65) in objects, money, power, aggression, noise, and 
domination. In Irigaray’s view, the male is a subject “[w]ho never grows up” (1993:145). Irigaray’s view of 
men, presented here entirely in her later work, is crude enough to make even the insensitive reader 
clench their jaw, and I must take pains here to add that her definition is not simply due to the possibility 
that the old patriarchal order itself paints an incomplete picture of men, or that Irigaray reads men 
sympathetically as equally misrepresented under the traditional logic. Irigaray takes these definitions 
seriously and uncritically, and makes it clear throughout her oeuvre that Epistemology W represents men 
well; it is women who are misrepresented under it. Most tellingly, she also retains the above description 
of men through Epistemology W across the entirety of her later work in which she presents a new social 
order. The men defined in her own post-patriarchal society are still those from the logic-of-the-one; they 
have simply been presented with a balancing counterpart in the form of a separate female subject under 
Epistemology I; they have not been replaced or problematized. 
This female counterpart receives a more favourable treatment given the rehabilitation of those values 
suppressed under patriarchy. Even though male and female represent the two natural poles of sexual 
difference, Irigaray believes that women represent the processual nature of the cosmos more accurately 
than men (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:149). For Irigaray, the feminine “moves in harmony with the 
fecundity of nature […] Tuned differently to the rhythm of the earth and the stars. Intimately tied to 
universal circulation and vibration” (1993:195), in a way that ensures she “experiences menstruation, her 
periods, as continuously related to cosmic time, to the moon, the sun, the tides” (Irigaray, 2007:108). In 
other words, woman’s “becoming has its own specific often cyclical, temporality linked to cosmic 
rhythms” (Irigaray, 1994:25). Therefore, “time in a woman’s life is particularly irreversible, and […] 
compared to men’s time, it is less suited to the repetitive, entropic” (Irigaray, 2007:108). Seeing as 
women’s vaginas represent a sex organ that is not self-identical like the penis, but instead a set of 
differential lips in constant contact, the female body therefore “does not have the same relation to 
exteriority as the male” (Irigaray, 1993:63), which again in turn determines a particular relational 
subjectivity. For one, “[w]oman takes more pleasure from touching than from looking” (Irigaray, 
1985b:26), and this tactile relationship means that “[h]er sexuality, always at least double, goes even 
further: it is plural […] woman has sex organs more or less everywhere. She finds pleasure almost 
anywhere” (Irigaray, 1985a:28), the result of “the multiplicity of genital erogenous zones (assuming that 
the qualifier ‘genital’ is still required) in female sexuality” (Irigaray, 1985b:64). This non-self-identical 
diffusion translates into intersubjective relations as well. Unlike men, “[w]omen, in fact, privilege 
intersubjectivity, relationship with the other gender, the relationship of being-two, the physical, and, 
particularly, the natural environment” (Irigaray, 2000a:15); they prefer dialogue (Irigaray & Lotringer, 
2000b:37) and are more interested in the other sex, in place, in qualities of people (Irigaray, 1994:49), 
rather than hierarchical competitions between people in contrast to “man [who] defines himself in 
relation to his house or his neighbour’s, his car or any other means of transport, the number of miles he’s 
covered, the number of matches he’s played […] Man doesn’t concern himself with improving the quality 
of man” (Irigaray, 2007:77). Women are thus inherently relational in the sense of being reciprocally 
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social, and relational towards subjects rather than objects (Irigaray, 2002b:147). And lastly, given the fact 
that “for women, dichotomous oppositions didn’t make sense as they did for men, at least not without a 
radical submission to the phallic” (Irigaray, 1989:197), we can deduce that women are not suited to 
classical logic or mathematics as standardly practiced; instead “[i]nterior decorating […] should meet with 
their approval” (Irigaray, 2000a:148), or else “if [woman] did not have to feed herself and procreate […] 
woman could live in love indefinitely” (Irigaray, 1993:64). 
The result of this Irigarayan dimorphism is a culture of two (and only two) subjects who are radically 
different and represent complementary properties in a bipolar cosmos: women prefer cycles, change, 
care, intersubjectivity, and nature; men prefer linear explosive (ejaculative) time, culture, the subjection 
of nature to industrialised production, exchanging goods, and war. It is of vital importance to note here, 
both to understand Irigaray’s insistence on difference and for our critique later on, that Irigaray maintains 
that crossover or gender-blending between the sexes is both impossible and undesirable since it would 
disrupt the bipolarity of absolute difference (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:91; 2004:70-71). For Irigaray, all 
persons are cisgender and only cisgender. It should be clear how these subjects fit into a processual 
cosmology as opposite poles, necessary for “safeguarding the universal relation between two 
singularities, as is that between man and woman” (Irigaray, 2000a:9). As a result of their “irreducible” 
(Irigaray, 1985a:139; 1993:13; Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:58) strangeness to one another, there exists an 
“insurmountable difference” (Irigaray, 2000a:7; Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:106), interval, space, or 
ontological negative between men and women (and only men and women, on account of their privileged 
difference). The “ontological” here refers to the subjective dimension of becoming through the 
possession of a (specifically sexed) body. “Negative” indicates that the horizons of the two sexually 
different ontologies do not significantly overlap or dominate each other, but that the other sex 
represents a mystery on their own terms. This negative is not merely bodily, material, or descriptive, but 
also relational, ethical, and prescriptive. In being two, neither can overpower the other, and both are 
necessary for the cyclical, processual exchange to be fecund and (pro)creative; consequently, “this couple 
can represent the first stone in a ‘renewal of the democratic and moral foundations’” (Irigaray, 
2000a:25), and “[t]his couple embodies the ultimate concrete reality of the community” (2000a:26), since 
it is between men and women that desire exists (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:114); that is, for Irigaray 
desire exists between difference and not sameness. 
Having expounded Irigaray’s cosmology and her subjects within it, I would now like to stand apart for a 
moment (beginning the trend of largely independent critique to be taken up later in Part 2), as indicated 
in the introduction to this section, and justify my reading of Irigaray as essentialist here. 
Claims are frequently made by advocates of Irigaray’s theory that her “sexual difference” is not sex 
difference (biologically defined) or gender difference (socially/behaviourally defined), but a reference to 
positions defined within the symbolic order (or presently not defined), or that her sexual difference refers 
to an ontological rather than a material, ontic difference, and that Irigaray thus does not fall into 
essentialism (Du Toit, 2015:12,17; Stone, 2009:4; Whitford, 1991:14). For instance, Caldwell (2002:17) 
suggests that “the fundamental premise that concepts must reduce materiality to function”, and thus to 
biological determinism, does not necessarily apply to Irigaray’s fluid use of sexed concepts. Deutscher 
(2002:111) proposes that Irigaray’s work does not essentialise biological sexual difference but rather 
identifies a lack of sex in the Western tradition and thus demonstrates how it is, in fact, the traditional 
logos that has enacted essentialism with its concept of the “lack” or absence. Irigaray’s use of “sex” and 
“difference” in sex is thus held to be either an abstract representational issue, or, insofar as it refers to 
the real, an existential and phenomenological rather than biological issue. This defence is certainly true 
of the early Irigaray in Speculum and This Sex, who is interested in (mis)representations of feminine 
subjectivity in the history of Western thought, and the hierarchical negation maintained by the logic-of-
the-one underpinning Western rationality.77 But the Irigaray of An Ethics of Sexual Difference and recent 
                                                 
77 From Irigaray’s early work, consider: “What I want, in fact, is not to create a theory of woman, but to secure 
a place for the feminine within sexual difference” (Irigaray, 1985b:159), and: 
“I refuse to let myself be locked into a single ‘group’ within the women’s liberation movement Especially if 
such a group […] purports to determine the ‘truth’ of the feminine, to legislate what is means to ‘be a 
woman’” (1985b:166). 
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works such as Why Different? and Je, Tu, Nous moves away from a purely symbolic position into a 
position that seeks to provide a corporeal basis for sexual difference through an appeal to concepts such 
as the “real”, “nature”, and the “cosmos” (Stone, 2009:5,39).78 This shift follows from her realisation that 
simply rehabilitating feminine identity within the symbolic order does nothing to challenge the 
phallocentrism of the order itself, nor does it overcome the covert culture-over-nature (reason-over-
body) hierarchy implicit in such an order regardless of its oppressive or liberated content, since the very 
idea of the symbolic, or recourse to it, always privileges language and representation over ontology and 
becoming. 
We may therefore read Irigaray’s theory of “men” and “women” in one of three ways: firstly, as 
concerned purely with symbolic representation rather than factual claims about corporeal experience; 
secondly, as concerned not merely with representations but mainly with the facts of lived experience in 
an essentialist sense (ontic, material); and thirdly, as concerned with the facts of lived experience in a 
non-essentialist phenomenological sense (ontological, existential). Let me respond briefly to these 
readings. 
Regarding symbolic representation, as a deconstructive critique Irigaray’s work can certainly be defended 
as concerned purely with symbolic representation rather than biological determinism. As Irigaray 
(1985b:162) reminds us, “from a feminine locus nothing can be articulated without a questioning of the 
symbolic itself”. Yet as a constructive solution to that critique, Irigaray can no longer be concerned merely 
with symbolic rehabilitation and thus it is likely that her theory steps out of the purely representational 
realm and enters into pronouncement on bodily facts. Irigaray would likely reject a language of abstract 
hypotheticals (a “gappy” language of absent or variable referents where “male” and “female” are 
interchangeable79 or simply conjectural, or where a third term exists to replace them) since such a 
language echoes the disembodied abstractions of Epistemology W and the logic-of-the-one, and it 
privileges sign over referent. Indeed, Irigaray warns us that “[a] social and political order which is not 
founded on the real is precarious, and even dangerous. All the imaginary disturbances, all the 
authoritarian deviations, all the cultural regressions are possible here” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 
2000b:149).80 Take for instance, the following direct comment by Irigaray on essentialism/social 
construction in a chapter titled “Feminine Identity: Biology or Social Conditioning?”, from her later work 
Democracy Begins Between Two:  
The question as to whether belonging to a gender is the effect of a biological destiny or of 
social conditioning fails to take into account the fact that being or becoming a woman 
means acquiring a civil dimension which is appropriate to ‘feminine identity’, a culture which 
corresponds to one’s own body and specific genealogy, one’s own way of loving and of 
procreating (Irigaray, 2000a:36). 
                                                 
78 From her later work, consider the change to: “The sameness of women, among women” (Irigaray, 
1993:115); 
“Insofar as they are citizens, women are in some sense equivalent” (Irigaray, 2000a:11); and 
“Differences between women [are] linked to different stories but not to a different relationship with being or 
identity” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:84), and are thus existential but not contingent. For Irigaray, the bodily 
phenomenology of women is uniform among themselves. 
79 “The most irreducible space is between woman and man […] the impossibility of their reciprocal 
substitution” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:58); “man’s and woman’s subjectivity are both inexchangeable” 
(2000b:118). Note also the use of the word “most” in the first quote. This directly implies that spaces between 
men and men or women and women (in homosexual relations, for example) are less irreducible, and thus 
more unstable and open to domination, or regression to domineering “sameness”, than heterosexual 
“difference”, on Irigaray’s view. This is clearly heteronormative, and we will discuss this more in Chapter 3. 
80 Irigaray’s concern is reasonable. Similar concerns about representations not being grounded in reality arise 
elsewhere with propositions that are unverifiable, unfalsifiable, or contradictory (ex falso quodlibet). Given her 
views on not only the existence of sexual types, but also those types having stable properties, by “real” Irigaray 
means the reality of physicality of a body as sexed, either male or female. In other words, a social order 
premised upon the recognition of sexed features. 
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Irigaray here suggests again that a social order and the recognition of a sexed identity (male/female) is 
necessary to cultivate the full expression of a sexed subjectivity tied to (“appropriate to”) a particular 
sexed body. This however does not solve the essentialism/constructionism problem posed above, nor 
does she explain why she considers it a pseudo-problem by dismissing it as a “failure” which does not 
take her own position (the need for sexed social identities reflecting sexed bodies) into account.81 In fact, 
it seems as though Irigaray merely reverts to the original problematic concepts. In explaining why it is 
neither nature nor nurture, she simply appeals to a “civil dimension” (nurture) appropriate to “feminine 
identity” (nature), in a way that respects the body and procreation (nature). In short, she suggests that 
feminine identity is shaped by nature and this requires full expression in culture; a form of essentialism 
seems to be the answer in her later work. We may therefore assume that Irigaray’s definition of sexed 
subjects is not simply a symbolic project aware of its own socially constructed limits82 - indeed elsewhere 
she explicitly rejects the possibility that the subject can be constructed through discourse (Irigaray, 
1985b:89; 1993:216; 2007:42-43; Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:11,75). 
Irigaray does not always speak of subjects only as becoming, processually, through rhythms that require 
certain symbolic representations in order to fully develop and express themselves. Certainly Irigaray 
never speaks of men as becoming, but only as static entities restricted to aggressive release and stasis, 
implying a tension or contradiction in her proposal of fluid becoming. Throughout her work, Irigaray 
instead speaks of men and women already as men and women acting according to certain roles. If we are 
to take the claim seriously that she is not an essentialist and that she does not prescribe set roles for men 
and women based on biological “facts”, then we should not be able to find references to “male” or 
“female” as nouns in her language at all, but only references to various subjectivities that are continually 
in flux and not determined by bodily types. Her duality would have to relinquish terms such as “male” 
and “female” which seek to designate sexually specific bodies. Yet even if we assume for a moment that 
her essentialist appeals to biological materiality are, in fact, metaphorical and strategic, the negative 
parameters (if not the positive content) are such that bodies in her system still organise themselves into 
two groups which exclude one another. We are still left with “metaphorical” men and women, and only 
those two. And these, conveniently for Irigaray, still have the same anatomy as their non-metaphorical 
biological versions. In other words, whether she starts with the material body or not, and whether she is 
a biological essentialist or not, Irigaray still ends up with exactly the same categories as before, reliably 
linked to certain anatomical features, and moreover she enforces these categories and denies the 
possibility of crossover.83 There is no-one in Irigaray’s category “woman” who has a penis, and there is 
no-one in her category “man” who is not aggressive. And there is no-one outside these two. How, then, 
are her categories not the original stereotypes, and how are they not corporeally marked? One can 
demonstrate the fact that her categories are materially specific in another manner by begging the 
contrary question: what could Irigaray mean if not “male” and “female” as physically sexed subjects with 
penises and vaginas, respectively? If Irigaray intended her subjects to be sexually “disembodied” (that is, 
if she is not essentialist and intended the terms “female” and “male” to refer to rhythms open to anyone 
and not sexually specific bodies) then by definition she could not have a system of sexual “difference”, let 
alone “two” subjects to begin with, as there are no fixed referents nor any that are different. If 
“woman/female” does not contain specific markers of identity, such as the lips of the vagina, that is, if 
                                                 
81 Tellingly, we will encounter several dismissals by Irigaray of contrary readings as “failures”, most notably in 
the section 3.3. Ethical Implications. 
82 To clarify – she certainly acknowledges that this social construction can and has created identities under 
power relations within the patriarchal order; that, after all, is the point of her entire diagnostic project, 
identifying the misrepresentation of women under the masculine symbolic. But those were limited and 
inauthentic identities. They excluded the feminine body by not drawing their source from the material Real. 
On Irigaray’s view then, the material/corporeal facts of embodiment supply the only accurate and ethically 
significant markers of identity. Social construction is thus not the origin of identity, although socially enshrined 
identities can still exist “after the fact” within an Irigarayan society in, for instance, the law. 
83 That is, she uses sweeping qualifiers such as “all” and “only” to create generalisations that state all persons 
are either male or female, and only male or female; and she uses this cisgender assumption as the basis for 
subjects coupled in a heterosexual relation (since different poles are necessary for exchange, development, 
and becoming, as we have already discussed). 
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the category has no limited definition or connotation, then Irigaray is essentially contradicting herself 
since this means “anything goes” and any denotation will be true. If no constraint is applied to the 
concept “woman”, then this means by (lack of) definition that auto-affective men with penises can be 
women in Irigaray’s new system. Yet this is clearly not what Irigaray is arguing.  
This conclusion by negation as it were, along with the positive ontological content given to definitions of 
“male” and “female” by Irigaray herself, strongly suggests that Irigaray’s definition of sexed human 
embodiment is deterministically essentialist in its approach and heteronormative in its content. In formal 
terms, the traditional and Irigarayan concepts of “sex” might not be intensionally equivalent, but they are 
still extensionally equivalent.84 Whether or not we define “female” as “not-male”, “not-(not-male)”, or 
“ontologically processual and ambiguous human”, Irigaray’s system still yields “human being with female 
reproductive organs” as the referent; since the defining features of “femininity” are, for her, linked to 
menstruation, birth, and mothering. Therefore, regardless of whether the connotations of Irigaray’s 
notion of “sex” are the same or different from traditional “sex”, the denotation remains the same. This 
casts into doubt the radicalism of her theory, and lends support to the reading of her (later) work as 
essentialist. It also implies that arguments which defend Irigaray’s categories of sex as “open” follow the 
same problematic format as the following example: 
“There are two and only two separate cities in South Africa that comprise the executive and 
legislative centres respectively; one is called the ‘City of Jacarandas’ and the other is where 
the Parliament is located, but we cannot say that they are Pretoria and Cape Town”. 
Irigaray explicitly tells us that not only do two (and only two) “cities” exist, but that these cities have 
different and specific properties. To insist that ‘Jacaranda City’ is not ‘Pretoria’ is akin to insisting that 
‘subject with womb, breasts, labia, and menstrual or lactating potential’ is not ‘female’, and clearly 
something is awry in such an insistence.85 For these reasons, it is safer to assume that when Irigaray uses 
words such as “sex”, “male”, “female”, and “body”, she is referring to something stable, tangible, 
coherent, and non-substitutable. We can assume, then, that Irigaray’s representational model of reality 
aims at tying word to object by saying something (ostensibly) true about the material existence of sexed 
embodiment, and the way that embodiment in turn defines subjectivity, which in turn, defines a 
particular relation to the symbolic, to language, culture, and representations. The result is a definition of 
(double) subjectivity that is generalizable and positively specific, rather than generalizable yet minimally, 
negatively non-specific. In order for such a definition to be applicable to all men and women in all 
situations (and again, only men and women), it must have in its connotation some stable, coherent, and 
generalizable property for universal application; that much is entailed in the requirements of making 
truth claims about “all x”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
84 Please note the technical use of “intension” without a “t”, referring to “connotation”, paired with 
“extension” referring to “denotation”. 
85 Except, of course, for transgender, intersex, and transsexual persons. But Irigaray does not acknowledge the 
existence of such bodies, and, given her own appeal to the “standard” properties of “women”, we may assume 
for her “female” means “sexed female”, and that the word is not a variable placeholder. 
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2.2. HORIZONTAL LOGIC-OF-THE-TWO (EPISTEMOLOGICAL) 
I want to think and I don’t want simply to submit myself to the traditional categories of logic 
(Irigaray quoted in Hirsh et al., 1995:100). 
In order to question the universal subject, it is necessary to approach another logic. The only 
logic that can guarantee a rational and universal foundation is that which starts from the 
reality of two genders, masculine and feminine (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:146). 
It’s a matter of questioning the foundations of Western rationality and asking yourself why a 
syllogism is thought to be more rational than respect for nature […] why is our rationality 
historically based on abstract logical categories rather than on a culture of experience 
(Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:73). 
It is unfortunate to note that Irigaray does not provide us with a fleshed-out account of a horizontal86 
logic-of-the-two as a formal language, logic, or representational system in response to the old logic-of-
the-one, and consequently our investigation here, meant to mirror that in section 1.2., will be very short. 
Yet this should not be taken as a disadvantage. As with her poetic style (at least in her earlier works), the 
choice of not supplying us with a new language is deliberate, and is aimed at highlighting both the 
constraints of working within the conception of reason given by Epistemology W, and the gap this 
rationality creates in the possibility of producing new work. If we may appeal to metaphor for a moment 
here, Irigaray has given us a ladder with which to see that, in fact, the maze of Western language in which 
we roam has walls and a final boundary, beyond which the rest of the countryside still sprawls. We are 
currently still so used to the binary imperatives of the maze – left, right, no, dead-end, start again – that 
we would be ill-suited to defining a new logic from within its walls. Such a language must come from 
beyond the horizons of our current symbolic order, and since that Order defines everything from our 
culture to rationality, a new language requires a complete Kuhnian paradigm shift. It is therefore a 
language of the possible, “a language that we still don’t know, that is yet to be created” (Irigaray & 
Lotringer, 2000b:131). 
However, hints as to the shape of this new language can nonetheless be found in Irigaray’s work. To 
begin with, it must start from, and represent, the doubling of subjectivity. We know that under the 
masculine categories and binary logic of the previous order, woman was interpreted as a lack, a 
commodity, a sexual hole, or a space for the use of men – in childbirth or intercourse. Male subjectivity, 
in other words, causally determined the content and structure of the language by reflecting men’s bodily 
corporeality and relational attitudes: the self-identity of the phallus (Irigaray, 1985a:42,44), the rigidity of 
the penis (Irigaray, 1985b:113), the preference for unequal subject-object relations (Irigaray, 2000a:152-
153), autoeroticism (Irigaray, 1985a:32); in short, “representation designated as presence” (1985a:247).87 
This masculine representational order could neither represent women, nor allow them to represent 
themselves, since the existence of their feminine subjectivity was denied, and they were given no means 
of expressing this lack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
86 In opposition to the “vertical” logic-of-the-one. The patriarchal logic, as we saw, operated according to 
binary hierarchies, which may be described as “vertical” insofar as they privileged one value and suppressed 
others. A “horizontal” logic-of-the-two, on the other hand, places each subject beside the other, so to speak, 
by maintaining an insuperable difference between them in order to prevent suppression of one by the other. 
87 Recall the notions of “solidity”, “positive presence”, and horror of the vacuum explored in section 1.1. 
Metaphysics of Solids. 
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On the other hand: 
Doubling, which corresponds to a reality, implies a different way of speaking, a dialogical 
way which takes into consideration both man’s way and woman’s way of speaking. Such a 
language doesn’t conform to traditional Western logic, with its complement: poetry. It 
unfolds between two modes of speaking, two languages, man’s and woman’s. The exchange 
between these two subjects creates a third language (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:131). 
A new Irigarayan language, then, would require feminine subjectivity to receive equal representation on 
its own terms. Examples of this would include encouraging women to speak among themselves without 
the use of masculine grammar (especially in Romance languages such as Irigaray’s native French),88 
reintroducing feminine corporeal events such as menstruation and lactation into discourse, since these 
are what mothers and daughters need to speak to each other about as they share the same bodies 
(2000b:32), returning meaning to material things rather than abstract ideals, since “[f]or us women, 
meaning remains concrete, close, related to what is natural, to perceptible forms” (Irigaray, 2007:104), 
relinquishing binary either/or categories (Irigaray, 1989:197), and having the opportunity to talk with 
subjects rather than about subjects as objects, since women prefer relationality over domination 
(Irigaray, 2000a:152). A good example of the last suggestion in practice is Irigaray’s interesting use of “I 
love to you” instead of “I love you”: 
‘I Love to You’ means: I don’t take you as an object of my love or desire. I love you as 
irreducibly other. I keep a ‘to’ as an inalienable space between us, a guarantor of your 
freedom and mine […] in order to avoid any amorous possession of consumption […] I will 
never entirely know you and that to love you implies respecting the mystery that you will 
always be for me (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:81).  
The to is the place where the intention of the one and the other can meet (2000b:90). 
Especially as regards the “to”, “space between”, “mystery”, and “meet”, this new language both creates 
and inhabits, without oppression but as a mediator, a space between the current limits of both masculine 
and feminine subjectivity: it is the liminal meeting place of two horizons, and as such represents an 
interval, or a negative, that cannot be overcome since it secures difference between the two subjects. 
This “space” between is therefore the condition of possibility for the Irigarayan language. Such a 
language would closely resemble poetry, introducing “a new age of thought, art, poetry, and language: 
the creation of a new poetics” (Irigaray, 1993:5), and she does state (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:134) that 
her method refuses to “split abstract logic on the one hand, and poetry on the other”. 
Finally, one last insight comes in the form of the following: “sensible representation is our primary 
method of figuration and communication” (Irigaray, 2007:104). By “our”, Irigaray is referring to women 
of course, but I think that is unfair given the potential of “sensible representation” and the fact that all 
humans can sense and represent. This phrase represents something of a paradox: “material abstraction” 
would be a similar phrase, or “physical language”. But paradoxes are fruitful since they reveal the limits 
of reason. Indeed, those of us who are synaesthetes, author included, should recognise that “sensible 
representation” is only a paradox if we assume that there is a difference between black and white 
markings on a page and, for instance, the movement of limbs or the apprehension of colour when 
reading symbols. For some, there is no difference between colour tones and sound tones since they 
reliably trigger one another, or between “abstract” words on a page and the perception of movement 
triggered by those. For those of us with blended senses, language always already “appears” to us outside 
the merely abstract or conceptual (beyond the intension of words or symbols), as we may experience a 
text as a rainbow of colour and personalities,89 and consequently the meaning of words is always diffuse 
and not limited to their actual connotations and denotations. “Sensible representation” suggests that a 
new language, again not restricted merely to women in this sense, could be something like dance, or 
                                                 
88 A language of I-she / you-he and I-he / you-she, such that masculine pronouns do not dominate subjectivity 
and there is a clear separation between male and female (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:37;86-87). 
89 I can personally vouch that “B” is an exceptionally kind and approachable letter. B is typically seated indoors 
near a large glass window on a sunny and quiet day, mostly early morning. 
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gesture, or music through colour or through some other physical sense not in the same category as 
sound.90 Communication can be “figured” in any number of ways. This blending of categories and appeal 
to the body would tie in very well with Irigaray’s own attempt to move beyond binary categories and 
redeem corporeality. Unfortunately Irigaray does not pursue the idea beyond the given phrase, and we 
are left to imagine for ourselves what the epistemology and language of her new society would look like. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
90 Other examples that come to mind include Braille (communication solely through a texture accessed by 
contact, unlike the distance of the gaze covered earlier in section 1.3.), or Egyptian hieroglyphics and the 
picture-poems of Guillaume Apollinaire (both of which blur the boundary between picture and word). Linked 
to this, we will touch upon the concept and ethics of “contact” in the following section, 2.3. Ontological 
Negative. 
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2.3. ONTOLOGICAL NEGATIVE (ETHICAL) 
To love purely is to consent to distance, it is to adore the distance between ourselves and 
that which we love (Weil, 2007:65). 
We’re amazed at thought, but sensation is just as magical. A divine power is just as manifest 
in the sensation of the lowest form of insect as it is in the brain of Isaac Newton (Voltaire, 
2011:235). 
Irigaray envisions a ‘horizontal transcendence’ between two mature but irreducibly different 
subjects, man and woman (Hirsh et al., 1995:95). 
If I may return to the parallel I have been drawing between the issue of place and the issue 
of sexual difference […] How can we work out a problematic of place that would involve not 
cutting or annihilation but a rhythmic becoming in relation to place? (Irigaray, 1993:39,42). 
Alongside her diagnostic uncovering of the logic-of-the-one in Part 1, which stands as possibly her most 
important investigative discovery, Irigaray’s creation of the ontological negative, or space between 
subjects, is arguably her most important constructive contribution in response to patriarchal negation.91 
We encountered the ontological negative as a descriptive function in the outline of sexed subjectivities in 
section 2.1. above, but it also serves a normative function as we will see in this section. The idea of the 
ontological negative does not appear explicitly in her early works Speculum and This Sex, though it could 
be read implicitly as a consequence of her critique of the lack there, and it first appears in the second 
phase of her work in An Ethics – at least such is its appearance in the oeuvre surveyed for this thesis. We 
can thus trace the ontological negative as a solution that emerges with the development of her thought.  
In the context of responding to the sameness of the logic-of-the-one with radical alterity, the question of 
how two radically different subjects can talk to, relate to, or love one another is both the central question 
and a non-question for Irigaray, because she situates desire precisely within the space of difference.92 
Alterity is the very condition which makes such a relation possible. The space of the ontological negative 
is therefore the answer to the question of intersubjective relations. Several parts of Irigaray’s book An 
Ethics of Sexual Difference present an investigation of the creative potential of space that prevents two 
subjectivities collapsing into one under, for example, the old logic-of-the-one. For instance, we find the 
following reading of the interval as “place” in Aristotle: 
Place cannot simply be matter or form, on one side or the other side of growth and 
becoming. Thus matter and form cannot be separated from the thing; place can. In fact 
place reveals itself as a result of that separability. Without being reduced to either a part or 
a state of either matter or form […] Place is thus not the thing but that which permits the 
thing to be (Irigaray, 1993:39-38). 
More importantly, Irigaray also speaks positively of the figure of the angel in Western history, as an 
intermediary that moves between spaces, communicating, and thus drawing them together without 
superimposition and therefore oppression (Irigaray, 1993:16-17), and she also speaks of the need for a 
“third term” between men and women to prevent a one-to-one comparative relation (1993:12). Probably 
her most exemplary exposition of the mediating interval can be found in her analysis of Diotima’s 
discussion in Plato’s Symposium, Diotima being a rare female interlocutor no less. Irigaray identifies the 
unusual status of Diotima’s dialectic as one which never uses the Hegelian synthesis of one between two 
opposites: 
 
                                                 
91 At any rate, as we saw in Part 1 the logic-of-the-one is nothing more than the suppression or negation of 
conceptual space between subjects. Later in this thesis, I aim to suggest extending this space between more 
subjects who are different, rather than only two (male/female). 
92 Therefore it is a non-question since difference is the very condition of communication, but it is also a central 
question because “different” subjects require a new language to speak to one another. 
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In effect it [Diotima’s logic] doesn’t use oppositions to make the first term pass into the 
second in order to achieve a synthesis of the two, as Hegel does. From the outset, she 
establishes an intermediary that will never be abandoned as a means or a path. Her method, 
then, is not a propaedeutic of the destruction or the destructuration of two terms in order to 
establish a synthesis that is neither one nor the other. She presents, uncovers, unveils, the 
insistence of a third term that is already there (Irigaray, 1993:20). 
This passage should remind us of the logic-of-the-one, a self-reflective logic that transforms all values 
into a relation to the first, and likewise the intermediary, space, third term, or “path” should remind us of 
the erasure of the “vagina” as the way out of Plato’s cave. Irigaray also shows how Diotima uses this 
method to oppose the standard view that love (or the god Eros) can possess an object of love, for then 
desire would disappear: “He must be lacking in order to desire more […] He is therefore an intermediary 
[…] He is between the one and the other, in a state that can be qualified as daimonic: love is a daimon” 
(1993:22-23). This, of course, is in contrast to the traditional conception of love as a relationship of power 
or ownership split between the lover and the beloved93 (Irigaray, 1993:24), or in Ancient Greek 
homosexuality, between the older more knowledgeable man and the younger learner.94 This new, 
reinterpreted interspacing of the interval means that for Irigaray “[l]ove is thus an intermediary between 
pairs of opposites” (1993:24),95 “[a] being of middle nature” (1993:23) whose “aim is to realise the 
immortal in the mortal between lovers” (1993:26). Space implies potential for change, development, and 
communication between subjects; as well as maintaining as relationship of respect by refusing to devolve 
one party into the other. The result of this space between persons is a fecundity that “is mediumlike, 
daimonic, the guarantee for all, male and female, of the immortal becoming of the living” (1993:26). 
Then, after the dense richness of these few pages, Irigaray returns to critique and demonstrates how the 
voice of Socrates/Plato interferes with Diotima’s message. 
I must stress that this ontological negative is vital to understanding Irigaray’s solution to patriarchy, in the 
context of the devaluing lack created and then excluded within the Western tradition. Irigaray not only 
overcomes the (supposed) lack by rehabilitating traits attributed to the feminine (such as motherhood, 
fluidity, corporeality) into a positive presence,96 but she also places this mediating space between men 
and women, as a distance of ethicity,97 or the space for communication and respect that prevents one sex 
from incorporating the other, and she shows how this space allows for growth, change, and potential 
(becoming), therefore creating life in opposition to the category of death in the old patriarchal logic. 
Perhaps most importantly, the ontological negative is not Hegelian, it exists “in a manner different from 
that of Hegel. The negative will remain insurmountable, and it will serve to maintain the singularity of the 
subjectivity of the one and the other as well as the inalienability of the relation between the one and the 
other” (Irigaray, 2004:70). In this way, it cannot be overcome and subsumed into a new synthesis, and 
thus it remains a constant horizon, limit, and mystery. The ontological negative, in various forms as the 
                                                 
93 Note how “beloved” denotes something in relation to the lover, as “that which is loved”. Again, the binary 
negation of the logic-of-the-one. 
94 Which served the social function of perpetuating masculine knowledge through socially accepted pederasty, 
or mentoring (Mottier, 2008:12). 
95 Again, notice how love is restricted here to a particular set of subjects, heterosexual subjects; a parallel and 
equally problematic claim would be something to the effect of: “love is an intermediary between pairs of 
white persons”. An objection to this, in defence of Irigaray, cannot be that whites are the “same” yet 
heterosexual couples are “different”, since my point is that both propositions follow the same form: “x is 
applicable to persons displaying property y”, where “x” is love and “y” can refer to either difference (in 
Irigaray’s heterosexual model) or sameness (in racial segregation), and still be problematic. The issue here is 
not sameness/difference, but the logic of the statement, which can discriminate using both sameness and 
difference. This equally problematic use of both sameness and difference suggests that they are capable of the 
same tendency to discriminate, and might in fact not be “opposites”. This problem of being “double-edged” 
will be discussed in section 3.1. Epistemic Coherence below. 
96 “For me, the way to overcome such a hierarchy is through recourse to the right to civil identity: a positive, 
affirmative right” (Irigaray, 2000a:58). 
97 “Ethicity” is something of a neologism, though not mine. As far as I know, it exists in general usage but has 
not been officially coined. Using “ethicality” would be too cumbersome, but the meaning is the same. 
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space of difference, is therefore the central piece of conceptual apparatus that underlies Irigaray’s own 
system, from the bodily difference between men and women, to the cultural order that respects this 
difference as an ethical imperative. 
Of course, the ontological negative, being a space or interval of difference, represents in a certain sense 
the empty or the liminal. Yet it must be noted that this space is neither hostile nor inert, it is an 
emptiness that is not the dreaded lack: “the negative at work is not equivalent to a nothingness: it is that 
which accounts for the alterity of the other and which protects it” (Irigaray, 2004:72). For Irigaray its 
intermediary, daimonic value means that it is a pregnant space that can hold difference and ambiguity, 
and therefore generate new meanings between persons, rather than a dead space. It is in this sense the 
prime source of ethicity. 
Examples of the ontological negative in practice include the caress and the act of listening. On Irigaray’s 
view, corporeal intersubjectivity requires more than simply the gaze. As we saw in section 1.3. above, the 
tyranny of the gaze represented the manifestation of patriarchal domination within intersubjective 
relations, for a number of reasons. In contrast, for Irigaray, the most phenomenologically immediate and 
profound expression of respectful intersubjectivity (and thus also an expression of the ontological 
negative) is the caress (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:164). 
Reading Levinas, Irigaray finds inspiration for a number of phenomenologically and ethically important 
observations about the caress. Firstly, unlike the gaze, the caress can be intimately returned and 
reciprocated (Irigaray, 1993:187). The gaze, recall, is imperiously unidirectional. Secondly, as a result of 
the caress’s bodily proximity, “all the senses share in the nature of the caress, the hand serving, in its 
way, as the most intimate” (1993:193). The gaze, on the other hand must by definition distance itself 
from the texture of materiality and corporeality. Since the stretch of an arm requires greater nearness, 
other senses such as the sound of breathing or the scent of the beloved become intertwined with the 
encounter. And thirdly, the caress, more than the gaze, accords the self a limit and acknowledges the 
shape and space of the other without appropriation. In Irigaray’s words: “Touching can also place a limit 
on the reabsorption of the other in the same. Giving the other her contours, calling her to them, amounts 
to inviting her to live where she is without becoming other” (1993:204). This forces a self-recognition of 
our own limits in more than one way: firstly, the resistance, suppleness, or welcome of the other to our 
touch reminds us that we are not them, and thus prevents appropriation. It also reminds us that our 
ability is limited – we can only extend our arm or hand so far before we reach a limit, a limit where the 
other may or may not be. The gaze knows virtually no limits and can sweep an entire landscape; it 
penetrates, as we say, without actual intimacy. And lastly, the touch also brings the other to a sensual 
awareness of their own shape, and an awareness of our awareness of that shape; it thus requires the 
phenomenology of a reciprocated double consciousness of our intention and the other’s intention. 
Nobody can gauge the intention of a gaze, it is the privilege of the voyeur. But the caress traces the 
outline of the other’s shape in close contact and thus brings awareness to the limit of our hold over the 
other, even as it connects us in inescapable reciprocity; I cannot touch without being touched. 
It should be noted, however, that Irigaray draws a distinction between sensation and perception. Merely 
delighting in the sensation or feeling of the other reduces them to a different kind of commodity, an 
emotional commodity, to consume (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:105). Irigaray believes that Sartre, 
Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas commit this error of sensation by trying to capture the other through a 
caress or gaze that reduces them to an object whose mystery we can easily grasp (Irigaray, 1993:159; 
Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:106,115,165) in much the same way as the gaze; that is, “all these 
philosophers imagine a complicity between the eyes and the hand” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:123). On 
the other hand, perception means acknowledging the interiority of the other as a subject on their own 
terms, and not merely their exteriority as sensibly accessible to us (2000b:114). The caress, then, is 
intended not merely as a sensation of the other as an object, but a perception of the other as a subject, 
all the while expressing the interplay of difference or a tactile limit that creates a space between the two 
subjects. 
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What are the other ways, the other methods to reach a culture of two subjects? I have 
already talked about negativity as a manner of respecting the other as other. I can also speak 
about the necessity of listening to and of being capable of keeping silent. There are two 
manners of being attentive to the other as such (Irigaray, 2002a:85). 
Similarly, the act of listening expresses the space of the ontological negative in intersubjective relations 
as well. Firstly, there exists an epistemic limit (and therefore interval) to what can be known, 
represented, and spoken about the other on their own terms, since the two sexes cannot know what it is 
to experience the materiality of the other’s body or the subjectivity of their being: 
The necessity of silence, of what is impossible to say in relation to the other gender, signifies 
above all the respect of a limit in terms of what can be said of one of the two genders. This is 
a way of making sure that each gender will not have the right to speak for the other, to 
speak in their place, to impose norms thought to be adapted to these necessities (Irigaray & 
Lotringer, 2000b:78-79). 
Secondly: 
The relation to the mystery of the other demands, rather, a withdrawal that allows it to 
manifest itself, a listening to its alterity (Irigaray, 2004:73). 
Listening to the other is repeating him/her as such and simultaneously creating a place for 
exchange between them. Listening to the other is a way of coming out of possession 
(Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:109). 
Listening thus represents a parallel to the caress. The caress also encouraged “a withdrawal” (touching 
reaches a limit upon the surface of the other) that reminds the person caressing of their own limits while 
letting the mystery of the other manifest itself. Moreover, something of the reciprocated consciousness 
remains, since listening is in a sense to recreate, repeat, or echo the other. The Irigarayan concept 
underlying a new society of two individuals who are different, is therefore the interval, or “ontological 
negative”. The interval acts to overcome the lack enforced by the traditional patriarchal order by 
maintaining a space of difference between two subjects, rather than only one, where the other is 
excluded. In the process, the interval also establishes a space for communication and reciprocity. 
 
We have now reached the end of Part 1. The two chapters which explored the two phases of Irigaray’s 
work can be summarised as follows: 
1) There has been an historical injustice (A diagnosis of the problem: historical, contingent) 
1.1)  Including the fact that this injustice arose out of an epistemological and symbolic 
misrepresentation of female embodied subjectivity, and consequently a repression of 
certain ways of being; (descriptive / is) 
1.2)  We should attempt to address this historical injustice (prescriptive / ought) 
2) There exist men and women, and only men and women (The construction of a solution: 
ahistorical, necessary) 
2.1) There are men and women 
2.2) There are only men and women 
2.3) These two categories are fundamentally different (psychically, relationally, bodily, etc) 
2.4) These two categories cannot be expressed in terms of each other 
(These are all instances of “sexualism”: material descriptions / ises – recall the first stage in Diagram 1.) 
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THEREFORE: 
2.5) They should be treated differently, and a culture of “sexual difference” ought to be 
established. 
(This is an instance of “sexism”: normative prescriptions / oughts – recall the second and third stages in 
Diagram 1.) 
 
Chapter 1 followed the earlier work of Irigaray in a diachronic survey and diagnosis of the Western 
tradition. The material was structured into three parts according to our starting definition of philosophy 
and the method of its application. We saw that Irigaray’s main contribution in her early work was the 
identification of the logic-of-the-one, and the way this self-identical, binary logic of negation established 
a social and representational order that privileged masculine subjectivity, and both sacrificed and 
replaced the body in general98 and feminine subjectivity in particular with a self-repeating pattern of 
“male” preferences such as reason (over the body), culture (over nature), and solidity (over fluidity). 
Chapter 2 introduced Irigaray’s later work by focusing on her solution to this patriarchal order, again 
following the three-part structure. First, we explored her processual cosmology and the two (and only 
two) subjects, male and female, who exist on equal terms in radical alterity as manifestations of this 
natural order. Second, we briefly touched on Irigaray’s language and epistemology not-yet-thought, and 
saw that it favoured multivalent logic over binary classical logic, and would take the form of poetry or 
some other means of expression, even physical expression, that would blur the rigid boundaries between 
traditionally rational and intimately expressive. Lastly, we encountered arguably the most important 
contribution in Irgiaray’s later work, the ontological negative. This negative established not only a 
physical or objective difference between the materiality of the two subjects (and again, only two 
subjects, male and female), but also a subjective and therefore relational or existential difference 
between the two subjects. Given the radical alterity of the two subjects, each not describable or 
knowable on the other’s terms, this negative remains insurmountable and thus maintains a constant 
space between them allowing respectful, equal communication to occur. Unlike the old logic-of-the-one, 
which suppressed the space and difference between subjects, and thus the potential for speech, 
listening, silence, meeting, and reciprocity, the ontological negative establishes the conditions for 
reciprocity, maintained explicitly across the distance or interval of sexual difference, thus establishing the 
two subjects as the male and the female. Of Irigaray’s various insights in Part 1, we shall carry over into 
Part 2 a diagnostic awareness of the logic-of-the-one and the interval of the ontological negative as 
useful conceptual tools gleaned from Irigaray. However, we will be critical of her use of sex as the prime 
category of being, her attempt to provide specific attributes to sexed subjectivity, her insistence that 
there are two and only two sexes, her description of ethics, reciprocity, and relationality being 
maintained between two different sexes across the ontological negative in a matrix that is both cisgender 
and heteronormative, and her opposition, in setting up an ethics of difference, to all forms of sameness 
and neutrality (asexuality). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 Although Irigaray does not acknowledge the extent to which this may have disadvantaged men, as well as 
women. 
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PART 2: DEVELOPMENT 
3. CHAPTER 3: CRITIQUE OF IRIGARAY’S SOLUTION 
 
Having completed our exposition of Irigaray in Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 1, we are now ready to 
commence with a critique of Irigaray’s theory of sexual difference here in Part 2, drawing mainly on those 
ideas outlined in Chapter 2. The impetus for this sharp turn towards critique comes from an 
understanding that Irigaray’s solution takes as unquestioned universal subjects “men” and “women”, and 
is directed solely at such “men” and “women”, thus being cisgender-heteronormative and perpetuating 
gender stereotypes. The impetus also comes from an understanding of Irigaray’s solution as largely 
essentialist insofar as it utilises “mediated” or arbitrarily constructed bodies (such as “male”) without 
acknowledging their non-essential character, and so her solution does not escape from the problematic 
logic of hegemonic typologies described in Diagram 1. The critique in Chapter 3 will again follow the 
familiar empirical/epistemological/ethical structure: 
 Section 3.1. Empirical Facts will consider the current biological data on sexual types to explore whether 
Irigaray’s strict male/female duality, which forms the first premise of her system of difference, is correct. 
Section 3.2. Epistemic Coherence will take up conceptual concerns. There, the concept of “coherence” 
will be discussed with reference to Irigaray’s “typology” of two sexual types, in order to demonstrate that 
“coherent” systems serve a limiting and exclusionary function by suppressing the ethics of space between 
subjects. We will also examine the “same/different” binary, which underpins Irigaray’s appeal to types 
and especially to difference, to understand whether the binary does in fact denote two entirely separate 
referents, or whether the sameness/difference dichotomy is instead an ambiguous double-edged sword 
that cannot be used to create generalised (or positively specific and “thick”) descriptions. We will also 
consider the possibility that Irigaray’s method of disrupting the logic-of-the-one with the logic-of-the-two 
logically implies disrupting the new logic-of-the-two with a logic-of-the-three, or four, and eventually the 
queer and post-sexual logic, in keeping with one of our starting assumptions about the dialectic of 
ideological systems (recall Diagram 2).  Having rejected the sameness/difference dichotomy and seen 
how Irigaray’s logic requires a move to greater inclusion, the notion of “multiplicity” as a negatively non-
specific capacity will be briefly introduced as an alternative to describing individuals as “same” or 
“different” according to positive, specific traits (such as sex). Section 3.3. Ethical Implications, the final 
section in Chapter 3, will consider the moral consequences of Irigaray’s ethics of sexual difference. We 
will begin with her scant remarks on homosexuality, and reveal the way she interprets non-
heterosexuality solely through a lens that is both cisgender and heterosexual. We will then pick up the 
concept of “ethical space” as a conceptual tool for exploring exclusion, and consider the way Irigaray 
excludes the queer body from her own male/female duality. The section will conclude by remarking on 
the possibility that men have also been misrepresented and mistreated under patriarchy, and indeed 
under Irigaray’s own system.  
Having reached the end of our critical analysis, Chapter 4 will briefly sketch the outlines for an alternative 
theory of embodiment, drawing on the concepts of vulnerability and trust. Bearing in mind the 
hegemonic typologies outlined in Diagram 1, and having seen Irigaray’s solution to be another such 
problematic typology in Chapter 3, the question of how to define “unmediated” bodies that are as 
inclusionary as possible will become crucial. Instead of appealing to ostensibly essential and enduring 
physical traits such as race or sex (as in Irigaray’s theory and in the patriarchal system she responds to), 
the concept of vulnerability as a general capacity to suffer will be suggested as a defining property of the 
unmediated human body, thus avoiding the pitfalls outlined in Diagram 1. This will be explored by linking 
vulnerability to Irigaray’s ontological negative, non-specificity, and multiplicity instead of the 
sameness/difference dichotomy. 
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3.1. EMPIRICAL FACTS 
Whenever we talk about embodiment, such as sexed embodiment, we are engaging in truth claims about 
matters-of-fact (whether about bodies, beliefs about bodies, the historical treatment of bodily groups, or 
symbolic representations) as much as value judgements about normative prescriptions. Therefore it is 
necessary to examine what the scientific evidence has to say about the existence and properties of sexual 
types, in contrast to Irigaray’s highly ordered typology of sexual categories. This section will firstly 
concern itself with the data surrounding the prevalence of LGBT+ persons and three-gender societies, in 
order to disrupt the male/female duality of Irigaray’s model, and secondly outline the problem with 
Irigaray’s attempt at deriving essentialist bodies from metaphorical readings of texts. 
 
Some facts about “difference” 
Our model of sex and physical relations is culturally (not biologically) defined and can be 
redefined – or undefined (Shere Hite quoted in Mottier, 2008:63, own emphasis). 
Why should we laugh if we were to see a parcel of men sitting around a drawing-room table 
in the morning and think it alright if they were women? (Florence Nightingale quoted in 
Walters, 2005:49-50). 
The injunction to become sexed in the ways prescribed by the Symbolic always leads to 
failure and, in some cases, to the exposure of the phantasmatic nature of sexual identity 
itself (Butler, 2007:76). 
I believe that all men, black and brown and white, are brothers, varying through time and 
opportunity, in form and gift and feature, but differing in no essential particular, and alike in 
soul and the possibility of infinite development (Du Bois, 2016:1). 
Let me be clear at this early stage of my argument: I do not accept that there are biologically 
differentiated human social groups to be called races – biological groups, seen as ‘natural’, 
to which we can and should and do attach any generalizable and unchanging attributes of 
culture, physical ability, intelligence or whatever else (Maré, 2014:27). 
Difference exists. Difference in race […] difference in gender…How can we refuse or deny 
that? (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:26). 
Recalling that Irigaray (problematically) draws no distinction at all between sex (anatomy, such as female) 
and gender (social role, meaning behaviour and relation to others, such as feminine), that for her there 
exist clearly identifiable sexes, and that there exist two and only two sexes (male and female) into which 
all persons can be grouped, let us begin with some data and counter-examples to problematize the 
accuracy and relevancy of Irigaray’s claim about not only the existence of “sexes”, but also the claim that 
they are essentially and insuperably “different”, and that a couple both cisgender and heterosexual in 
this way, since it exemplifies difference in contrast to the patriarchal sameness of the male subject alone, 
represents the ideal couple in society (as in Irigaray’s ontological negative). Our statistics will be drawn 
mainly from the United States of America, given the availability of data and fairly unrestricted sample size 
and sample access there. 
Estimates of the number of persons who enduringly identify as LGBT+ in the USA begin at 3,5% of the 
adult population (over 8 million) (Gates, 2013:2). Surveys report the prevalence of adult same-sex 
encounters, whether or not the respondents coherently identify as non-heterosexual or not, to range 
from 4% to 16,8% of the population across the 1990s and 2000s (Twenge, Sherman & Wells, 2016:3), 
suggesting that on average 8,2% of the population (19 million) have engaged in same-sex sexual 
behaviour, and 11% of the population (25 million) have at least acknowledged some form of same-sex 
attraction (Gates, 2011:7). This blended view of sexual attraction and sexual identity extends into the so-
called “sex” of the brain as well, which was considered in the previous century to be clearly male or 
female on the classic “Martian/Venusian” model, a time when, importantly, Irigaray did most of her 
writing and homosexuality was still classified as a mental disorder. Recent evidence suggests that the 
situation is far less clear-cut than that. Using the metaphor of a mosaic, a 2015 article spearheaded by 
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Daphna Joel demonstrates a lack of sexual dimorphism across comparative Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
scans of male and female brains. The study, covering both white and gray matter, reveals both 
considerable overlap between male and female subjects, and a lack of internal consistency “as” male or 
“as” female within groups, suggesting a spectrum or mosaic of traits without clearly identifiable sets  (Joel 
et al., 2015:15471-15472). A similar article, also from 2015, appeared in Nature with the heading “Sex 
Redefined”, extending the discussion of sex blending to intersex and transgender persons. The article 
makes clear the way in which having XY or XX chromosomes (or any other variation) does not ensure 
being anatomically “male” (sex) or even psychologically “masculine” (gender) (Ainsworth, 2015:288-289). 
“Sex” cannot be reduced to a single element such as anatomy (genitalia), chromosomes, or hormones, 
since these may clash to produce, say, an XY female. (chromosomally male, anatomically female). The 
article cites the example of a pregnant woman who discovered the existence of two entirely different 
sets of cells in her body – one half carrying XY chromosomes and the other XX. Therefore, sexual identity 
sits along a spectrum comprised of many elements, from chromosomes, gonads, and hormones, to 
psychological gender identity and the choice to be identified at all. Yet compare this with Irigaray’s claims 
that “the manifestation of gender is assured by particular chromosomes, different in women and in men 
[…] The safeguarding of life would be in some way dependent on chromosomes” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 
2000b:153), and that “[w]e have no problem accepting that the brain is sexed […] Aren’t those who deny 
or refuse the sexuation of discourse de facto accomplices in the repression of sexuality?” (2000b:44-45). 
Both statements make different empirical observations (chromosomes ensuring sex; differently sexed 
brains) about the nature of alleged sex differences, and both sets of observations are demonstrably 
incorrect. This is important since her subsequent division of society into two sexed subjects relies on 
these (incorrect) observations about there being two sexes at all, and that these two sexes are different. 
Furthermore, her first claim also ties the “safeguarding of life” to sexual difference – an ethical 
imperative is thus introduced in the form of heterosexuality as the best “preserver” of life, which I need 
not point out is problematically exclusionary. Her second comment goes on to accuse anyone who speaks 
against such differences as “accomplices” (a strong word implying criminal guilt) in the patriarchal 
repression of sexuality, which, as we saw with the logic-of-the-one, is a repression supposedly premised 
on appeals to “sameness”. 
Nonetheless, if we accept the claim that there are no “male” or “female” brains, and that instead each 
brain is a mosaic of different traits along a spectrum, then the result is rather interesting: by extension, 
we cannot say that there are male or female brain types at all, since the original point of reference has 
been erased. We cannot speak of specifically male and female mosaics because the “original” male or 
female archetype from which this mosaic draws its different parts, is non-existent – we have no only-
male or only-female reference points from which to disentangle the “male” or “female” bits of the 
mosaic. As allegedly “sexed” beings, humans are simply variations of the same, linked not by one 
common denominator nor by two denominators in two distinct groups, but rather by a chain of family 
resemblances where such resemblances are not shared by the entire spectrum or any one “set”, but 
varied between individuals. Grosz (1994:209-210) uses the metaphor of the Mobius Strip to describe such 
a spectrum, although her use of the Mobius Strip is more general by relating it to the ontology and 
phenomenology of the mind/body dualism, and not only to sexual difference. Thus, if “male” and 
“female” are not binary bookends on a spectrum, if the difference between “types” merely depends 
upon various degrees of ambiguity in (contingent) anatomy, and if part of the spectrum includes entirely 
asexual and aromantic individuals, then it becomes unclear what particular content can be given to the 
word “sex”. As it loses its intension, “sex” loses its extension as well, since it no longer refers to anything. 
Importantly, it thus becomes increasingly difficult to speak of individuals as being “the same as” or 
“different from” others. 
Along the lines of the Mobius Strip, we might be here reminded of Plato’s sexual theory in the 
Symposium. Speaking through Aristophanes, Plato suggests that all human individuals were originally 
created with two heads, two sets of limbs, genitalia, and so forth, before being split into two separate 
persons – resulting in the human bodies we recognise today (Plato, 2008:25-26). Love, Plato contends, is 
simply the yearning for one’s “other half” (2008:27). Importantly, Plato’s account both acknowledges the 
existence of, and tacitly approves of, same-sex relations as well (2008:28). While we might not accept the 
myth, it resonates with the Mobius Strip/spectrum metaphor insofar as both assume an ontological state 
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that is primarily undivided along a spectrum, without the assumption of clear “differences” and “types”, 
and both thus have the advantage over the Irigarayan sexual model which only acknowledges the 
existence of men and women, and further orders these into heterosexual pairs. Grozs’ Mobius Strip is 
both more accurate and evocative, but it is incomplete. Mobius Strips have edges or boundaries. A more 
complete metaphor would be a Klein Bottle, which is the extension of a Mobius Strip such that is has a 
surface area but without edges, internal volume, or a clear beginning. 
Unfortunately, Irigaray would likely reject the Mobius Strip or Klein Bottle metaphor, since her premises 
force her to conclude that the mere presence of masculinity along the same continuum as femininity 
always means that maleness is appropriating femaleness as a variation of itself by negation.99 Irigaray 
believes this to be true not only of the old symbolic order (where it certainly did function in such a 
manner), but also of any new rehabilitated order that may arise post-patriarchy, an order which requires 
instead absolute difference. In her view, male and female, masculine and feminine, cannot exist on the 
same spectrum, within the same existential dimension, within the same phenomenological space of 
embodiment, because they are fundamentally different ways of apprehending and creating the world 
(recall our exposition of her sexed subjects in section 2.1.). They must inhabit different ontologies and 
separate epistemologies. She would also reject the notion of a spectrum since the conditions of her ideal 
society require two and only two subjects, since “insuperable difference” (what Irigaray (2002a:84) calls 
an “insuperable negativity”) is necessary for the ethical relation she envisions. If by chance there are 
Mobius Strips for Irigaray, then there are two, and only two; one with gradations of femininity, and one 
with gradations of masculinity, yet the two never feed into one another. This view, as we have just 
discussed, is both descriptively incorrect (or at absolute best, incomplete) and normatively narrow. 
To return to the spectrum of “types” and the way in which sex is comprised of many different 
combinations of features which do not always “match up” (such as chromosomes and genitalia), we can 
demonstrate the point using some numbers. If, for argument’s sake, we adopt a minimally conservative 
view such as Irigaray’s, and accept the presence of nothing more than, firstly, sexed men and sexed 
women, secondly feminine and masculine “gendered” behaviours which can be attributed to either of 
these, and thirdly the presence of both heterosexuality and homosexuality, then the minimum number of 
sexed and gendered combinations we can expect to find is 23 which is 8. Already, we can derive eight 
sexual identities from a typically Irigarayan model of two sexes, something Irigaray never acknowledges. 
If we step outside a conservative reading and admit the existence of at least five chromosomal sexes (XY, 
XX, XO, XXX, XXY), our initial tally would be 20. But we must also add intersex and transgender persons, 
as well as the other romantic orientations (heteroromantic, homoromantic, aromantic, panromantic, 
biromantic), and the other sexual orientations (bisexuality, asexuality, pansexuality, queer). Our final 
count is 1250 sexual variations. This number is still within the limits of what is readily identifiable and 
easily countable; we accept that there are in fact bisexuals and XOs, and we have words for them in our 
language.100 In other words, there are 1250 combinations which would currently be easily recognised.101 
This is without including those who only partially identify with any of the above and not including those 
who refuse to be identified at all (those who “queer”, as a verb, their identities). Were we to blur the 
boundaries between these 1250 types, since none of them can ever entail a full description of a person’s 
                                                 
99 Recall Chapter 1: her historical analysis of Epistemology W under the logic-of-the-one demonstrated the 
ways in which the presence of the masculine depended upon the negation of the feminine. Where any 
semblance of the female did exist, it was only to serve the reproductive ends of the male. In fact, Irigaray does 
speak disapprovingly of the Mobius Strip metaphor since it only moves within itself and closes off the cycle to 
others (Irigaray, 1993:105). This however refers to intersubjective relations and not to the spectrum of bodily 
difference. 
100 We might call this analogous to countable infinity in mathematics. 
101 (5) Male, female, transgender, intersex, asexual 
(5) Heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, pansexual, asexual 
(5) Heteroromantic, homoromantic, biromantic, aromantic, panromantic 
(5) XY; XX; XXY; XYY; XO 
(2) Masculine, feminine 
= 2x54 = 1250 
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experience, then the number of possible sexed and gendered variations would become infinite.102 It 
would refer to a state of personhood rather than a specific state of sexual identity, since the common 
denominator, sex, has been erased and shown to be contingent. In light of this, it is no longer feasible to 
talk about “sex” or “gender” because those terms no longer mean anything specific at all; attempts at 
specificity will not only result in an infinite list of particulars, but will also be prescriptive about what each 
category should entail, both of which are untenable. And if we do not try to be specific, while still 
speaking about “sex”, then we will not say anything interesting at all given the lack of intension or 
connotation, and that is not acceptable either. In this way, the appeal to “sex” thus becomes linguistically 
empty. 
Yet despite the prevalence of same-sex relations among even non-LGBT+ persons, the placement of 
sexual anatomical “types” along a more accurate spectrum, and, consequently, the de facto erasure of 
clear “types” to begin with, stereotypes and discrimination remain. In the US, suicide is (alarmingly) the 
second most common cause of death for young adults between 15 and 24, and of those who survived 
and reported suicide attempts in 2015, a disproportionately large 29% were LGBT+ (Raifman, Moscoe, 
Austin & McConnell, 2017:351) – a horrifying but unsurprising statistic considering the degree of 
discrimination faced by LGBT+ individuals. Consider the recent “Bathroom Bill” crisis103, the fact that 
nearly 30% of adult transgender persons surveyed in 2015 reported losing a job or a promotion as a 
result of their gender identity (GLAAD Transgender Media Program 2017:6), or, in South Africa, the fact 
that an average of ten cases of “corrective rape” are committed against lesbians per week (Spira, Chad & 
Schneeweis, 2015:8), and that a mere 32% of South Africans think homosexuality ought to be accepted in 
society (Spira et al., 2015:11). Returning to adolescent suicide in the USA, given the social and political 
climate at the time of the survey (the 2000s and 2010s saw the rise of state-by-state struggles for same-
sex marriage, the end of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, and eventually the June 2015 Supreme Court ruling in 
favour of same-sex marriage), further research notes a 7% decrease in suicide attempts among LGBT+ 
youth after the implementation of same-sex marriage, equivalent to about 134 000 fewer young adults 
attempting suicide every year (Raifman et al., 2017:354-355). Clearly, the identification and social 
normalisation of sexual types (such as “gay” or “straight” in institutions such as marriage) is an important 
factor in mental health, and in turn, is an ethical issue. We are left wondering, conversely, what an 
Irigarayan society, which insists upon the universal existence of two and only two sexes coupled in a 
heterosexual union, would do to a gay, bisexual, lesbian, transgender, intersex, or asexual adolescent’s 
developing sense of self. 
Nonetheless, the situation is slowly improving. The USA General Social Survey indicates that, from 1973 
to 1991, the majority of people surveyed considered same-sex relations “always wrong”, peaking at 77% 
in 1988 (Gates, 2015:68). However, more recent polling suggests that support for same-sex marriage, 
which we may read as support for same-sex relations and therefore homosexuality, rose in the US from 
27% in 1996 to 60% in 2010 (Twenge et al., 2016:1714). In the United States, roughly 6 million children 
have at least one LGBT parent (Gates, 2013:2). The 2010 US census indicates the existence of more than 
640 000 same-sex couples, of which about 125 000 are raising almost 220 000 children (Gates, 2013:2-3); 
further research puts the number of couples higher at 690 000 (Bos, Knox, Van Rijn-Van Gelderen & 
Gartrell, 2016:179). Regarding the parenting capacity of same-sex couples, the American Academy of 
Paediatrics issued a policy statement in 2013 reporting wide consensus on there being no difference in 
development between children raised by opposite- or same-sex couples (American Academy of 
Pediatrics, 2013:828), and urging the government to extend full marriage and adoption rights to non-
heterosexual persons (2013:829). Reports by the American Sociological Association and American 
Psychological Association argue the same (Gates, 2015:75). 2016 research, again, indicates the same 
consensus, suggesting that any differences in social development which may result in the children of 
same-sex couples are not due to the parents’ ability, but to the social stigmatisation the family may face 
                                                 
102 We might call this analogous to uncountable infinity in mathematics. 
103 The “Bathroom Bill” crisis in America refers to the attempt by state legislature to restrict access to public 
bathroom facilities, either inclusively or exclusively, by using the sex an individual was assigned at birth. An 
exclusive “bathroom bill” would thus make it impossible for a transgender person to use the bathroom 
matching their own gender identity.  
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from outsiders (Bos et al., 2016:182). It is not being raised by two men that causes mental distress; it is 
being stigmatised for it by others who hold the incorrect belief that “men” and “women” should be 
“masculine” and “feminine” and should exist in a certain relation with one another. If the children of 
same-sex couples display the same healthy development as those of opposite-sex couples, then this 
demonstrates a lack of sexual specificity or sexual difference as an allegedly important factor in 
development: two men can raise a daughter (difference, between male parent and female child), two 
women can raise a son (difference), a man and woman can raise either as well (same, at least one parent 
will share gender with a child). Both cases defined as families of either difference or sameness result in 
the same developmentally healthy children. This is in stark contrast to Irigaray’s view of clear, essential 
differences and the privilege accorded the heterosexual couple. In fact, tying in with parenting, Irigaray 
explicitly states that “[t]oday, only a mother can see to it that her daughter, her daughters, form(s) a girl’s 
identity” (Irigaray, 2007:44). Note the use of the sweeping qualifier “only”, and the appeal to “a girl’s 
identity”. The latter, as we have seen, is for Irigaray tied to the possession of a cisgender, female body, 
and this insistence that someone of sex X must ensure that others of sex X develop according to (sexed) 
gender X amounts to a command along the lines of “be a real woman” or “be a real man”.104 The direct 
and unveiled, though unstated, implication of this view is that a man cannot (and not merely should not) 
raise a daughter on his own (as, say, a heterosexual single parent) or with another man (in a homosexual 
couple). In view of the lack of evidence for Irigaray’s claim, and certainly in view of its function as a 
heteronormative, cisgender tool of exclusion and discrimination, I think it is fair if we soundly reject it. 
In addition to the statistics and empirical evidence presented above, there exist examples in practice of 
successful societies not based on the strictly heterosexual, cisgender, male/female duality which Irigaray 
considers to be the only alternative to patriarchy. The Zapotec Oaxaca region of Juchitan in Mexico, for 
instance, has a three-gender model comprising men, women, and muxe. Muxe are sexed as males, 
comprising about 6% of men in one estimate (Stephen, 2002:46), but are considered different from most 
men insofar as they adopt the characteristics and behaviour of both men and women, engaging in 
“women’s work” such as embroidery, and taking either men or women as romantic and sexual partners 
(2002:43).They form an entirely separate category from men and women, not dependent on sexual 
orientation; being homosexual does not mean being muxe and vice versa. While being muxe but not 
homosexual is perfectly accepted, being homosexual and not muxe is generally frowned upon (2002:44) 
suggesting, again, that muxe forms a larger, distinct class of which homosexuality may or may not be a 
part, yet homosexuality itself is not expected to exist independently. Elsewhere among Native Americans, 
similar three-gender traditions have long histories. In 1591, European observers in what is now Florida 
noted the presence of what they called “hermaphrodites” among the Timucu people, whose role seemed 
to involve caring for the sick; and among the Zuni, the “half-men/half-women” lhamana occupied 
important spiritual roles as symbols of cosmic harmony (Stephen, 2002:50). While all these examples 
demonstrate the possibility of social orders beyond the duality of two sexed subjects, they go further and 
call into question the importance of difference between subjects as well: the third gender individual is 
not clearly masculine or feminine, and their identity is not relationally constituted by the way their sexual 
orientation takes the same sex (homosexuality) or the opposite sex (heterosexuality) as its preference. 
This point about the blurring of difference is important for our consideration of Irigaray, since she takes 
both the existence and maintenance of difference as the centrepiece of her theory. Irigaray’s assumption 
is that there exist two sexes who are entirely different and must remain so on either side of the 
ontological negative (to prevent domination by reducing either to the “same”), and in this way the 
ethicity of respecting the other as other is upheld through sexual difference; sexual difference is her route 
to a harmonious ethics with two equal subjects. Yet why reduce difference to two poles and two subjects 
in this way? Does not the lhamana demonstrate the possibility of a “balance of difference” as both sexes 
in one subject, without a regression to “sameness”? Does androgyny in one subject, and perhaps all 
subjects, not exemplify the balance of the two poles Irigaray describes the cosmos as possessing? Is this 
not akin to the blended queer identity we find more and more in today’s society, with everything from 
                                                 
104 This is to say nothing at all about transgender or intersex parents and their transgender or intersex children, 
since Irigaray does not even acknowledge the existence of ambiguous, transitioned, or “blended” sexes and 
genders. 
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same-sex marriage and pride parades, to intersex/transgender rights and LGBT+ organisations on 
university campuses? 
Sadly Irigaray does not discuss the way in which such societies (which do not follow a strict division of 
difference as in the Irigarayan heterosexual, cisgender duality) present valid alternatives to both 
patriarchal oppression, and to her own male/female duality. Instead, her theory of difference is 
developed entirely on its own as a response to (perceived) masculine sameness, trapping her in a duality, 
with “difference” between rather than within subjects taken as the only solution to “sameness”, and 
“men” and “women” as the only subjects capable of such difference/sameness. The existence of multi-
gender societies, as well as the existence of transgender, intersex, or non-heterosexual persons 
everywhere, is enough to unseat the descriptive power of an Irigarayan view premised solely on “men 
and women, all men and women, and only men and women” insofar as such a view attempts to give an 
empirical description of an actual state of affairs, and it is enough to unseat the prescriptive power of 
such a view insofar as it attempts to order society along an axis that is sexed (and only sexed and not 
“raced”, post-sex, or post-human), and sexed between only men and women. In other words, proving 
that the base elements of Irigaray’s “sexual difference” (“men” and “women”) do not exist in any 
essential or enduring sense, and that the very identification of these types, regardless of whether they 
are enduring or not, is both arbitrary and contingent, is sufficient to render her conclusions (when 
expressed in sexed terms) unworkable, since it means that all propositions containing “man” or “woman” 
in her work, essentially the entirety of her oeuvre, are devoid of stable referents, meaning, in turn, that 
Irigaray cannot say anything true or verifiable about men, women, or sex, since those words do not refer 
to any states-of-affairs.105 It is analogous to demonstrating that the first premise (or any premise) of a 
syllogism is false; the result is that the conclusion is necessarily false. By means of demonstration, we can 
replace every “gappy” word such as “man”, “woman”, or “sexed” with a substitute that has equally 
unverifiable and arbitrary connotations and therefore no clear denotation, such as “satyr”, “nymph”, or 
“blessed”. The point need not be belaboured, and it is surely with this sense of bemused irony that those 
of us who are queer readers (especially intersex, asexual, or transgender), look upon texts which purport 
to speak not only about the presumed existence of sex, but identifiable types of sex,106 since we need 
look no further than our own embodiment to see clear proof of the contrary.107 
It would be an understatement to say that all the statistics discussed so far in this chapter merely 
“problematize” Irigaray’s model of both sex and difference. They do more than that, since they 
demonstrate that the very first assumption of the Irigarayan view, that there exist clearly identifiable 
sexes (again, two and only two) and that these are different, is empirically false; and moreover that the 
insistence upon such types is not only inconsistent with the progress of morality (same-sex marriage, 
intersex and transgender rights, gender neutral pronouns), but also has serious ramifications for mental 
health, in everything from adolescent suicide to workplace discrimination. 
 
                                                 
105 This “empirical” point about the existence of types is of course in addition to ethical considerations about 
how the application of such classificatory schemes limits individuals. We will discuss such ethical points in 
sections 3.2. and 3.3. below. 
106 Or a text on race; consider an albino or mixed-descent reader. 
107 For instance, as an aside on the method and psychology of preparing the literature for this thesis, I read all 
of Irigaray’s thirteen books and articles as works of fiction in a state of (unsuspended) disbelief, given how 
entirely alien they are to both my own embodiment (and subsequently my phenomenological horizons) and 
contemporary societies in which gender is rightly blurred with same-sex marriage, the introduction of gender 
neutral terms, and well-populated and visible queer communities. I imagine however that someone both 
cisgender and heterosexual, especially someone female who would ostensibly benefit (cui bono?) from 
Irigaray’s re-reading and re-valorisation of women in contrast to their historical patriarchal oppression, would 
read her works differently when they were written almost half a century ago in the 1970s and 80s as she 
gained prominence, or even nowadays too (since her works are clearly written for an audience both 
heterosexual and cisgender, and no-one else), and part of my aim throughout this critical chapter is to show 
how worrying such heteronormative readings are, even for women, being both descriptively incomplete and 
prescriptively oppressive. 
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The problem with deriving “reals” from “representations” 
Let us recall that the initial phase of Irigaray’s work (covered in Chapter 1) is an exercise in examining the 
texts of past (male) philosophers, and that her subsequent solution to the patriarchal bias identified 
there (covered in Chapter 2) is an exercise in constructing well-defined and essentialist “types” of sex 
with different and enduring properties. I would argue that it is problematic to draw universalising 
conclusions (especially conclusions about the materiality of what constitutes a “sexed” body) on the basis 
of contingent textual interpretations. Put differently, nothing necessary can be inferred about the nature 
of reality by reference to representations alone; to assume otherwise is to commit a category error and 
misidentify the object of one’s search.108 We would be mistaken, for example, if we tried to deduce 
anything necessary and universalisable about the essential nature of trees through the examination of 
the treatment and depiction of trees in Renaissance art. An examination of this kind, which approaches 
once-removed representations as the object of inquiry, can only tell us about the beliefs surrounding 
trees at any particular point, beliefs which manifest themselves as descriptions and prescriptions coded 
in representational systems such as language, art, architecture, and medical treatises. This is history or 
sociology. Something similar can be said of Irigaray’s attempt, on the basis of poetic and textual 
interpretation alone, to deduce necessary, essential truths (at least in her later work) about the material 
properties of not only human bodies but the order of the cosmos as well. It is an attempt that conflates 
representation with reality. 
Identifying masculine biases and historical trends within the imagery of certain languages does not 
constitute a theory of embodiment. Irigaray’s admirable critique of patriarchy, logocentrism, and one-
sided symbolism does not constitute a theory of “men” and “women” as embodied subjects. By this I 
mean that it does not offer substantial reasons for her claim of the material, ontological status of men 
and women as subjects, but rather it offers a deconstructive analysis of the language and epistemology 
employed in describing men and women in the past. Providing textual interpretations of the metaphors 
at play in contingent historical responses to embodiment may be interesting and linguistically useful, but 
it does not tell us anything necessary about embodiment itself, nor about how we should respond, 
ethically and politically, to such embodiment in the present day given new facts about, for example, the 
fluidity of gender and sex. 
Importantly, tying in with one of our primary themes, the relationship between representation and 
reality, it could be argued that Irigaray stretches the project of textual interpretation too far and commits 
a category error by blurring the boundary between word and referent. Irigaray’s entire prescriptive 
project, the redemption of actual sexual types, is based on a textual reading of a descriptive lack of sex in 
the (male) historical tradition. The reading of a conceptual and metaphorical lack in historical texts (a 
hermeneutic exercise in representation) does not constitute evidence of actual material types which 
those metaphors mis/represent (an exercise in ontological realism). We cannot infer the existence or 
nature of sex itself (already an impossible ideal) from historical attitudes towards sex, any more than we 
can infer the existence of a supernatural realm from the persistent and universal presence of mythology 
in all cultures. As all good exercises in hermeneutic interpretation should do, the reading of historical 
texts and the tradition of erasing the body (sex, femininity, and fluidity included) should certainly be 
taken, as Irigaray rightly does, as a project in the history and sociology of contingent, contextual attitudes 
towards the body, but it cannot offer us proof of the existence of embodied specificity or the 
phenomenological nature of embodiment itself. Irigaray’s project more than exceeds our expectations by 
identifying not only a disturbing lack in the Western tradition, but also the problematic patterns of the 
logic-of-the-one and the metaphysics of solids, and the way these manifest in the injustice of patriarchy; 
yet she commits a logical error, I would argue, by treating this reading as evidence of the (negated) body 
(rather than simply evidence of attitudes towards “the body”), and moreover, the body defined in a 
particular, sexually-dual way. Firstly then, Irigaray commits something of a category error, secondly, she 
offers no text-independent evidence for the existence of the material body, and thirdly her account of 
                                                 
108 The move to new categories or representations does of course open up new and liberating spaces, for 
instance in freeing women’s subjectivities from the patriarchal male universal. These new categories, however, 
are still limited. 
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the nature of embodiment is developed solely in opposite terms to the misrepresentation of the body in 
texts by male philosophers. 
Stone (2009:43) concurs with my point here that “Irigaray cannot rightly infer from patriarchal culture 
that there are naturally only two kinds of human body, male and female”, and that at best “it entitles her 
to conclude, more weakly, that male and female bodies exist with distinct characters and, perhaps, that 
most humans are either”; although as I just stated, I would take this further and argue that Irigaray 
cannot rightly infer from patriarchal culture that there are certain kinds of human bodies at all, especially 
if we treat patriarchy as suspiciously as Irigaray does;109 there is very little at all, I think, that can be said 
about the “unmediated” body. This point about the error of deriving the “real” from the “representation” 
(or in the words of the thesis title, the “phenomenological” from the “semiotic”)110 can be demonstrated 
another way, by imagining the opposite starting point of Irigaray’s project: suppose we found ourselves in 
a situation without a prior system of representations identifying and regulating bodies (such as 
patriarchy) to react to, similar to Rawls’ “original position”. Without a sedimented history of descriptions 
and prescriptions, how would we represent sex if we could view all its forms and start from a blank slate? 
Given the pervasive fact of human bisexuality, our marked lack of dimorphism in comparison to other 
animals, and the lack of prescriptions or incentives to form highly ordered (and artificial) “couples” of 
two, paired off between only “different” sexes, it is exceedingly unlikely that we would end up with a 
representational and social system of “men” and “women” (and only men and women, only cisgender) 
who are “masculine” and “feminine” respectively (and all gendered accordingly, without crossover), and 
heterosexual to boot, as Irigaray problematically envisions. I speculate that the result would be rather 
more “diffuse” than that, and thus more accurate in its distribution of desires and identities across all 
persons regardless of anatomy, than a male-female heterosexual matrix permits. This implies that 
despite Irigaray’s appeals to universality in her definitions, there is something reactionary, and therefore 
dependent, arbitrary, and constructed, about her theory of “difference” and her selection of “sexes”. In a 
thought experiment without a monosexual patriarchal antecedent, we would not have to assert a specific 
kind of “difference” (such as Irigarayan sexual difference) in response to specific historical “sameness” 
(patriarchy, the male subject as universal standard), which in turn suggests that an appeal to difference is 
as arbitrary and incomplete as the oppressive sameness it responds to.111 There might then exist 
alternatives beyond the co-dependency of sameness and difference, and insofar as sameness and 
difference depend upon and respond only to one another as “opposites”, they might in fact represent 
two sides of the same problem rather than solutions to each other, or in fact, be the same thing. This is a 
conceptual point we will discuss with other epistemological concerns in the following major section, 3.2. 
Epistemic Coherence; for now, let us briefly consider some empirical points against Irigaray’s cyclical, 
processual cosmology. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
109 Which might suggest something of a contradiction in her treatment of patriarchy. She correctly rejects 
patriarchy’s unjust treatment of women, yet she still carries over its identification of “men” and “women” as 
existing types (which is surprising since it is, after all, the basis of its oppressive function: it requires these first 
to discriminate) and she also carries over its heterosexual bias in her formulation of the male/female couple as 
the most “fecund” and desirable alternative to the old male/not-male “couple”. 
110 “Phenomenological” refers to the apodictic and unmediated experience of one’s own embodiment, with 
social descriptions and prescriptions bracketed out – as far as possible, since it must be conceded there is no 
entirely unmediated body. “Semiotic” refers to the opposite – the application of representations or signs, that 
is, coded descriptions and prescriptions, to produce a mediated body that draws meaning from a socially 
constructed environment. “Pilot” would be an example. 
111 Which is, in a sense, what I am doing in this thesis as well, by opposing Irigaray. I am not arguing for the 
kind of dual “difference” she is, however, and my point in using disruptive “difference” is precisely to reveal 
the problems with difference. 
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A note on Irigaray’s processual cosmology 
Let us quickly remind ourselves (section 2.1.) that Irigaray’s theory describes the cosmos (that is, the 
physical universe) as comprised of processes and cycles, alternating between poles of difference in 
perpetuity, in everything from the seasons to subjective relations and experiences – the bodies of women 
(all women, and only women), for example, are held by Irigaray to be “cyclical, temporality linked to 
cosmic rhythms” (Irigaray, 1994:25), and thus governed by those cosmic rhythms insofar as they are 
“[t]uned […] to the rhythm of the earth and the stars”,  “[i]ntimately tied to universal circulation and 
vibration” (Irigaray, 1993:195), in keeping with “the light cycle, the seasons” (Irigaray, 2007:83); unlike 
men (all men, and only men) (Irigaray, 1993:144-145), who invariably “care little about living matter” 
(Irigaray, 1994:16) and always prefer “the representation of the universe as made up of abstractions” 
(Irigaray, 2000a:15). This purported evidence of cosmic cycles between states of difference is taken as 
support for the need to cultivate such difference between human subjects as well in the form of a society 
that recognises sexual types (two subjects, men and women), the difference between them, and the 
possibility of growth and healthy relations resulting from the interplay of this difference (as in, for 
example, the growth of plants in the cycling of the seasons). Unfortunately for Irigaray, this conception of 
the cosmos does not hold up to empirical scrutiny at all.  
Under entropy it is both commonly known and easily demonstrable with a simple cup of tea that the 
universe is not comprised merely of cycles between differences and poles, but rather is tending toward a 
state of maximum entropy and therefore stasis.112 The process of the universe is, contrary to Irigaray’s 
claims, a tendency to end cycles and disperse energy into a state of “sameness”. Moreover, the sun 
which is for all humans and most animals the sole source of light and therefore sight, and thus represents 
for Irigaray a masculine value favouring oculocentrism and “upward” or “intangible” abstraction over the 
(downward, tangible) earth and darkness (recall the issues of the gaze and the sun as the highest good 
after the womb of Plato’s Cave in Chapter 1), is in fact the very cause of those bipolar processes Irigaray 
chooses to valourise. The cycle of the seasons is dependent not merely on our planet’s axial tilt but also 
on the constancy and warming effect of the sun, and, most importantly, all energy stored and 
transformed by life on earth is obtained primarily from the sun,113 resulting in a chain of energy beginning 
with cyanobacteria and vegetation, and ending with animals and apex predators such as humans. 
Whatever role other celestial bodies may play, such as the earth’s own aforementioned tilt and the 
moon’s influence on ocean tides, is also subject to entropy. We know that the moon is drifting away from 
our planet and eventually our tides will no longer “cycle”. The earth’s rotation, too, is slowing and 
eventually there will be no seasons. Lastly, as the sun dies it will expand dramatically and destroy life on 
this planet with its heat. Whatever processual cycles manifesting in differences and poles Irigaray may 
have in mind, these are relative and local both spatially and temporally – spatially we only recognise 
them in a format extreme enough to be called “sexed” here on our own planet, where, we must 
remember, the emergence of the human race resulted in such sexed terminology in the first place,114 and 
temporally we recognise too that these cycles did not exist in the past on our planet and will cease to 
exist in the future. Contrary then to Irigaray’s insistence that these processes are both universal and 
essential (both pervasive and fundamental to all areas of the cosmos at all times), we do not find them in 
this form anywhere else, and we know that under entropy they are short-lived. Indeed, we might say the 
bipolar processes Irigaray has in mind actually represent exceptions: highly localised and ordered clumps 
of coherence constantly dispersing energy and slowly falling silent, ending their processes and cycles, like 
a stirred cup of tea ceasing its movement, and losing its temperature.115 
                                                 
112 We must remember from section 2.1. that Irigaray approvingly attributes constant cycles and changes to 
women, and disparagingly attributes homeostasis and a lack of rhythm to men (Irigaray, 1993:144-145). 
113 With the very small exception of extremophiles found in places such as volcanic vents. 
114 It is only through our construction of “sex” and types of sex within that category, that we are able to 
identify sex as a significant feature of the world. We ought to remember that within the parts of matter we call 
“life”, sections of the animal and plant kingdoms are asexual; and outside “life”, matter is not “sexed” or 
reproductive. Of the totality of matter in the cosmos, very little is “sexed” indeed. 
115 We might, simply for interest’s sake, draw an analogy here and say that the collapse of ordered and 
localised clumps of energy into a “spread out” minimal state is very similar to my earlier suggestion (recall 
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As for human subjects, the non-metaphorical claim that “women do not have the same relationship to 
entropy” (Irigaray, 1994:25), or again that “female sexuality would perhaps fit better […] with a 
procedure that corresponds to going beyond disorder or entropy” (Irigaray, 1993:124) cannot be treated 
as empirically true; it is analogous to the claim “black people do not share the same relationship with 
gravity”. Women are comprised of the same matter as men and subject to the same physical laws. To 
argue otherwise without evidence other than textual metaphors is to argue against the weight of 
empirical evidence, and surely this point cannot be branded scientism or dismissed as a dogmatic 
misreading of Irigaray, especially since Irigaray does not supply us with a metaphorical interpretation of 
established physical concepts such as entropy,116 and therefore we cannot read this as a purely symbolic 
project, nor as a metaphorical reinterpretation of the definition or process of “entropy” as generally 
understood. In addition, given Irigaray’s own attempt at describing physical processes literally (non-
metaphorically) as sexed, we must assume that her use of “entropy” is literal; let us recall this is all to be 
found in her later work, which discards textual readings of historical texts and mimetic subversions of 
established concepts with metaphorical language. Similarly, the claim tying women’s bodies to “cosmic 
rhythms” and “vibrations” through their relation to bodily fluids (Irigaray, 1985a:207; 1985b:109; 
1993:156) makes little sense since men have a greater net volume of blood (being larger on average) with 
the addition of semen; indeed anyone who has had a litre of water to drink ought to be susceptible to 
lunar influences if Irigaray’s view were true, yet Irigaray expressly ties menstrual cycles to the moon and 
tides (Irigaray, 2007:108). Insofar as it might be objected that Irigaray’s cosmological claims could be 
metaphorical (and I have already argued that they are not in section 2.1., since her earlier work tends to 
metaphor more than her later covered here), it is not clear exactly what the content of those metaphors 
would be, or how metaphorical claims about women and the cosmos could say anything sound about the 
actuality of women’s bodies and their relation to physical processes without being merely poetic. Indeed, 
given this last point, it seems that her claims are non-metaphorical since they purport to make truth 
claims about causality and physical properties such as temporal relations and rhythms in humans 
governed by cosmic events. Yet if they are non-metaphorical, then they describe properties which are 
either soundly disproven (such as the supposed link between menstruation and lunar cycles) or else 
unverifiable and unfalsifiable (such as the link between vaguely-defined cosmic cycles and feminine 
ontology), and thus drift into astrology more than astronomy. 
The evidence presented in this empirical section demonstrates that human subjects are neither “sexed” 
nor “different” in the way Irigaray claims they are, and therefore that claims about “sex” or the 
opposition of “sameness” and “difference” cannot be made in a way that readily refers (denotes) since 
the definitions (connotations) are lacking, or at best temporary and contingent rather than necessary, 
sufficient, and generalizable. Since Irigaray’s theory begins with the unquestioned assumption that sex is 
a universal human trait, and that there are two and only two sexes who are similar within each sex and 
insuperably different between the two, and since her theory moreover requires this narrow starting 
definition for the sake of her idealised male/female duality, it follows that any social prescriptions or 
models for relationality drawn from this incorrect starting description will also necessarily be incorrect at 
worst, or sorely lacking at best. This is simply true of inferences drawn from either incorrect or 
incomplete premises. Put differently, Irigaray’s highly specific and restricted universe of “men and 
women, and only men and women, where men are men and women are women” only makes sense at all 
under the following conditions: the rejection of asexuality and aromanticism as a possible dimension of 
human subjectivity, the assumption that sex exists from the outset in a mind-independent and therefore 
essential, enduring way that can be readily identified (given her rejection of the social construction of sex 
                                                                                                                                                       
Diagram 2) not only that minimal, negative descriptions are generally to be ethically preferred, but also that 
under the “dialectic” mentioned earlier, over-descriptive and over-prescriptive systems are likely to collapse 
under their own weight when challenged by an opposing system into a negated state of “not-(x and not-x)”. 
Being similar to the notion of Ockham’s Razor, I’d like to tentatively term this process “Epistemic Entropy”, as a 
possible point for future research. 
116 Similarly, we find the following: “Before Chernobyl, it was possible to hope that the general chaos or 
entropy of our time might at least be regulated somehow in nature. This was a serious scientific hypothesis” 
(Irigaray, 1994:3). It is not clear what to make of this, since the Chernobyl disaster does not disprove the 
function of entropy as Irigaray claims but, as with virtually everything else in the universe, demonstrates it. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
77 
 
and her alignment of sex with non-human cosmic order), the assumption that there are two and only two 
sexes, the assumption that sex and gender are tied so as to permit no distinction (that females are 
feminine, for instance), the assumption that no crossover between men and women is allowed, the 
assumption that everyone is cisgender, and the assumption that everyone is heterosexual. Purely 
conceptually, we should note that the number of assumptions underlying Irigaray’s work is very large. 
Unpick any one of these and, since Irigaray’s theory depends upon them being true, her conclusions will 
become unstable. Given the evidence presented so far, it is perfectly reasonable to assert that all these 
assumptions are incorrect,117 and thus it follows from an empirical point of view that Irigaray’s theory of 
“sex” and “difference” has very little ground to stand on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117 It is obviously true that many people are asexual and aromantic. Sex does not exist in an easily-identifiable 
cosmologically essential sense. There are not two and only two sexes. Sex and gender are not the same. 
Crossover, or gender-blending/bending does exist. Not everyone is cisgender. Not everyone is heterosexual. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
78 
 
3.2. EPISTEMIC COHERENCE 
 
Language always proceeds from a beginning to an end, from a past to a future, but as it 
necessarily has recourse to writing, this progression is always liable to turn around on itself. 
It is an artefact (Irigaray, 1985a:296). 
Whenever we talk about embodiment, or indeed anything at all from physics to art, we must necessarily 
code our information in a representational system, most likely natural language. It is therefore essential, 
regardless of what reality the language refers to empirically or what it incites us to do ethically, to 
examine the language formally or structurally to see whether the ideas it conveys stand in a coherent 
relation to each other. We may well speak about the history, art, social function, and value of the Hagia 
Sophia, but we may also speak, independently, of whether the geology of the area can support its 
foundations and whether its walls can support its dome. Both methods of description are equally 
important, but they are not reducible to one another and therefore can be pursued on their own terms. 
In this section, we will explore the conceptual structure of Irigaray’s thought by applying the notion of 
“coherence” to it, and by examining whether “sameness” and “difference” are in fact opposing terms. 
 
Interval contra lack; coherence contra interval 
As we saw in Part 1, Irigaray’s diagnosis identified a negative lack which maintained sameness (the 
masculine, Chapter 1), and her solution proposed a positive presence (the feminine, Chapter 2) to 
counter this by inaugurating and maintaining difference. We also saw how the former depends on a 
system of strict ideological coherence that denies change, and enforces a one-way relation between 
subjects (subject-object between male-female); and the latter depends on the introduction of conceptual 
space (the interval) in order to ensure a respectful two-way relationality, a distance of difference, 
between two subjects. However, the situation is not so neat. There appears to be a contradiction or 
conceptual tension present in the way Irigaray’s own solution also employs coherence and limits space, 
although Irigaray herself does not outright introduce “coherence” as a theme. 
The notion of “coherence” could serve as a very useful conceptual tool or summary of the anti-dialectic 
and anti-entropic structure118 of ideological systems such as patriarchy, hetero- and cisgender-
normativity, and racism. In brief, it could summarise and describe the tendency of such systems to form 
coherent patterns through the repetition of certain elements (bodies) with certain properties (physical 
markers such as skin colour), maintained in a stable, predictable relation (such as heterosexual marriage, 
slavery, or segregation). Let us define “coherence” as the mechanism underlying the ideological 
processes summarised in Diagrams 1 and 2 insofar as it spends energy identifying (describing) and 
maintaining (prescribing) patterns of elements/types/bodies (as in marriage or segregation), in order to 
avoid collapsing into a minimal state of multiplicity where no single feature is taken as a reference point 
for identity. On this definition, coherence ensures that social descriptions can move from first stage 
descriptions to second stage prescriptions to final products as third stage hegemonic typologies (Diagram 
1). Third stage typologies themselves then occupy a role of either “x” or “not-x” in society, oscillating 
between oppressive sameness and resistant difference (Diagram 2), before a major event, such as a slave 
revolt or constitutional battle over same-sex marriage (caused by the dissonance of both coherent 
systems inadequately describing lived embodiment), causes both x and not-x to collapse into a minimal 
state of maximum allowance, post-(x and not-x): everyone can marry, all persons may use public facilities 
without segregation, no-one should be a slave, all persons should receive equal pay for the same work, 
all individuals should have physical access to buildings.  
                                                 
118 Remember the dialectic outlined in Diagram 2. Ideological systems which attempt to maintain thick, 
positive, over-extended descriptions of embodiment are “anti-entropic” since they necessarily distort or 
fabricate at least part of a subject’s identity, and any false description maintained against correction, resists 
being transformed into a minimal or more accurate description, rather like heating a cup of tea resists entropy. 
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It can be suggested that the idea of coherence in the sense employed here begins with an end, and thus a 
certain kind of death.119 Coherence can be defined as the maintenance of a specific pattern, and a 
pattern is self-repeating and can only be identified at its end. A pattern may be misidentified and 
misrepresented if cut off too soon; as in the series “XXXXXXXXXXYYYYYYYYYY” being identified as a series 
of Xs only after consulting the first 10 objects.120 Infinite sequences in mathematics can, of course, not be 
known to their end, but their properties can be exhaustively described and their values predicted by a 
given series equation, correctly identifying them as a particular type of pattern. Patterns, or coherence, 
can thus be known either by abstracting their nature without infinite observation,121 or by continuous 
observation until a termination event. Both instances rely on observation and prediction, and regardless 
of whether the sequence itself is finite or infinite, complex or simple, and regardless of the manner in 
which this is determined, both are exercises in finitude: that is, both cannot approach a pattern as 
something “in infinity” but as something limited in conceptual space to a particular spatio-temporal 
frame. Coherence, then, relies on a limitation (finitude) of both space and time. This ties in very well with 
Irigaray’s identification of the logic-of-the-one as a tool for limiting the space for knowing and expressing 
the (female) subject, and our independent interpretation of her system as requiring the interval 
manifested variously as “distance”, “space”, or the “ontological negative”. Thus, Irigaray seems to agree 
with us on the instability and ethical inappropriateness of appeals to coherence, usually as normative 
morphologies, and instead on the need for the ambiguity and distance of space, disrupting patterns or 
logics that enforce coherence. 
However, this leads us directly to an objection against Irigaray’s system. Irigaray’s theory, despite rightly 
identifying an historical lack and proposing space as the solution to the logic-of-the-one and the 
metaphysics of the solids (instances of descriptive and normative coherence), nonetheless covertly relies 
upon coherence itself. If we define coherence as the maintenance of patterns (first descriptively in 
abstracto and then normatively and practically in re through for example the law, dress code, gender 
division), then Irigaray’s notion of clearly divided and identifiable body types and ontological processes is 
an example of such patterned coherence. Whatever internal ambiguity and fluidity Irigaray might 
attribute to these processes, they exist as patterns of schemas for human existence that reliably produce, 
on her account, humans differentiated into two, and only two, groups. This is not to suggest an outright 
teleology on Irigaray’s part (she resists such limitations), but rather the presence of what she considers a 
natural order that inevitably manifests itself in the structure of dualistic sexual difference. Processes, 
then, are patterns, for if they were truly unpredictable (recall Irigaray’s image of turbulent fluids) and 
ambiguous then they would not result in clearly differentiated sexes, let alone the idea of sex itself.122 
Moreover, if we accept the definition of patterned coherence given above, then the following epistemic 
questions arise: how is Irigaray able to identify the existence or abstract the nature of this sexual pattern 
within the limited finitude of her own experience? How is she able to know that it applies to others 
when, on the basis of her own ontological negative, the other (especially the male other) is unknowable 
to her? 
The maintenance of coherence requires a limitation and control of space (potential) and the way energy 
(work) and matter (bodies, resources) are distributed within that space. Despite the centrality of space in 
Irigaray’s thought, her system of duality actually requires the regulation of space, insofar as it designates 
space only for those who are either male or female. We can also suggest that the notion of 
                                                 
119 Not to be confused with the death and sacrifice Irigaray identifies in the traditional Epistemology W. That 
death refers to the negation and non-being of anything outside the representational system whereas the 
death referred to here, as we shall soon see, presupposes the end of the system itself as its own beginning by 
assuming knowledge of all elements without encountering them all. Both are nonetheless relevant and can 
coexist within the same representational pattern: a pattern that denies anything outside itself, and then 
proceeds to repeat itself by assuming it knows its own end and therefore the full extent of its 
nature/definition. 
120 Which reminds us of the Problem of Induction. 
121 Which is something we do all the time since we are finite beings and must make decisions. 
122 That is, they could not be relied upon to reliably select “sex”, whatever sexual types may exist, as a single 
category from the range of embodied experiences. 
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“performance” requires a “script” of some sort. That is, the material body of the individual requires the 
interposition of a script or code of imperatives before unmediated gesture, desire, sensation, and 
appearance are transformed into an identifiable social role or performance.123 Recalling Diagram 1, this 
script begins by identifying, describing, and thus unifying or grouping specific bodily features into an 
identity (“you are x”), before applying regulations, expectations, and norms to the constructed identity 
(“as x, you belong here and should do a, b, and c”) and placing it in a structure of relations with other 
identities; rather like signs or words in semiotics. The script turns the performer into a cultural letter that 
can be grouped and regrouped coherently with others into sentences. This should be fairly easy to 
identity as a forward linear progression: in order for me to place you in a particular social role, I must first 
have identified you as x. Therefore, first comes descriptive identity, followed by prescriptive relation, 
culminating in a system, which, of course, existed from the very beginning with the first act of 
identification. Indeed, is the word “script” not in both “pre-script-ion” and “de-script-ion”, whether such 
descriptions and prescriptions are biologically essentialist, or not? The script thus comes to stand for the 
body, to mask it, or occupy the space of the body, and the interval between the body-as-apodictically-
experienced and the body-as-performed-socially. In some sense then, the script unfairly demands of the 
individual a degree of schizophrenia, which is what Bordo (2000:242)  has in mind when she refers to 
“the double bind of masculinity” requiring men to be both paragons of intelligence and reason, and at 
the same time virile, rough, athletes and beasts. The very word “masculine” has come to mean 
“aggressive” in common culture, regardless of whether the overwritten bodies and temperaments of 
men (and women?) are in fact suited to such scripts. Sometimes the script expects such contradictions, 
but there is always a more fundamental contradiction between the constructions of the script and the 
reality of the body.124 
It is also very important to remember that performances of any kind, by definition, require suspension of 
disbelief: not just schizophrenia then, but amnesia as well. In order for us to take a performance 
seriously, we must forget that there are individuals beneath the roles they have been cast in, who are 
participating in the collective reading of a script. The normative typology, whether it be racial 
segregation, patriarchy, or heteronormativity, takes for granted and forgets that the “types” it relies on 
are, in fact, descriptive identifications (as opposed to self-determined identities) in a prior, arbitrary, and 
contingent vocabulary, which then receives codification in normative structures such as the law. By 
“forgetting” that the categories of humans are to a large extent fictions, actors, and that the real 
individuals beneath are only partially described by the fiction, such identificatory typologies become 
hegemonic since they conceal their own mechanism, or the fact that there is a script. Like varnished 
wood or painted walls, the performance, which is nothing more than a patterned coherence, builds up a 
patina of more and more de-scriptions, justifications, and pro-/pre-scriptions until the point of departure, 
an arbitrary selection of named anatomical features, is erased. For instance, implicit 
racialisation/racialism becomes subsumed under the overt and visible actions of racism, meaning that the 
real problem – the identification of types that makes racism possible at all – is concealed, and instead the 
debate turns upon how to treat those types, whether in oppressive or emancipatory situations, such as 
apartheid or affirmative action. 
 
                                                 
123 I acknowledge that similarities can perhaps be drawn here with Butler’s work on performativity in Gender 
Trouble (2007), but I will not be providing an account of Butler in this thesis. 
124 An appeal such as mine here to a “real” body beneath social roles and representations is problematic and 
perhaps naïve. But recall here that I drew a distinction at the beginning of this thesis between unmediated 
(ostensibly “real”) and mediated bodies (socially constructed). My distinction does not fall into essentialism or 
over-description since I ascribe very little to such bodies beyond the experience of pleasure and pain, or being 
physically limited or enabled by a body; such as being too tall for a doorway or stubbing one’s toe. To argue 
that everything is socially constructed is to undermine one’s own argument since this removes the body that 
can be constructed or misrepresented in the first place; moreover it removes incentives for acting against 
injustice since an absent body cannot be misrepresented or mistreated. A bare minimum, rather like Moore’s 
hand, seems necessary. It is this bare minimum that I am appealing to. 
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But I would like to suggest here as well that the notion of “script” is also useful as a tool for conceptual 
reverse engineering.125 From the presence of a heavily-articulated system of values, we can reliably infer 
the existence of a prior script, and from that, the existence of a prior body that has been effaced to some 
degree; put differently, we can infer the presence of an over-extended, thick, positively specific 
representation at the expense of a real body beneath it. This, I think, is what Irigaray had in mind with the 
logic-of-the-one (and, of course, the system of Epistemology W extrapolated from it). From the logic-of-
the-one’s performance, the ritual sacrifice and negation of a lack (being the maternal, the feminine, the 
fluid and ambiguous), she was able to infer, rightly, the presence of an unjustly overwritten body 
beneath, and hence able to redeem the muted values associated with femininity such as motherhood, 
touch, and intimacy under a new script, Epistemology I. 
This, however, leads us to conclude that there are three issues with Irigaray’s own logic-of-the-two. The 
first is that Irigaray does not entertain the possibility that the patriarchal script of Epistemology W 
misrepresents men as much as women. The second is that she does not explore the ways in which her 
own dual-logic, Epistemology I, represents yet another script and therefore another possibility for 
denying certain features of the body. The third is that the male/female duality presented as a solution 
does not entertain the existence of other bodies or subjectivities outside that script and thus establishes 
the performance of a new hegemonic typology, albeit a typology of two (difference)126 rather than one 
(sameness). This move from one to two subjects might suggest the possibility of moving toward “the 
many”. This will be taken up shortly. For now, it is worth considering the issue of sameness/difference in 
order to see whether “difference” does in fact represent the opposite of “sameness”, and therefore 
whether difference is a solution to sameness as Irigaray envisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
125 Similar to “code switching” in sociology. A speaker’s introduction of a new vocabulary, or code, or even 
manner of speaking, can be taken to reliably indicate that the speaking subject is switching “roles” or identities 
in response to the context; for instance, the sudden difference in vocabulary and tone when having to answer 
a call from one’s employer while with a group of friends. 
126 Although as will be stressed below, this is not true difference, since “difference” can be rewritten as a 
“sameness of difference” that still represents one new solution (the hegemony of a duality). 
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Difference is a sameness of difference, but multiplicity and neutrality are not samenesses 
[I]t is not possible to rediscover this path back to the self in any other way that brings both 
vitality and happiness. Anything else falls back into the opposition of the one and the many, 
into subjection (Irigaray, 2000a:173). 
[A]t a certain level equality corresponds to the sacrifice of difference, ultimately to its 
erasure (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:139). 
Not all subjects are the same, nor equal, and it wouldn’t be right for them to be so. That’s 
particularly true for the sexes (Irigaray, 2007:14). 
Instead of pursuing cultural development, the world is retreating to the minimum grounds 
for human definition […] what appears to be the reasonable way is utopian or misguided. 
Why? Women and men are not equal. And the strategy of equality, when there is one, 
should always aim to get differences recognised (Irigaray, 2007:76-77). 
The multiple goes well with the logic of the one – or the One – and even postulates it 
(Irigaray, 2004:72). 
How can the double demand – for both equality and difference – be articulated? (Irigaray, 
1985b:81). 
How can we get out of these false dilemmas: difference equals hierarchy[?] (Irigaray & 
Lotringer, 2000b:11). 
The claim that women are different, that they possess difference, is often used to justify 
gender inequality when in fact it is not justification at all. Difference is not a property but a 
term of comparison or relationship. That women are perceived to be different in relation to 
a male-defined norm is not a reason for gender inequality but a reflection of it (Disch, 
1992:15). 
We have already mentioned the idea that Irigaray’s invariably unfavourable treatment of the concept of 
sameness (whether in male homosociality or mathematical self-reference) and her invariably positive 
assertion of difference in response to sameness (whether in revaluing the female body on its own terms 
or in the ontological negative), is both a reactionary and insular enterprise insofar as it sweepingly 
generalises the application of one concept (difference) as the only solution to another (sameness) on the 
basis of a historical contingency – there having been the use of sameness under patriarchy as a means of 
oppression. My suggestion here is that this reaction, and Irigaray’s further insistence that anything 
outside either sameness or difference is necessarily, in some way, still a regression to sameness, sets up a 
false dichotomy in which, if “sameness” is unethical, its opposite “difference” must logically be ethical, 
and given the exclusion of other alternatives, must also be the only alternative. Moreover, I contend that 
the use of the sameness/difference divide, where sameness manifests as oppression and difference as 
liberation, does nothing to solve the problem of arbitrarily selecting physical features such as skin colour 
or genitalia and the subsequent ordering of human subjects according to those features, and the 
assumption underlying the argument of this thesis is precisely that such typologies of identification 
always misrepresent (and subsequently mistreat) some or other excluded aspect of human identity. In 
this sense, arguing between “sameness” and “difference” is a pseudo-problem insofar as both lead to 
precisely the same issues of assuming the existence of “types” of subjects at all (recall Diagram 1, stage 
one), attributing moral properties to those types (stage two), and ultimately misrepresenting and 
mistreating those types (on the basis of a necessarily incomplete representation or type) when the 
typology becomes an enforced or policed template for organising society (stage three); especially if the 
representations or “types” are generalised, as Irigaray does with “men” and “women”. 
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Both sameness and difference are problematically patterned as both require a coherent repetition and 
(re)production of the same general descriptive and prescriptive structure (whether universalising monism 
or duality as particular examples) into the future.127 Multiplicity, however, since it takes as its only 
starting axiom the negative non-specific sameness of allowing all difference, steps outside the very 
condition of patterned coherence and hierarchy by assuming virtually no descriptive or prescriptive 
function, and thus I oppose Irigaray’s reading of multiplicity as a regression to the “same” or the “one”. 
Multiplicity may be defined instead as the refusal to take a single reference point, such as sex (and 
subsequently either male or female or both) or race, as the starting point for defining a subject’s identity. 
Difference, however defined, is simply another appeal to sameness. “We are all different in manner x” or 
“we are all different in sharing property x” is a statement that 1) says the same thing about all the people 
it refers to, and 2) generalises the same category of experience. A typically Irigarayan statement such as 
“there exist only men and women, and men and women are different”128 can be rewritten without losing 
its truth value as “there exists nothing that is different outside the sameness of being either male or 
female”. The attempt to argue the opposition of sameness and difference essentially boils down to 
arguing semantics and creating a pseudo-problem. Put simply, we can rewrite all propositions in Irigaray’s 
oeuvre which contain the word “different” as statements expressed in terms of “sameness”,129 while still 
saying what Irigaray herself wishes to say.130 Once this is done, it becomes clear not only that the appeal 
to difference in any simple sense does not solve the problem of oppressive sameness (since it is 
sameness), but also that objections to sameness can be levelled against difference as well. In other 
words, the words “sameness” and “difference” can both truthfully denote injustice at the same time, in 
much the same way as “I am where I am” and “I am not where I am not” can both truthfully denote 
where I am, at the same time. Technically, “I am not where I am not” is not the negation of “I am where I 
am”; but that is irrelevant since our point here is that p and not-p both denote the same thing and by 
Euclid’s Law are equivalent. Furthermore, the contingent, material conditions of difference are so 
subjective and relational that one cannot a priori state, in totalising terms, that sameness and difference 
are opposites. One person’s sameness is another’s difference. 
Put differently,131 the fact that both p and not-p denote the same thing means that either there is a 
contradiction, or the statement is trivial and not-p is, in fact, not not-p. Sameness and difference are two 
ostensibly opposing words which refer to the same thing; they are logically parasitic upon one another. In 
order to avoid presenting trivialities then, a theory of equality using these categories must justify what is 
the same or different, how it is so, and why this matters. It must also demonstrate that what we consider 
the “same” or “different” stays that way across time for all people and does not revert to the opposite, 
otherwise it risks a contradiction. Clearly such a typology is not only empirically impossible but also 
ethically undesirable. Talking about sameness/difference, whether in sex, race, or dis/ability, does not 
                                                 
127 A good example is Irigaray’s call for new female genealogies in Epistemology I in response to the male-
centred lineages of Epistemology W. Such a pattern would no doubt exclude those who are not clearly male or 
female. The place of an intersex or transgender parent is uncertain, I would say denied, in an Irigarayan 
society. 
128 This is a formulation of my own. See the following by Irigaray: 
“[I]n humanity at large, there are only men and women” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:181), (note “only”); 
“In the entire world, there exists only men and women” (2000b:167), (again, note “only”); 
“[T]he insurmountable difference between man and woman” (2000b:106); 
“[W]oma(e)n and ma(e)n represent two different worlds, two visions of the world which remain irreducibly 
distinct” (Irigaray, 2000a:151). 
129 In much the same way as a mathematical equation can have any of its variables shuffled to express the 
others in terms of whichever one we choose, without losing the truth value. 
130 The possible objection that “difference” refers to different connotations for “men” and “women” is 
irrelevant and misses the point here. The point is that the logic of using the word “difference”, not the content 
of that difference, can be rewritten using the word “sameness”. That the truth value of the resulting 
propositions is still the same only demonstrates, again, that the content was not affected and is not of concern 
here. This is a semantic issue conceptually independent of whatever “properties” or “variations” of difference 
we may wish to ascribe to “men” and “women”. 
131 No pun intended this time. 
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help since it does not get us beyond the discussion of the same physical markers. Nor does it clearly state 
what is different/same for whom, since what x considers to be their defining “difference” is to person y 
an indication of x’s sameness. Sameness and difference, by definition, require comparison; yet any such 
comparison is relative to the observer is thus not stable enough to generalise.132 Equality needs to be 
radically rethought so as to not apply to essentialised bodily markers, since these are open to any number 
of contradictory interpretations, even for the same individual. Something similar is pointed out by Disch 
(1992:15), who argues that arguing for difference from difference might be a category error. Difference is 
a comparative relation derived a posteriori, it is not a property known a priori. Using a form of essential 
difference to argue for difference is therefore to employ “difference” in two inconsistent ways, and 
moreover to use it in arguing for itself, resulting in circularity. 
This false division between sameness and difference, and the universalising insistence that anything 
other than difference is necessarily a covert regression to masculine sameness, reaches a pitch that any 
non-heterosexual or non-cisgender person will easily recognise in the following exchange between 
Irigaray and an interviewer: 
[Interlocutor]: I’m saying that beyond a certain point I simply fail to understand the 
masculine-feminine oppositions. I don’t understand what “masculine discourse” means. 
[Irigaray]: Of course not, since there is no other. The problem is that of a possible alterity in 
masculine discourse – or in relation to masculine discourse (Irigaray, 1985b:140). 
Irigaray has here failed to grasp the question. The appeal to something beyond “the masculine-feminine 
oppositions” should be both very familiar and important to any LGBT+ person and the question, in 
suggesting a horizon beyond the point of a male/female duality, seeks to evaluate the validity of 
Irigarayan dualism in a context or space outside itself, “beyond the point” at which it no longer applies; 
we may imagine such a question being asked at a pride parade, for instance, although the context here is 
not non-heterosexual, it is automatically implied in inquiring after the validity of sexually dual language 
“beyond” the point of masculine-feminine oppositions. Beyond a certain point, the use of two to combat 
the tyranny of one, or beyond the incorrect belief that there are only two at all, the Irigarayan duality 
makes no further sense. Yet Irigaray does not answer the question, but instead dismisses it out of hand 
and reframes it as a failure on the interlocutor’s part (or that of their language) to realise that their own 
question is “actually” a symptom of the masculine order; an order that would make them fail to 
understand the masculine-feminine oppositions because it does not produce them in language, it 
acknowledges no real other (the feminine). In other words, Irigaray’s (problematic) starting axioms, that 
there are only men and women, and anything outside this is a regression to the masculine order, 
necessarily and unknowingly commit her to a position in which she can only understand questions about 
anything beyond sexual duality as failures on the questioner’s part to acknowledge the universality of 
those, and only those, dualisms. There is nothing outside the male/female duo for Irigaray; consequently 
the question “what about anything beyond the two?” must necessarily, for her, seem meaningless. This 
means that Irigaray’s assumption of a two-sex model and her treatment of everything other than doubled 
“difference” as a problematic regression to “sameness”, causes her to reliably misunderstand post- or 
trans-sex questions about anything other than a male/female duality, and to treat such questions as 
unwitting regressions to the masculine order. In the language of our introductory remarks on Diagram 1, 
Irigaray’s insistence on specific “male” and “female” bodies as first stage universalised descriptions, or 
unquestioned starting premises, commits her, after these are socially patterned using second stage 
prescriptions, to a third stage product (a male-female duality) that cannot question its own starting 
axioms and denies anything outside itself (outside a duality of only men and women). We will consider a 
number of such exchanges between Irigaray and interviewers on the topic of non-heterosexuality in 3.3. 
Ethical Implications below. 
                                                 
132 We must bear in mind, of course, the power of social institutions in generalising and establishing 
“objective” identities, into which we are born and raised. This however is not an argument for their validity 
insofar as such identities may insufficiently or incorrectly classify and police a person’s body (consider intersex 
persons and sex reassignment surgery at birth). 
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We saw in Part 1 how Irigaray opposes the logic-of-the-one and binary systems, and instead hopes for a 
duality of radical alterity; and we have agreed that these are justified aims. But a further problem is that 
in order for her to make any such claims, they have to be made in binary form, despite Irigaray’s 
objections. Her own duality has to stand in a logical relationship of direct denial with the other 
alternatives in the form below, or else she cannot deny them and assert her own position: 
 
Duality 
x 
Everything else 
Not-x 
 
This looks suspiciously like the logic-of-the-one Irigaray (rightly) aims to avoid. Let me pause here and 
clarify one point to refute a potential objection. I am well aware of the liberating fluidity, (alleged) lack of 
binary terms, and new expressive space Irigaray hopes to establish within her system of “duality”, and I 
am not denying the usefulness of those. What I am saying instead is that the external epistemological 
structure in which this hope is embedded must organise itself externally in the logic-of-the-one so as to 
deny (or negate) the legitimacy of other forms (such as binarity or neutrality). This is made even clearer 
by the observation that Irigaray cannot claim that her duality and (all) other systems cannot be placed in 
a binary of x and not-x, for then she would have no reason to deny the others, and her own claim could 
not stand. Furthermore, picking up on the totalising notion of “all”, Irigaray’s rejection of all other modes 
of relationality (on the basis of them being regressions to the same male universal) is also problematic as 
it seems to rely on mis-definitions of those alternatives. It seems unlikely and too convenient that 
everything other than Irigaray’s duality is necessarily a regression to sameness. This seems even less likely 
since some of these alternatives are the opposite of one another (take “multiplicity/plurality” and 
“neutrality”).133 If the set contains antithetical terms and labels all of them problematic, then it follows 
that either this is a contradiction or one of the contradictory terms is, in fact, not problematic. Put in the 
(binary) terms of sameness/difference which Irigaray herself utilises, it cannot be true that difference is 
only to be found in duality, and things as different as multiplicity and neutrality are not only semantically 
the “same” but also regressions to the same injustice.  
For several reasons then, I propose that the “dual” sexual difference in Epistemology I is too easily a false 
dichotomy, and moreover relies covertly on the logic-of-the-one. Therefore, instead of Irigaray’s own 
binary represented below: 
Duality 
x 
Everything else 
Not-x 
 multiplicity binary neutrality etc 
 
The situation might more accurately be described as a complex spectrum:134 
Multiplicity Duality Binary Neutrality 
 
                                                 
133 Where multiplicity and plurality, which I shall treat as synonymous here, refer to any range of accepted 
sexual identities that refuses countability, such as queer identity (in opposition to Irigaray’s duality), and 
neutrality refers to the preference not to be identified according to sex (or any feature, the term neutrality 
stands in relation to whatever embodied identity is in question), such as asexuality or aromanticism. Insofar as 
multiplicity is sexed here, neutrality is not-sexed, meaning they are opposite terms. 
134 The order is, of course, debatable. Neutrality would better stand off the spectrum entirely. The point is 
simply to demonstrate gradations and variations, with the possibility of those not even on the spectrum 
(asexuals, aromantics) further calling into question the universality of appeals to sex, even within the 
spectrum, as a universalisable category of experience. 
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Merely from a logical point of view then, to speak of difference is always, by necessity, to speak of 
binaries and boundaries, and as we discussed earlier, to speak of a sameness of difference. In a set 
comprised of as many elements as the English alphabet, to claim to be p and only p is to claim to be 
different from a and b and c¸ and so forth. In other words, it is always p and everyone else, which is a 
cleverly disguised binary. The impossibility of insisting that one can talk without “x and not-x” becomes 
clear when Irigaray herself is forced to state that in her own system “[t]o be a woman means not to be a 
man and to be a man means not to be a woman” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:91). For the sake of 
conceptual clarity then, we can assert that any discourse based on difference, no matter how numerous 
the elements in the set, is always necessarily a discourse based on binaries when any single element (or 
union of two elements such as “male” and “female”) is taken as a point of reference, and from this 
“ontological” distinction between elements follows a normative distinction; that is, to treat the elements 
differently. 
An elaborated version of the internal content of Irigaray’s binary can be depicted as follows. The first 
binary set up by Irigaray (within her duality) is an “either/or” between “male/female”, where “male = x” 
and “female = p”, and p is not “not-x”: 
EITHER OR 
x (male) p [NOT “not-x”] (female) 
 
Irigaray then takes the first binary and inserts it as one element into a second binary: 
EITHER OR 
EITHER OR 
(Something terrible)135 x p 
(Irigaray’s initial binary worldview) 
 
She does not, however, consider rewriting her binary as follows: 
EITHER OR 
x p (NOT “not-x”) Neither x nor p 
You are totally like 
me 
You are totally unlike 
me 
We both belong to a common third 
 
In other words, Irigaray cuts short the progress of the logic and tries to sell the false dichotomy fallacy, by 
insisting that we must either accept a world of “difference” and duality between men and women (and 
only men and women) in response to the “sameness” of patriarchy, or we must accept a world of 
“genocide” where gender is blurred and sex is not taken as the centrepiece for ethical relations (in, for 
instance, the ontological negative). It is strange, considering her poetically liberating project, to realise 
that Irigaray is ultimately constructing a taxonomy of relations: relations of x to p, x to x, and p to p. This 
sort of typology ought to be precisely the sort of thing Irigaray is pitted against. In her own words, 
Irigaray states that “[e]ach subject is indexed to a gender and addresses another subject which is equally 
                                                 
135 This overarching “either/or” where “or” refers to a non-Irigarayan world where gender is blended 
(transgender, intersex, drag) or even transcended by some individuals (asexuals, aromantics, gender-fluid 
persons) is considered unacceptable by Irigaray. “Something terrible” is a mild adjective in comparison to her 
own apocalyptic choice of words. Across her work, Irigaray uses “end of the human species” and “genocide” 
(Irigaray, 2007:4), “vehicle of death” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:152), and “holocaust” (Irigaray, 2000a:37). 
These self-same quotes will be repeated in their full form with others, and briefly remarked upon later in 3.3. 
Ethical Implications. 
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so” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:163). For someone as careful with her critique and choice of diction as 
Irigaray, the use of “indexed” reveals something of a Freudian slip.136 It is a rather clinical word, especially 
when applied to living, human subjects, and it implies the reduction of those subjects to symbols or 
elements within an ordered list or typology, much the same as an alphabet, and the limitation of the 
subject to that position: the subject is indexed to a gender.137 It also betrays the arbitrary act of 
identification and selection required by an index: we can order letters or concepts alphabetically because 
we have constructed them. We need only look at foreign alphabets, or analogously the queer body, to 
realise the inherent limitations of our own index. 
We can see this pattern of setting up binaries without carrying the logic through to its conclusion in her 
definition of subjects as well, again starting with the male universal from Chapter 1: 
Male 
SEXED 
 
Before countering it with the female: 
Male Female 
SEXED 
 
Yet Irigaray stops here. She openly states that gender-blending, crossing the sex line, is both impossible 
and unacceptable (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:91; Irigaray, 2004:70-71). We have already seen in our 
exposition of Irigaray that she thinks infinite individual variations on their own are unacceptable (Irigaray 
& Lotringer, 2000b:77-78), and that such variations can only exist in the duality between men and women 
(2000b:83). In her own words, Irigaray “refuses […] the fact that the plural of the one would be the 
multiple before being the two” (2000b:159-160). This is understandable in light of her fear of the logic-of-
the-one (the multiple being seen as a disguised singularity), and a reduction to what Irigaray calls 
“today’s greyness” (2000b:126) or “the dullness of the neuter” (Irigaray, 2007:103).138 This is short-
sighted insofar as it cannot see, or outright denies, that her own logic commits her to a gradual 
progression that moves away from singularity and duality into multiplicity, and ultimately away from sex 
in favour of a broader post-sex “common third”, starting with an acknowledgement of the existence of 
transgender, intersex, and non-heterosexual individuals: 
M F Queer/LGBT 
SEXED 
 
 
                                                 
136 The phrase “the infinity of lists” by Umberto Eco (2012) comes to mind. 
137 This ties in with our earlier discussion in this section on “scripted” typologies. 
138 Consider the following remarks by Irigaray: “[W]e can abandon the model of a single and singular subject 
altogether [But] this does not mean that the one of the subject can become many” (Irigaray, 2000a:6); 
“The argument of the plurality of citizens is not valid, either. Society is made up of two sexes” (Irigaray, 
1994:59); 
“And it is not possible that a common third still exists between us, man and woman. This is true between 
different cultures or traditions, but first of all it is true between us, between our masculine and feminine 
subjectivities” (Irigaray, 2002a:82). 
For Irigaray, the possibility of moving into the multiple or plural means moving into sameness, since it ignores 
the (privileged) difference between men and women (and only men and women), and thus does not grant an 
historical moment to recover the female body from the negation it experienced under the patriarchal logic-of-
the-one. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
88 
 
The dialectic pattern should be clear by now, but the types above still attribute positive content to sex, 
which means that they need to be adjusted for asexuality and aromanticism as below: 
M F Q Asexual 
SEXED 
Finally, just as the feminist critique displaced oppressive masculine discourse, so too does the 
authentically non-sexed, ambiguously sexed, or queer body displace universalising talk of necessarily-
sexed embodiment. 
 
M / F / LGBT / Asexual / anything goes 
POST-SEX 
 
Apart from the internal content of this process, that is, the content pertaining to sexed subjects as male, 
female, intersex, and so on, the external typologies into which they group, such as dualities or 
singularities, must also follow this dialectic process: 
 
Singularity (binary) 
(S) 
x Not-x 
PHYSICALLY MARKED 
 
This binary singularity in the diagram above represents the masculine universal diagnosed by Irigaray and 
outlined in Chapter 1, with women as not-men, or not-x. Irigaray’s solution to this singularity, the duality 
described in Chapter 2, can be represented in the diagram below. Note that so far, both instances 
(singularity and duality) have still maintained the same property – being sexed, or physically marked. The 
notion of there being men (and only men and not-men) in the patriarchal model (the singularity, or 
negational binary), and of there being men and women in Irigaray’s duality, has gone unquestioned. The 
subjects have simply been rearranged using nothing more than their genitalia. Even though the 
problematic singularity has been negated and opposed with Irigaray’s duality, the issue of being 
physically marked and identified accorded to that mark, has not. 
Singularity 
(S) 
Duality 
(~S) 
x Not-x x p 
PHYSICALLY MARKED 
 
Both of these can be opposed with a third position, (not quite the “common third” or “common 
humanity” yet) illustrated below, that of infinite individuation, in which all forms of difference and 
identity are retracted into the individual quite absolutely, such that no physical trait can be said to hold 
for all persons universally, or for any group of people (such as “femininity” for women in the latter case, 
or “sexuality” for all persons regardless of sex in the former). In such a position, difference itself becomes 
the common denominator and an absolute category of experience, such that the having of a difference is 
more fundamental than the having of a specific difference, the latter of which might simply be called 
“sameness”. This has the advantage of maintaining difference without being exclusionary, a type of 
“commonality of plurality”. 
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S 
(S) 
D 
(~S) 
Infinite 
Individuation 
(~[S.~S]) 
x/not-x x/p a, b, …p, x… z… 
PHYSICALLY MARKED 
 
Yet this position, despite presenting a chain of difference and opposition from singular to duality to 
infinite individuation, has still carried over the same physical property – the assumed existence, and 
assumed normative importance, of sex as a bodily marker. Therefore, for the dialectic process to 
complete itself, the assumption of sex, either as something which is different or the same between 
individuals, must also be opposed. Hence: 
Common Third 
~(~[S.~S]) or “none of the above”. 
Anything goes. 
POST PHYSICAL/EMBODIED MARKERS 
 
In such a state of multiplicity, difference is not a determining constituent element of people, nor is it an 
end goal; rather, difference is the initial and varying means by which the same equality is achieved. 
Difference is simply the route by which we construct physical access to all buildings for all persons, or 
achieve equal pay. It is the contingent means, not the essential identity. 
If we polarise difference into two subjects and make it absolutely irreducible, as Irigaray does, then we 
become oppressively exclusionary. If we collapse difference into a single sameness, then we again 
become similarly oppressive. What is needed is an entirely new vocabulary of embodiment (one that 
takes fluid materiality seriously) and subsequently moral vocabulary, that can navigate beyond the Scylla 
and Charybdis of difference and sameness. We saw previously that the old patriarchal definition of 
difference was in fact disguised sameness; in this regard Irigaray showed that “I am different from you” 
requires a point of comparison, and generally a problematic one at that. We also saw that Irigaray 
proposed a new solution along the lines of “I am different”, where that difference is so radical and 
outside our present conceptual vocabulary that “from you” is almost meaningless. Yet we demonstrated 
that Irigaray’s solution, the most prominent one, is inadequate. Instead of the standard “I am different 
from you”, what is needed is a new understanding, with a new language. I am drawn here to an 
unassuming phrase in Dan Savage’s introduction to Miller’s ground-breaking 1971 essay On Being 
Different. Part of Savage’s story is worth quoting here: 
I was with my mom and dad and siblings at Water Tower Palace, an upscale shopping mall 
near downtown Chicago. We were going to the movies […] and in front of us in line were 
two young gay men. They were holding hands. I was maybe eleven years old – old enough to 
be aware, painfully so, of being different from other boys. […] While my parents could only 
see perverted weirdos […] I saw a future for myself. I was different like them; they were 
different like me. I was going to grow up to be like them. And they didn’t look unhappy. They 
looked like they were in love. They looked free (Savage in Miller, 2012:xiii-xiv). 
“Different like.” What this oxymoron suggests is not so much a contradiction as part of a solution. It 
suggests, again, that “sameness” and “difference” are not diametrically opposed concepts, but ones 
which intertwine and can be expressed in the same language, meaning that a solution cannot be 
expressed using only sameness or only difference. Note Savage’s observation that he was both “different 
from” and “different like” members of the same sex. Trivially, it is true that he was “essentially” the same 
as all men by virtue of his sex; and likewise he was “merely” different from some by virtue of his 
orientation, but that is missing the point here. The point is that “male” slowly becomes an empty 
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category as its necessary properties (such as orientation and chromosomal count) are proven contingent 
and shared by others of the opposite category (women, for instance). It no longer becomes meaningful to 
talk of oneself as being “different” or “like” another, precisely because that point of reference has been 
erased. Moreover, Savage’s poignant childhood recollection reminds us that in some very important 
instances, sameness is often a necessary and life-saving (if strategic and temporary) means of escaping 
the oppressive logic of the one – if x is oppressive then it makes sense to identify as the same as y, which 
is different from x. In Irigaray, such a community of sameness which is different can be found between 
women, despite her resistance “sameness”. Once again, we see the lines between “same” and “different” 
become fuzzy as the same words are employed in contradictory senses at the same time or employed in 
outright conjunction, an important point since Irigaray’s central premise is the alleged opposition of 
“sameness” and “difference”, and the space for ethics between the two. Since the majority of Irigaray’s 
oeuvre, certainly her later oeuvre, is comprised mainly of propositions expressing not only the existence 
and properties of “men”, “women”, and “sex”, but also the “difference” and “sameness” of these 
“sexes”, we may now do what we did in the previous critical section: treat “sameness/difference” as 
“gappy” words and substitute them in the text with equally unverifiable alternatives, or empty variables 
such as “X”. If we take a typically Irigarayan statement from her later work such as “In sexual difference, 
the fact that men and women belong to two different worlds” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:85), the 
following is obtained when words “referring” to sex and sameness/difference are replaced, bearing in 
mind the substitutes suggested in the previous section as well: “In blessed X, the fact that satyrs and 
nymphs belong to two X worlds”. This statement makes about as much sense to a queer person as the 
original Irigarayan version would. In a way then, the oxymoronic “I am different like you” speaks to the 
absurdity of using both difference and sameness, typically through essentialist bodily markers, as a point 
of reference. We are similar to others precisely in being different; if authentic pluralism is the aim, then 
the contents of difference need not be specified, since “difference” no longer refers. 
This is what I intend when I use the words “plurality” or “multiplicity”. They do not denote an 
undifferentiated grey monism, for that would require a single sameness as the reference point for the 
group’s connotation, and that would be to miss Irigaray’s warning about regressing to the logic-of-the-
one, whether the “one” is taken as “male”, “white”, “heterosexual”, or any other unquestioned universal 
based on a contingent physical trait. Rather, multiplicity in this sense takes as its reference point “the 
allowance of all reference points”, and what follows is a “set of all sets” conceptual anomaly that 
undercuts the very possibility of both sameness and difference, since unlike the logic-of-the-one 
(sameness) and unlike Irigaray’s own logic-of-the-two (difference), multiplicity does not presume to know 
anything enduring about the properties of its members (such as sex in Irigaray) and thus does not create 
arbitrarily “mediated” or scripted bodies according to those traits, with lines of division drawn between 
different types of bodies (such as the male/female divide across Irigaray’s ontological negative). 
Instead of drawing the various circles of its inclusion around specific, positive, disparate properties within 
humans, such as sex or ethnic origin, and thus running the risk of exclusion, multiplicity casts its circle as 
wide as the human race by taking something negative and absolutely minimal and universal, such as the 
right to life, or the dignity of free self-determination, or the ability to be injured, and says “anything 
goes”. I have argued against Irigaray’s deployment of “difference” in opposition to “sameness”, yet an 
objection may arise since the notion of multiplicity suggested here requires difference of a radical kind. 
This suggests a contradiction, or at least an inconsistency. I would like to suggest that it does not. I am 
opposed to Irigaray’s use of difference solely as a duality of difference, and I am also opposed to any 
difference, no matter the number of types involved, so long as that difference arbitrarily selects and 
enforces a universalised or generalised identity using a specific trait, such as skin pigmentation. In 
contrast, as already pointed out, multiplicity does not do this. This is vital to grasp, as it represents, at 
least I hope, the possibility of a solution to the sameness/difference (pseudo) dichotomy without 
presupposing and policing a single definition of personhood. This possibility will be taken up again later 
and explored in Chapter 4. 
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3.3. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In the entire world, there exists only men and women (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:167). 
[H]e means he, she means she (Irigaray, 2007:42). 
I start from reality, from a universal reality: sexual difference (Irigaray & Lotringer, 
2000b:146). 
I start from the love between a man and woman (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:162). 
[N]ormally […] “I love you” is said to an enigma: an “other”. An other body, an other sex 
(Irigaray, 1980:70). 
Yes, there’s an irreducible mystery between man and woman. It’s not at all the same kind of 
mystery that exists between woman and woman or between man and man (Irigaray quoted 
in Hirsh et al., 1995:110). 
It has been my observation, and I have done considerable looking into the matter, that 
relationships are very much the same, no matter what the sex of the people involved (Miller, 
2012:34). 
For every news 
Means pairing off in twos and twos 
Another I, another You 
Each knowing what to do, 
But of no use. 
[…] 
For fear 
Is over there 
And the centre of anger 
Is out of danger 
(Auden, 2013:43). 
 
Our ensuing discussion on the ethical aspects of Irigaray’s theory will be based primarily on her 
problematic placement of sexual difference as the condition of morality between subjects (remember her 
stereotyped definitions of men and women in 2.1. Metaphysics of Fluids and her placement of the ethical 
relation as one between different sexes on either side of the ontological negative in 2.3. Ontological 
Negative), where such a difference on her view requires subjects who are not only sexed (as a first 
assumption) but also of the opposite sex (a second assumption), and exist in a relation of paired desire 
that matches this opposition (a third assumption, heterosexuality). By definition, this view wrongly 
excludes same-sex relations from the same degree of ethicity Irigaray ascribes to the heterosexual couple 
(since morality is maintained via difference) and it incorrectly assumes that all subjects are both clearly 
and identifiably sexed (two unspecified or ambiguously sexed subjects cannot easily be called 
“different”), and are all sexed either male or female (a cisgender assumption excluding intersex and 
transgender persons). In exploring the ethics of her appeal to heterosexual difference, we will first 
consider her rare remarks directed at homosexuality, and her tendency to read homosexuality through a 
heterosexual bias. Thereafter, we will again take up the concept of “space” as a point of reference for 
ethics, and consider the ways in which Irigaray’s male/female duality, or logic-of-the-two, suppresses or 
negates space (as the patriarchal logic-of-the-one did to the female body) by denying the existence of the 
queer body outside the duality of the male/female society. The chapter will conclude with remarks about 
the possibility of the misrepresentation of men in Irigaray’s theory. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
92 
 
Unhappily, some very Gay interviews 
It is telling to note that Irigaray does not engage anywhere in her work with any counter-readings or 
alternatives which are contrary to her own reading of both patriarchy and her construction of “sexual 
difference”; her works are either limited to her own close readings of historical texts without recourse to 
secondary sources (mainly her early work), or polemics elaborating her own theory of “sexual difference” 
in short manifestos (mainly her later work, see for instance Democracy Begins Between Two and Je, Tu, 
Nous), again without recourse to secondary sources. In this sense her work is solely reactionary insofar as 
it exists in response to a prior tradition (patriarchy) and insular insofar as it ignores other contemporary 
readings (such as queer theory) – a point we have already briefly raised in 3.1. Empirical Facts. This is 
especially true regarding the lack of LGBT+ perspectives in her work, and indeed, under her 
generalisation that all persons are always either male or female, and only male or female, it is 
enormously problematic since she denies the very existence of queer people, a flaw serious enough to 
destabilise any conclusions she may wish to draw on universal terms. Irigaray’s only remarks on non-
heterosexuality, apart from the usual disparaging remarks about male homosociality and “men-among-
themselves”, appear outside the writings of her oeuvre in the form of interviews when she is pressed on 
the matter, and even there the discussions are notably short and quickly dismissed by her. Let us begin 
our discussion of the ethical dimensions of Irigaray’s work with that which is most obviously, and most 
painfully, excluded from her theory, the LGBT+ individual, and her remarks in interviews. 
R Rossanda: Your questioning “how” to communicate between the sexes, in I Love to You, 
starts with a thesis of the irreducibility of one sex to the other, the radical mistake of 
attempting to appropriate the other or to belong to the other. But isn’t this just as true in a 
relationship between two people of the same sex? No-one belongs to another person, 
because of each person’s singularity, in body and mind, as an inviolable entity that one 
cannot possess without damaging oneself. 
L Irigaray: Of course, each person is different. But this infinite differentiation of individuals 
does not allow one to structure relationships in twos or collectively. It remains on the 
horizon of the opposition between the One and the multiple […] To think in terms of 
difference between men and women at once means pursuing the constitution of human 
identity, the construction of History (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:77-78). 
“Of course…but”, or a quick dismissal. Irigaray’s response here reveals not only a bias that is both 
cisgender and heteronormative, but one trapped within the problematic pseudo-problem, or false 
dichotomy, of sameness/difference that we already discussed in the previous two sections of Chapter 3. 
Her assumption that there are two and only two types, and that the only way to counter historical 
“sameness” is through new “difference”, necessarily commits her to the rejection of anything other than 
“the two”. Notice how she does not approach same-sex relations at all; her response immediately states 
that homosexuality, confusingly called “this infinite differentiation” since everything other than 
male/female, whether infinite multiplicity, neutrality, or queer gender-blending is a regression to a 
problematic “One” in her view (recall, again, 3.2. Epistemic Coherence), “does not allow one to structure 
relationships in twos”. Why should we want to? Her “two”, after all, is male/female. In other words, 
Irigaray’s response to the question “what about homosexual relations?” is simply “yes, but they don’t 
allow a heterosexual structure”; not only is this a total evasion of the question, but it is also exclusionary. 
Note, on this ethical point, that Irigaray goes on to state precisely this exclusion: thinking in terms of the 
difference between men and women “at once means pursuing the constitution of human identity”, 
alarmingly eclipsing the possibility of a human identity outside being either male or female, meaning 
transgender or intersex persons. Even if we are generous and suppose that for Irigaray “human identity” 
(a very broad and sweeping term in the first place) is not limited to the male or female subject (although I 
am arguing that Irigaray thinks it is), she still supposes it begins with male and female subjects, which is 
not much better since it is clearly empirically false (there are not only male and female subjects) and, 
again, ethically exclusionary. Why, for instance, should we say that race begins with “white”, and all else 
is a derivative? This trend is typical of Irigaray’s comments on non-heterosexuality. 
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E. Weber: In I Love to You you focus on heterosexual relationships in search of sexual 
identity. Why couldn’t women or men define their sexual identity with someone of the same 
sex? 
L. Irigaray: We are begotten by woman and man, we live in a society of women and men. 
Whatever our sexual choice may be, we have to resolve the question of the two human 
genders’ cohabitation […] they belong to only one gender. To be a woman means not to be a 
man and to be a man means not to be a woman (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:91). 
Again, Irigaray avoids the question. She does not approach the notion of same-sex desire on its own 
terms, but answers only by remarking on the value of heterosexuality. To begin, two very necessary 
reminders that should be familiar: The description of homosexuality (or any sexuality) as a “choice” is one 
of the iconic homophobic objections to same-sex relations; the usual language is “lifestyle choice”. 
Sexuality is not a choice, and such language occupies an intensely familiar and defamatory place as hate 
speech in LGBT+ memory. (This is a controversial reading of Irigaray, and more will be said shortly on 
whether we can fairly equate offensive speech with her comment, and whether she intends it as such.) 
Secondly, “to be a man means not to be a woman” is simply a (presumably unintentional) rewriting of the 
standard “be a man!” (Irigaray herself emphatically states “he means he” (2007:42)), or its equivalents 
“homosexual men are not men”, “gays are women”, or “’n man is nie ‘n moffie nie”, since “man” or “he” 
is assumed in standard language (and in Irigaray’s model of sex) to mean both heterosexual and not-
feminine. It may of course be objected in Irigaray’s defence that she does not herself extend “be a man” 
into “homosexual men are not men”, but the point is that the logical implication, or the capacity to 
derive such a statement legitimately, is openly there. This is because Irigaray’s phrase “to be a man 
means not to be a woman” is exactly analogous to “to be a man means not to be feminine” (recall, 
Irigaray draws no distinction whatsoever between sex and gender and considers gender causally 
produced by sex). What Irigaray means when she says men are men, is that men are cisgender with 
penises, heterosexual, and not feminine. What homophobic objectors mean when they say men are men, 
is also that men are cisgender with penises, heterosexual, and not feminine. Furthermore, both examples 
imply prescriptions as much as descriptions in order to maintain the “manly man” definition; that is, the 
Irigarayan description “to be a man means not to be a woman” contains the further moral injunction to 
“be a man”, especially since the man/woman dichotomy is vital to her ideal society, which requires the 
enforcement of “difference” between sexed subjects. Thus a little linguistic digging reveals both cases, 
Irigarayan and homophobic, to be identical, whatever the difference in their histories. Whether Irigaray 
intends it as such or not, and it is possible that she does not, the language is nonetheless identical, and 
identical conclusions can be drawn from them; moreover Irigaray herself goes on to describe a culture 
between men and women as a culture of “natural attraction […] of love and attraction between a man 
and a woman” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:103), which, if anything, supports the reading of her remarks 
as homophobic, and thus we may now call them blatantly so. Note what is left out, negated - 
“unnatural”, which of course, is one of the other classic objections to homosexuality. It is also worth 
pointing out, thirdly, that regardless of whether Irigaray’s language can be read as homophobic or not, 
the statement “to be a woman means not to be a man and to be a man means not to be a woman” is 
without question transphobic;139 not only to transgender individuals, but also to intersex and queer 
individuals. The statement quite simply means “women are feminine and have only vaginas, men are 
masculine and have only penises”. There is no other “metaphorical” context in which to redeem and 
reinterpret a statement that outright denies, firstly, the existence of other bodies, and secondly, the 
possibility of crossover or gender-blending (“they belong to only one gender”). 
 
                                                 
139 In its guidelines for accurate journalism, the American LGBT+ organisation GLAAD dedicates several pages 
to correct queer terminology. Under the section “Terms to Avoid”, phrases such as “biologically male” and 
“born a woman” are designated inappropriate (note Irigaray’s frequent use of precisely such phrases) and the 
following is added: “Problematic phrases like those above are reductive and overly-simplify a very complex 
subject […] Finally, people are born babies: they are not ‘born a man’ or ‘born a woman’” (GLAAD, 2017:15). 
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Fortunately, some respite is to be found. The following remark constitutes the sole act of potentially 
positive recognition of non-heterosexuality I could find in Irigaray’s work: 
The love relation is always the most difficult […] The difficulty however is not limited 
exclusively to heterosexual relations, but to homosexual ones as well (Irigaray & Lotringer, 
2000b:140-141). 
While not obviously positive, this comment by Irigaray has the advantage of not denying the existence of 
non-heterosexuality or reinterpreting it along cisgender or heterosexual lines (yet, as we will see). 
Moreover, it suggests a similarity between same- and opposite-sex relations by at least including 
homosexuality within the scope of “the love relation” (which is still nonetheless assumed to be 
heterosexual, note “not limited exclusively to heterosexual relations”) and implying the difficulties faced 
by both types of couples are similar. However, in the next sentence our hopes are dashed as Irigaray 
again proceeds to reframe the specificities of homosexuality in terms of heterosexuality: 
Without knowing how to deal with the problem of relating to others which the culture of 
difference demands, even the love relation between members of the same sex is bound to 
fail (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:141). 
Why should homosexuals learn how to relate to each other by observing how the sexually-different 
others of the “culture of difference” (the Irigarayan male/female duality) relate? Irigaray makes it clear 
throughout her oeuvre that “other” only ever refers to the other sex,140 and the “culture of difference” is 
not general difference but sexed difference. In essence, Irigaray is therefore, unwittingly or not, doing 
here what she accused the patriarchal Epistemology W of doing: interpreting the other in terms of the 
same. In the old representational order this was the interpretation of women (other) according to a 
masculine template (same), here it is the interpretation of non-heterosexuality (other) according to the 
new Irigarayan heterosexual dual of Epistemology I (same). Ironically then for a theorist of difference, 
Irigaray is treating non-heterosexual couples as the same as her vaunted heterosexual couple. Beginning 
her statement with heterosexuality (“others”, “the culture of difference”) and rhetorically parenthesising 
same-sex desire beyond the comma as an afterthought in terms of the initial heterosexuality, (note the 
emphasis of “even”, as though homosexual desire is an exception) only further supports the reading of 
“others” and “culture of difference” as referring specifically to heterosexuality rather than difference in 
general. This extract provides a particularly clear and disturbing example of the shortcomings of Irigaray’s 
“ethics” of sexual difference. Note also the approving use of the verb “demands” – again, for Irigaray the 
solution, and the only solution to be demanded, is one of difference. By substitution we can yield an 
equally problematic example for clarification: “Without knowing how to deal with the problem of relating 
to our own members of our own white race, which the culture of racial endogamy demands, even the 
love relation between members of different races is bound to fail”.141 As with the biased heterosexual, 
cisgender starting point of her remarks in the previous exchange, the current extract shows how 
Irigaray’s conflation of the concept “sameness” with patriarchal oppression, especially in the logic-of-the-
one we discussed in Chapter 1, and her subsequent insistence (demand) for difference, and only 
difference as the condition of ethics, traps her in a position in which she cannot conceptualise legitimate 
“relations of sameness”, such as homosexuality on their own terms. Instead, she must resort to treating 
them as unnatural subsections or special cases derived from a heterosexual reading of difference, which is 
assumed by her to not only be descriptively correct (that there are two sexes, and only two sexes with 
specific properties), but also prescriptively justified (that there should be two sexes, a relation of desire 
between them, and that ethicity should be based on that difference). It is safe to assert as strongly as 
possible that Irigaray’s view here is wholly unjustified. 
 
                                                 
140 “[N]ormally […] “I love you” is said to an enigma: an “other”. An other body, an other sex” (Irigaray, 
1980:70). Note the use of “normally” as an adjective privileging heterosexuality. The implication is thus 
abnormality for non-heterosexuality. 
141 I have already dealt at length with the reasons why it does not matter which way around sameness and 
difference are used in the logic of such propositions. See especially footnote 95 on page 61, and the section 
“Difference is a sameness of difference” in 3.2. Epistemic Coherence. 
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Finally, Irigaray responds directly to the question of homophobia, albeit in her familiarly evasive way: 
Q: In the United States your work is sometimes misunderstood as homophobic, has been 
perceived as homophobic by certain writers. That’s what inspires the later question. 
A [Irigaray]: I think this isn’t fair, because I believe that when Speculum was understood as 
simply homophile, in part because  of an error of translation, and when it became clear that I 
wasn’t simply a homophile, then they said I was a homophobe, because people didn’t know 
how to think the difference fairly. Then, either one is a homophile or a homophobe? 
(Irigaray quoted in Hirsh et al., 1995:105). 
Observe, again, that Irigaray has not answered the question. Certainly it is valid to point out that 
“homophile vs homophobe” may be a false dichotomy (though how is not made clear), but pointing this 
out does not answer the question by clarifying her position on many of her own statements, which as I 
have already shown, are identical to the usual defamatory comments encountered by many LGBT+ 
persons on a daily basis. One can answer the question without submitting to the dichotomy, it is simply a 
matter of affirming or denying whether certain propositions denigrate the value of same-sex relations. 
Notice also that Irigaray’s response reframes the question as a failure on the part of interlocutors or 
critics to understand her own model of sexual difference, shifting the burden of proof. Lastly, note how it 
denies or ignores the possibility of homophobia existing at all in her thought: since her thought purports 
to exist beyond the possibility of simple binaries, the question “is it homophobic or not”, as a binary, is 
not applicable, to her mind. This is an instance of side-stepping the issue, or else of setting up the 
conditions of her own work so as to avoid the possibility of being critiqued. As a parallel, when asked “Is 
your work racist?” it is insufficient to reply “Must I be either racist or not?”, when one’s work is filled with 
comments that deny the existence of other races beyond a duality of black/white, and establish a strict 
social relationship between black and white people. 
Irigaray’s comments on non-heterosexuality are not encouraging. Far from it, many of her statements are 
unquestionably transphobic, and all display a cisgender, heteronormative bias that forces any 
consideration of non-heterosexuality in her thought to be bent through a lens that invariably reinterprets 
all instances of the “same” (for instance, a male/male couple) according to the Irigarayan model of 
“difference” (the male/female couple), since as we saw in Chapter 1, for her the “same” necessarily 
represents a regression to the logic-of-the-one, requiring disruption by the “two”. At no point can her 
language regarding the non-existence of asexual, intersex, and transgender persons be considered 
strategic. It does not represent a stepping-stone to greater diversity further down the path; it is dogmatic 
to the point of caricature. It generalises descriptions (all persons are either male or female, and only male 
or female) and denies that there will ever be anything other than “male and female”, and presents this in 
an allegedly “ethical” system to which the only alternative is an apocalyptic collapse of civilisation. 
Hyperboles and adjectives, to be sure, but they are hyperboles in Irigaray’s own language and in no way 
misrepresented or taken out of context; consider the extracts from Irigaray in the following footnote.142 
                                                 
142 Consider the following eight quotes: 
1. “This neutralisation, if it were possible, would mean the end of the human species. The human species is 
divided into two genders which ensure its production and reproduction. To wish to get rid of sexual difference 
is to call for a genocide more radical than any form of destruction there has ever been in History” (Irigaray, 
2007:4). 
2. “The world changes. Nowadays, its development seems to threaten life and the creation of values” (Irigaray, 
2007:29). Without explanation, we are left to wonder whether this is a reference to (the justified and 
welcome) trends of same-sex marriage and neutralising bathroom access, which go against the notion of 
desire and relationality as something between only men and women, and which erase the need for such 
differences in the first place. Unfortunately Irigaray confirms our fears: 
3. “What will result from the blurring of identities? Whom and what does this serve today? To surpass a still 
unaccomplished human destiny? Why this immoderation? Is it not, once again, a vehicle of death more so 
than of life?” (Irigaray & Lotringer, 2000b:152). 
4. “[G]ender neutrality puts us, individually and collectively, in danger of death” (Irigaray, 2007:73). 
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To politely use veiled language and call such statements “worrisome” or “problematic” is dishonestly 
euphemistic and inconsistently light in comparison to the statements’ own weight; and especially (but 
not solely) for those of us who are LGBT+ it is difficult, I would say inappropriate, to refrain from 
expressing outrage at such statements even in academic settings. This section of Chapter 3, after all, 
concerns itself with ethics, and as a queer person I would say that the justified response of any 
transgender, non-heterosexual, intersex, homosexual, or asexual person reading Irigaray’s views on non-
heterosexuality should be outrage.143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
5. “[N]eutralising grammatical gender amounts to an abolition of the difference between sexed subjectivities 
and to an increasing exclusion of a culture’s sexuality. We would be taking a huge step backwards if we 
abolished grammatical gender, a step our civilisation can ill afford” (Irigaray, 2007:61). 
6. “Justice in the right to life cannot be exercised without a culture of humankind comprising men and women” 
(Irigaray, 2007:73). 
7. “Sexual difference is necessary for the continuation of our species […] it’s here that life is regenerated” 
(Irigaray, 2007:7). 
8. “[I]n refusing the challenge [of instituting sexual difference] we run the risk of conflict, war and regression in 
human civilisation” (Irigaray, 2000a:12). 
143 It is ironic to note that Irigaray’s polemic insistence in her later work, in the face of whatever evidence 
might exist to the contrary, that there are men and women and only men and women defined in a particular 
manner, goes against a very prescient psychoanalytic remark made by her in her early work: “In fact, anything 
that is repeated so emphatically must be suspected of being a kind of denial or refusal of awareness […] 
Somewhere it forgets or denies that its subject has already been disguised and travestied by a certain 
speculation” (Irigaray, 1985a:162). Has not the intersex body, the transgender body, and the non-sexed body 
(race, etc) “already been disguised and travestied by a certain speculation” on Irigaray’s part, namely the prior 
and unquestioned assumption of the existence of sex, and the subsequent insistence on “male and female” as 
the only possible alternative to the old patriarchal order? Has she not, by virtue of this unquestioned starting 
assumption, foreclosed on the possibility of other bodies? 
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The ethics of space with(out?) the sameness/difference dichotomy 
We can relate these comments on non-heterosexuality back to Irigaray’s ontological negative and our 
singling out of “space” within Irigaray’s theory as a point of reference for ethics. Let us recall for a 
moment Irigaray’s diagnosis of a pervasive lack and suppression of space within Epistemology W, and 
also her warning that a descriptive order which treats itself as the self-perpetuating origin and negates all 
possibilities (spaces) outside itself (traditionally the feminine and maternal) becomes a prescriptive order 
that figures the lack outside itself as the space of death or non-being (Irigaray, 1985a:26-27), since it itself 
is being, and thus sanctions “conceptual” sacrifice, and very often real violence. This, if we remember, is a 
very important insight by Irigaray we carried over from Chapter 1, since it demonstrates how an 
ostensibly abstract and merely descriptive metaphysics of solids and binary logic-of-the-one can become 
violently prescriptive, since it ties existential and ethical concepts such as being and life to its own 
“neutral” vocabulary of positive, solid, mechanised presence (in the classic metaphysics of solids), and to 
the self (re)producing binary of x/not-x (in the logic-of-the-one). Thus it grants itself the power to declare 
dead or expendable that which falls outside its own values. 
Yet I would like to argue that Irigaray falls prey to using this sacrificial logic herself in her subsequent 
solution, causing a hidden ethical dilemma. Even though she rightly wishes to overcome such sacrificial 
negation and rehabilitate that lack into a fecund space between subjects, the fact that her solution, 
firstly, privileges one type of embodiment (sex) and, secondly, creates a system of two and only two 
subjects implies that, by her own diagnostic logic, her system merely transfers this same “void of death” 
to anything outside the new male/female duality. Indeed, evidence of this can be found in her later 
works. Irigaray frequently ties death, both biological and cultural, to the absence of two genders.144 
Consider the following line of “post-sex = death” reasoning, presented in a staggered concatenation:  
Yet the prospect of a neutral, asexual community is disturbing. […] Although life, obviously, 
is always sexed, death on the contrary no longer makes this distinction. […] A society which 
eliminates the dividing line between life and death is capable of all forms of holocaust. […] 
This is the point we have reached today (Irigaray, 2000a:37). 
Apart from the perfectly valid observation that calling asexuality145 “disturbing” is offensive to asexuals 
(and possibly aromantics), we also find the totalising assertion that life “obviously”146 is “always” sexed; 
the sweeping “obvious” means sex and its effects both are and should be clear to everyone, and the 
qualifier “always” means there is no other alternative, other than death of course. Not merely death, but 
an apocalyptic holocaust. In other words, the desire not to participate in a particular sexed 
representational order, by those of us who are neither male nor female through no fault of our own, 
means death. This should remind us of Irigaray’s observation that the masculine representational order 
meant death for women. In defence of asexuality, it should also be pointed out that there is a logical gap 
between “death no longer makes this [sexual] distinction” and the inference Irigaray makes that 
“asexuality is therefore death”. We cannot infer, as Irigaray frequently does, that gender-blending, 
asexuality, or aromanticism means “death” simply because “death”, by definition, is not-sexed. “Not-
sexed” is not the same as “a-sexual” – they are sexually different, we can note with semantic irony, and 
therefore such a line of reasoning represents a category error. All the same, returning to Irigaray’s point, 
her new man-woman representational order, by her own logic then, implies death for asexuals, 
aromantics, and perhaps demisexuals. Again, she has simply transferred the negation to a new group, 
                                                 
144 I refer the reader to the appended Irigaray index (Appendix page 116) and the entries under the heading 
“Death (post-sex, gender-blending…)”. 
145 Irigaray draws no distinction between asexuality as a sexual orientation, and asexuality as a society that 
does not recognise sex, which is already a highly problematic conflation. In fact, since Irigaray does not even 
recognise the existence or possibility of asexuality (or aromanticism) as an orientation (given her description of 
the entire cosmos and creation of life as sexed, and only death as unsexed), it might be said that she commits 
precisely the erasure or negation of a sexed dimension of being that she accuses “today’s” society of 
committing against sexual difference (or in the past, which the patriarchal logic-of-the-one of committed 
against women). 
146 “Obviously” to sexually mature adults? To all non-asexuals? 
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without realising (or admitting) this. There can thus be read a certain irony (or perhaps “tragedy” would 
be a better word) in the focus on space exclusively within the sameness/difference debate, or within 
Irigaray’s focus on space within (between) difference(s), because this focus is premised on the denial of 
any space outside the sameness/difference dichotomy. 
What can be seen here is not only a suppression of space (the denial of being or expressing that being 
outside being either male or female), but also the way in which the conditions of possibility of Irigaray’s 
system are its limits. The condition of possibility for Irigaray’s solution is the introduction of the feminine 
on equal footing, but in radical alterity, to the masculine universal. Yet maintained against anything 
outside that solution, such as the queer body, this male/female duality has solidified into a new limit that 
either negates anything outside itself (such as the very possibility or existence of a queer body), or 
reinterprets and subsumes it through the lens of (hetero, cisgender) difference (recall the interviews on 
homosexuality covered earlier). In this way, the non-space created (through negation or denial) by 
Irigaray presents us with several problems. We have already seen the first: placing anyone queer outside 
being either male or female in Irigaray’s logic-of-the-two means equating them with death. The second 
problem is the voicelessness placed upon those in the “non-space” outside the male/female duality, since 
the sphere of being and life, inhabited by only men and women, is equipped with culture, language, and 
the means of recognition. The third can be derived as a logical extension of her thought, although she 
never states it explicitly but only elliptically. Let us quickly recall here that the ontological negative, the 
interval (space) of respect placed 1) between (space) the ontology of persons who are 2) different 
(space), is the source of ethics and the premise of Irigaray’s new, (pro)creative social order outlined in 
Epistemology I. This means that those who fall outside the narrow male/female helix and the small 
ontological negative between men and women, cannot treat others or be treated ethically. They exist 
outside the possibility of difference and therefore ethics. Thus there is a double denial of space: within 
the 1) non-space of non-being and death inhabited by all non-men and non-women, there is 2) the 
additional denial of any space between members of that set. All non-binary persons exist outside the 
recognised duality of male/female, and all non-binary persons exist without the possibility of an 
ontological negative between themselves. The ontological negative exists between difference, and 
difference cannot exist in “death”; it exists between men and women, and therefore cannot exist 
between transgender, non-binary, or intersex persons. By simple extension of Irigaray’s thought we find 
that non-binary persons exist outside the possibility of lived being, cultural expression of their being, and 
ethical treatment. They are “creatures”, so to speak, without cultural, linguistic, or moral dimensions. 
Here then, to invert147 Irigaray’s earlier comment (2000a:37), is the possibility of a real holocaust. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
147 Sexed pun intended. 
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The misrepresentation of men 
In addition to the ethical ramifications of Irigaray’s views on non-heterosexuality, there are points to be 
made about her treatment of “standard” cisgender, heterosexual men within her own male/female 
duality. Several thinkers (Badinter, 1995:1,3,32; Mottier, 2008:121) have disrupted the black-and-white 
myth that patriarchy is a monolithic institution from which men can only derive benefit and women can 
only derive misery as victims, by suggesting, provocatively, that men are in fact “the weaker sex” and 
have the harder time (in contrast to the prevailing Freudian view that the passage from girlhood to 
womanhood is worse (Irigaray, 1985b:64-65; Pick 2015:60-61)).148 This move has not been made to 
subtract from feminist attempts at rethinking feminine identity or lessen the claim that women have 
been historically subjugated, but rather to broaden the feminist critique by showing that bodies have 
been misrepresented, and not just the body-as-female. Indeed, if it is true as Irigaray suggests that the 
body has been written out of the Western tradition, especially the female body, and the male body has 
either been replaced with the abstract ideal of reason or the geometrized materialistic machine, then it 
follows that the “male body” is in dire need of reinventing as much as the “female body” (assuming for 
argument’s sake here that such differences and bodies exist). 
If women have suffered a “negative” oppression of sorts, based on absence, muteness, and the denial of 
identity, then we might say men have similarly suffered a “positive” oppression, based on active policing 
and the enforcement of a particular identity. Irigaray would likely reject this not only as male 
appropriation of suffering, but also on the basis of her claim that all men are necessarily violent, non-
fluid, object-orientated, and so on, as we already saw in 2.1. Metaphysics of Fluids; for her the very 
existence of patriarchy as an oppressive institute is proof of that. In Irigaray’s view, patriarchy, as a 
monolithic unified cultural manifestation, exists because men are a certain way ontologically speaking, 
and have lived out their subjectivities so as to construct the present oppressive, hegemonic symbolic.149 
But this seems to be tying the cart before the horse and begging the question; this is an interpretation of 
men solely through patriarchy. Therefore to deny the generalisation that men are a certain way (which is, 
I contend, a reasonable denial), is to deny both men and patriarchy as the sole victors and thus the sole 
targets for a new theory. Let me be clear: I am not defending patriarchy or chauvinistic men. Rather, I am 
pointing out that Irigaray’s definition of men and women is too neat and constrained, and disrupting 
these categories (as we must since they overlap considerably, and indeed, there are not only two) 
destabilises the effectiveness of her appeals to sexual types and sexual metaphors (such as the phallus 
and set of vaginal lips), which, in turn, destabilises not only her original diagnostic critique but also her 
subsequent solution.150 Put differently, if the patriarchal Epistemology W is not an adequate description 
of the male psyche, if those with penises have also suffered certain losses under patriarchy, and if the 
sexed, phallic metaphor is not the only symbol of injustice, then this leaves Irigaray’s account incomplete 
and opens the space for other embodiments (such as race) and more diverse understandings of both the 
male and the female (such as gay men, transgender individuals, and asexuals). 
Arguably, however, there is a much larger critique behind the insight that male bodies have suffered 
under patriarchy as well, and it is a methodological rather than an ethical critique. Thinkers such as 
Irigaray are justified in their exploration of rethought feminine identities and embodiments on the 
assumption that it is not the appeal to embodiment in general, or bodily types and specificities in 
particular, that is at fault. Their projects, after all, depend on a revitalisation of embodiment, whether 
through new phenomenological analyses or the opening of new symbolic and legal spaces for expression. 
In turn, this assumption is supported by the fairly accurate observation that appeals to embodiment have 
                                                 
148 Irigaray also questions why girls should have the harder time, although she does not do this out of 
sympathy for men, but rather for the sake of critiquing the Freudian model of masculine desire to which girls 
must conform in sexual development. 
149 Even if this male symbolic is, paradoxically, premised on the denial of such a processual, bodily ontology 
(one which even men must have), by privileging abstract representation (logic, language, mathematics) and 
disembodied reason. 
150 Of course, the phallus is likely to remain as an abstract concept within the symbolic; it is after all premised 
on the separation between material penis and abstract representation. But it is still interesting to ask: what 
will the phallus become without a population of penises within it? 
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benefitted men and disadvantaged women historically. That is to say, on the basis that men have been 
“well represented” by appeals to embodied identity (being a “man” guarantees entry into the privileges 
of patriarchy), it is assumed that women, who have been misrepresented (or not at all) have at least the 
opportunity to rectify this now by constructing new systems of representation that properly reflect the 
reality of their embodiments. It is the historical use of embodiment rather than the concept itself that has 
been at fault. Yet the realisation that appeals to embodied identity have not benefitted men either in any 
simplistic sense problematizes the possibility that embodiment is a useful and ethical marker of 
personhood at all. 
The original argument would look something like this, where proposition 4 refers to the attempt at 
reimagining feminine embodiment: 
1: Men have been well-represented by appeals to embodiment 
2: Women have been misrepresented by appeals to embodiment 
3: Individuals can be well-represented by appeals to embodiment (see 1) 
4: Therefore we can ethically appeal to embodiment 
Ironically then, it seems that feminist justifications for body-specific identity covertly rely on the success 
of that which they oppose. Yet, adjusted for accuracy in proposition 1, the argument no longer makes 
complete sense: 
1: Men have been misrepresented by appeals to embodiment 
2: Women have been misrepresented by appeals to embodiment 
3: Therefore we can ethically appeal to embodiment 
Returning again to the metaphor of embodiment as a double-edged sword, if the application of appeals 
to embodiment has always been shadowed by some or other misrepresentation and subsequent 
mistreatment, then it is very likely that the notion of embodiment itself is faulty rather than the mere 
application thereof. This point is interesting for its apparent potential, as it reveals both a gap and a 
stereotype in Irigaray’s treatment of the male sex, insofar as she makes no attempt at offering a more 
complete understanding of men beyond the old trappings of Epistemology W. It also reveals a degree of 
conceptual tension Irigaray does not resolve: the male sex is anachronistically retained in her own system 
for a new society, presumably sincerely, as an unacceptable and infantilised stereotype, yet the female 
sex is rethought entirely and valorised in Epistemology I. It is worth adding that this is not merely an 
oversight or temporary strategy, since her new system of “sexual difference” requires two such radically 
different (sexed) subjects as we have seen, and there is likely no greater difference than men who never 
grow up (Irigaray, 1993:144-145) and are only satisfied when playing with loud machines (Irigaray, 
2007:57), whether in construction or warfare, and women who “live in love indefinitely” (Irigaray, 
1993:64), unsuited to standard logic and mathematics (Irigaray, 1989:197). And again, this stereotyped 
difference is perfect for an Irigarayan society of two subjects, since it is coherently maintained by the 
frequent sweeping qualifications that there exist men and women, only men and women, and crossover 
is both impossible and impermissible between them. Therefore it can be concluded that Irigaray’s highly 
problematic treatment of men is deliberate and central to the “difference” at the heart of her new sexual 
ethics; it is not an omission or even a by-product, it is a requirement.151 
However, seeing this gap as a space for potential, as mentioned earlier, is in fact to miss my point about 
the logic of using embodiment (whether in sex or race) – that both the identification and ordering of a 
physical marker as the key to a person’s identity (especially by an external party such as Irigaray, the 
powers-that-be in her sexed society, apartheid, or the “expert” medical diagnosis of non-heterosexuality 
as a mental disorder), is both arbitrary (since it ignores or subordinates other markers, as Irigaray does to 
                                                 
151 It is interesting to note that we would not conscience (and rightly so) the attribution of either such 
differences or such stereotypes to people under “racial” or “abled” categories; again the point in saying this 
refers to the logic of using embodiment, not the allegedly variable content of “different types” of 
embodiment. 
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race) and insufficient (since no single physical fact can encompass the entirety of an individual’s identity), 
and therefore always runs the risk of misrepresenting (descriptively) and ultimately injuring (normatively) 
individuals as they find themselves ordered and distributed within a coherent social typology that 
inevitably omits, denies, or fabricates large aspects of their own lived experience. In other words, to see 
Irigaray’s misrepresentation of men as an opportunity to do for men what Irigaray did for women, that is 
to rethink men as men, albeit new men in a supposedly more positive light, is to fall into the trap of 
repeating the old categories with seemingly new content. Rethinking men to match Irigaray’s women still 
leaves us with “men” and “women”, the incorrect assumption that everyone is one and only one of those 
two, and most alarmingly, the belief that these categories represent actual, identifiable natural types that 
exist in an enduring sense. It is therefore to only think within sex, and to miss the point that the 
constantly recurring possibility of misrepresentation and injustice through appeals to embodiment calls 
into question the very usefulness of sex itself as a category of identification; it is to try and fix the 
symptom rather than the cause. 
In summation, the absence (read: negation by Irigarayan logic-of-the-two) of the queer individual in 
Irigaray’s thought is not an exception or special case, and cannot be dismissed as a quaint thought-
experiment or hypothetical and polite “problematisation” of her thought. It is neither an exception, nor if 
taken seriously, an extension of her thought. Irigaray’s negative omission, or sometimes outright denial, 
of LGBT+ bodies and relations fundamentally undermines the ethical integrity and descriptive accuracy of 
her thought, since her project claims to describe “sexual difference” as a whole, on “cosmic”, “real”, and 
“universal” terms. In truth, hers is a theory not of sexual difference, but of  selectively-picked cisgender 
“sex” and hetero “difference”, and only cisgender-heterosexual difference, which is a very narrow 
definition indeed to claim as a basis for “universal” generalisations about the types of sexed bodies that 
“exist” and the range of relations permitted between those bodies; and moreover, within the scope of 
her thought, her own definitions of “men” and “women” are outdated insofar as they perpetuate a 
“Martian/Venusian” stereotype that, for instance, reduces men to Stanley Kowalskis. This is to say 
nothing about the equally problematic assumption that there are clear “types” to begin with, as 
discussed earlier in 3.1. Empirical Facts. Considering that the previous findings of section 3.1. removed 
any stable content from sexual “types” such as Irigaray’s “men” and “women”, that section 3.2. 
problematized the possibility of using “sameness” and “difference” in generalisable and diametrically 
opposed ways, and that section 3.3. showed how Irigaray’s theory, which does use specific sexual types 
along generalised axes of sameness and difference, results in a system of unethical exclusion, it can be 
concluded that Irigaray’s theory of sexual difference does not have sufficient support on either the 
empirical, epistemic, or ethical fronts. However, aspects of Irigaray’s theory, when reworked so as to 
remove their sexual assumptions and heteronormative tendencies, may still prove very useful. Firstly, her 
identification of the logic-of-the-one can be used outside the realm of sex as a diagnostic tool to reveal 
instances in which subjects are “negated” and ultimately oppressed by being reduced to the horizons of a 
single subject; here racism might be a good example. Secondly, her notion of the ontological negative, or 
more broadly of the space or interval for ethics between subjects, can also be maintained, albeit without 
the instruction that this space is situated only between sexed individuals, and moreover opposite-sex 
individuals.  
With this in mind, it is time to turn our attention to the possibility of an alternative in Chapter 4. In 
response to the problems with Irigaray’s theory outlined above, it is worth exploring the ways in which 
the unmediated body can be described without falling into essentialism or diametric 
sameness/difference, and thus without falling into potential traps such as racism, homophobia, or 
ableism. In order to avoid misrepresenting and misidentifying the diverse reality of the human body, 
what possible reference point can we use to define the human subject? 
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4. CHAPTER 4: TOWARD A NEW SOLUTION 
It seems clear that any effort to order the subject through a performative capture whereby 
the subject becomes synonymous with the name it is called is bound to fail. Why it is bound 
to fail remains an open question. We could say that every subject has a complexity that no 
single name can capture, and so refute a certain form of nominalism (Butler et al., 
2000:157). 
Once we situate the experience of the trauma of violated dignity within the Lacanian frame 
of the Real, we discover that the problem lying at the heart of human rights talk is that, in 
being asked to say what must be said to protect our humanity, human rights discourses are 
being asked to provide a linguistic response to the unspeakable inhuman but not unhuman 
forces that assault us (Bergoffen, 2012:108-109). 
Between empirical and transcendental a suspense will still remain inviolate (Irigaray, 
1985a:145). 
It is within neither the primary aim nor the permitted length of this thesis to provide a fully developed 
solution here. However, since the attempt to derive identity from an individual’s body is a moral issue 
and not merely an ivory tower consideration for academics, since this moral issue is especially urgent in 
the context of present politics, and since an opportunity is presented here by this thesis, I think we would 
be justified in very briefly discussing a tentative outline for a solution. Bearing in mind our criticisms, and 
carrying over from Irigaray both the notion of communicating and potentialising space and a diagnostic 
awareness of the logic-of-the-one, I will sketch in brief terms here the outline of a possible trajectory for 
a new ethics of relationality that does not rely on a coherent set of arbitrarily selected physical traits. 
Given our limited space, this response will be something of a fugue allegro. We will reach far into the 
collective conceptual toolbox and utilise several independent yet compatible concepts in an attempt at 
constructing a tentative solution to the issues raised earlier in the thesis. 
The aim throughout this thesis has been to demonstrate that all thick or positively specific 
representational attempts (which can be universalised) at selecting and defining the features of the 
human body, and consequently a coherent identity according to those features, no matter how 
metaphorical, fluid, and strategic or otherwise rigid and essentialist, are flawed insofar as they produce 
third stage typologies through first stage description (racialisation/sexualisation) and second stage 
prescription (racism/sexism). This has been explored with reference to Irigaray’s descriptive typologies of 
“men” and “women”, and her normative prescriptions tying men and women together in a (cisgender, 
heterosexual) relationship. In such theories, the starting axiom “types x and y exist”, however defined, 
contains the latent potential for subsequent prescription and exclusion, since the existence claim can 
never adequately cover all relevant aspects of the human experience. In the words of the title, such 
attempts misidentify the phenomenological-semiotic locus of human (dis)embodiment, whether 
understood as sex, race, nationality, difference, or sameness; that is, they conflate or over-describe 
selected physical features (the phenomenological) at the expense of others (since no single feature can 
be exhaustive) according to a semiotics (or series of representations), potentially misidentifying authentic 
expressions of embodiment. Consider for instance the exclusion of homosexual, intersex, asexual, and 
transgender individuals from Irigaray’s theory, as a result of her theory starting with the identification of 
a specific physical trait (such as genitalia) and deriving all else (in the form of “mediated” or constructed 
identities, such as “masculine”) from that trait.  
The results of this inevitable mismatch between representation and reality (or mediated and unmediated 
bodies), which is mistakenly considered a solvable problem, can be seen in the oscillation between 
essentialism/constructionism and sameness/difference. The conceptual dichotomies eventually form the 
basis for flawed social and ethical theories in an attempt at enforcing a stable and coherent relation 
between concept and being, in the typologies of “patterned coherence” discussed earlier, and I contend 
in Irigaray’s theory. In other words, this thesis has focused most fundamentally yet only implicitly on the 
relation between representation and reality: the way in which (un)ethical premises arise out of empirical 
observations couched in the logic of a particular epistemology (such as Irigaray deriving “male” and 
“female” from the unquestioned assumption that sexes “exist” and are necessarily “same” or 
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“different”), and the way in which human embodiment (and indeed all material reality) seems to resist 
representation to find authentic expression in the disjuncture between word and object. Given the fact 
that this disjuncture is the source of resistance,152 of better and more inclusive legal descriptions, and has 
been the reason for moral progress in everything from the abolition of slavery to same-sex marriage and 
universal suffrage (at least such is my hypothesis for the sake of this argument), we might call it the only 
nexus point or locus (or perhaps lacuna?) for providing us with an accurate and ethically workable 
conception of the human condition, embodiment included. It is this ground, those embodied experiences 
which remain outside the possibility of positive, universalisable representation, that should be the focus 
of all ethical studies, for it provides the ground for knowing what we ourselves are and what we owe one 
another. Having critiqued Irigaray’s solution (constructing mediated bodies according to specific physical 
traits against the evidence for sexual fluidity and ambiguity) and shown the concepts “sex”, “male”, 
“female”, “same” and “different” to be largely empty of necessary properties (and thus also referents), 
we are now left wondering whether the unmediated body has any properties at all that we can use to 
minimally define a new subject within a new ethics of relationality, since we have seen that the 
unmediated body appears to be a more suitable departure point for ethics. But how are we to approach 
and conceptualise the elusive body in the space between representation and reality, and would doing so 
not be going against everything we have just said, and undercutting the very condition of its possibility as 
the unrepresentable? 
It would seem that the way to do this is to find some minimally universalisable human capability or 
potential, rather than an essentialist physical marker, which moves away from an ethics of actuality and 
embodiment, towards an ethics of potentiality and relationality, without entirely discarding materiality. 
But where are we to find this mysterious unrepresented (and perhaps fundamentally unrepresentable) 
“real” human ground beneath our metaphor? And how are we to approach it without falling into 
valorising or reductive essentialism that relies on generalising thick descriptions? How, in short, are we to 
accurately describe what is minimally essential to the individual without being naïve essentialists, 
conservative moralists, or scientific reductionists? Here, I think, we must put our hands deep into the 
philosophical toolbox and find a few concepts that describe something minimally essential without the 
over-generalisations of, say, a description based on skin colour.  
Bearing in mind the trouble with creating thick generalised descriptions based on specific, arbitrary 
physical traits, let us begin here with an extract from Simone Weil’s essay Human Personality, and search 
for a minimal “negative capacity” rather than a “positive trait”: 
I see a passer-by in the street. He has long arms, blue eyes, and a mind whose thoughts I do 
not know, but perhaps they are commonplace. It is neither his person, nor the human 
personality in him, which is sacred to me. It is he. The whole of him. The arms, the eyes, the 
thoughts, everything. Not without infinite scruple would I touch anything of his. If it were 
the human personality in him that was sacred to me, I could easily put out his eyes. As a 
blind man, he would be exactly as much a human personality as before. I should not have 
touched the person in him at all. […] What is it, exactly, that prevents me from putting that 
man’s eyes out if I am allowed to do so and if it takes my fancy? Although it is the whole of 
him that is sacred to me, he is not sacred in all respects and from every point of view. He is 
not sacred in as much as he happens to have long arms, blue eyes, or possibly commonplace 
thoughts. Nor as a duke, if he is one; nor as a dustman, if that is what he is. Nothing of all 
this would stay my hand.  
What would stay it is the knowledge that if someone were to put out his eyes, his soul would 
be lacerated by the thought that harm was being done to him. At the bottom of the heart of 
every human being, from earliest infancy until the tomb, there is something that goes on 
indomitably expecting, in the teeth of all experience of crimes committed, suffered, and 
witnessed, that good and not evil will be done to him. It is this above all that is sacred in 
every human being. This profound and childlike and unchanging expectation of good in the 
heart is not what is involved when we agitate for our rights (Weil, 2014:58-59). 
                                                 
152 Recall the difference between self-identity and identification by others in the introduction. 
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The key concept to extract here is that of injurability or vulnerability, and the trusting expectation we all 
have on a daily basis that our vulnerability will not be injured by others.  Neither Irigaray nor Weil find 
justification for justice in the appeal to abstract rights, but rather in the intimacy of embodied 
experience. For Irigaray, we saw this embodied experience took the form of sexual specificity. Weil 
adopts a wider and perhaps more universal approach in appealing to embodied vulnerability both as a 
feature of our own private relation to the world, and others’ relations to us. Butler, too, explores the 
concept of vulnerability, tying the vulnerability of others closely to notions of our own loss and grief since 
we are always tied to others in any number of important bonds, both intimate and general, meaning that 
a loss of the other is a loss larger than any one person, since we are implicated as well in the other 
(Butler, 2006:22). For Butler, the grief at such a loss therefore “contains the possibility of apprehending a 
mode of dispossession that is fundamental to who I am”, which in turn could lead to a “normative 
reorientation for politics” (2006:28), insofar as it introduces vulnerability and grief as new concepts or 
reference points for analysing social relations. How does this help us with regard to our discussion of 
embodiment and the differential logic of discrimination? It alleviates the situation by firstly rewriting 
ethical (and therefore social, political, legal) responsibility as a response to vulnerability (and therefore 
grievability) rather than the demand for abstract rights; and secondly, vulnerability is not specific to any 
particular embodiment (or “represented” and mediated body, such as “male”), but is as it were the 
underlying condition of possibility for all possible embodiment; vulnerability is the horrifying potential 
not to be, or for any material embodiment to be injured, violated, or ended, which is  a universally human 
concern independent of embodiment,153 yet often expressed through embodiment.154 Vulnerability exists 
on this side of being (as opposed to not being, or negation) as becoming (rather than static being or the 
metaphysics of solids, reminding us of the fluid ontologies of the Pre-Socratics); it is a product of 
consciously existing, and not only or simply a product of consciously existing as/through/with a body that 
may or may not be sexed in a particular way as Irigaray believes, again casting doubt on the validity of 
rigid appeals to sameness/difference. Vulnerability then is both negatively non-specific and generalizable 
as a feature shared by all humans (and animals), since it represents the condition of possibility for being 
harmed; ethics in turn is nothing more than a system of values to prevent injury and promote wellbeing, 
thus vulnerability stands at the centre of any ethical relation. Being non-specific in this way by not 
appealing to supposedly essential traits (such as sex or race), and by not ordering these traits into stable 
categories of “same” and “different” (such as “all women and only women do x, whereas all men do y”), 
the notion of vulnerability as a universal capacity to suffer also meets the requirements of my earlier 
definition of multiplicity as a “set of all sets” that negates both sameness and difference and tries to 
define “human” minimally according to some shared fact about the unmediated body (such as 
vulnerability). Thus, the notion of vulnerability appears to be a viable solution to the critique of Irigaray 
presented in Chapter 3, and indeed to most theories that rely on over-descriptions and mediation, as 
outlined in Diagram 1. 
Furthermore, being a shared dimension of existence, vulnerability can enter communication reciprocally 
– we can speak to one another as vulnerable, and not with a gulf of logic and language between us, as in 
the two (ostensibly) epistemically distinct sexed subjects in Irigaray’s system. Vulnerability thus returns 
us to the ground of our being,155 which always elusively evades description between representation and 
reality, and yet springs up in resistance whenever a representation is exclusionary and oppressive (recall 
                                                 
153 There are, of course, degrees of vulnerability given to us by our embodiments, or our materiality, or even 
simply our location (for instance, disaster or war zones). But vulnerability always exists as a constant horizon, 
regardless of bodily or geographical circumstance, since any human being can be injured by another at any 
time. We may either exist or cease to exist regardless of how stable or unstable our health, bodies, and 
environments may be, therefore the possibility of injury and the vulnerable fear of not existing, (or what we 
might call the existential dimension of vulnerability), is not always identical to having a vulnerable body. 
154 As in, for example, illness or physical disability. During a bout of the ‘flu, we have all experienced the ways 
in which our existence becomes precarious and our bodies present themselves as obstacles or limits rather 
than conditions for accessing reality. In these “bodily” moments, as when our abstract identities (gay, black, 
blind) also become limits to our freedom (in societies, for instance, where homosexuality is criminalised or 
women are not allowed to drive), we find ourselves vulnerable and reliant upon others. 
155 By making the precarity of our existence apparent to us. 
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the distinction between mediated and unmediated bodies, and the role mediated/represented bodies 
play in the oppressive typologies of Diagram 1). Perhaps in returning us to that ground, vulnerability 
could be described as the apprehension of the horror of the real.156 Irigaray calls the denial and lack 
within Epistemology W “the ‘horror’ of being close to the ‘earth’” (1985a:352), and if we recall Chapter 1, 
the “earth” figured as materiality, corporeality, and messiness – the body. Echoing our starting definition 
of politics and ethics as the distribution (and treatment) of identity in the Introduction, if we redefine 
justice and rights on the basis of an identity of embodied vulnerability and relation of trust rather than an 
abstract rational ideal, then we have at our disposal a new lens for exploring geopolitics and bio-politics 
through what Butler calls the distribution of vulnerability (2006:32); “geo” and “bio” insofar as such a lens 
takes the body rather than an abstract “citizen”, as a means of exploring the ways in which bodies 
(biologies) are dis/placed geographically according to the infliction of injury upon them (consider 
refugees). This in turn might assist us in cutting through the red tape in refugee and race discourse, since 
vulnerability (and thus the identity of an individual deserving of protection and the authority to demand 
this) is not limited to geographic origin or the possession of specific embodied markers (such as skin 
colour, sex, or ethnic origin). 
Having identified vulnerability, what is its ontology, that is, what are its constitutive elements, as a 
dimension of human experience? I am drawn here to a description offered by Baudrillard:  
Another promise of fragments is that they alone will survive the catastrophe, the destruction 
of meaning and language […] Like the flotsam in Poe’s maelstrom: the lightest items sink the 
most slowly into the abyss. It is these one must hang on to (Baudrillard, 2007:8). 
And Irigaray: 
[T]he striking makeup, the motherly role she plays, cover up the fact that she is torn to 
pieces. Fragments: of women, of discourse, of silences (Irigaray, 1985a:228). 
We may extract from both of these excerpts the concept of the “fragment” as something that escapes 
complete linguistic construction and therefore also destruction; that is, it exists outside complete 
representation as a persistent unit of human experience – rather like vulnerability – and it therefore, in 
part, escapes the problem of patterned coherence (introduced earlier as a shortcoming in Irigaray’s 
solution) since it does not rely on specific bodily markers in any enduring sense; or if it does utilise 
markers, it does not generalise them. We are all broken by language, by categorisation, despite being 
treated as “whole” or legible, and therefore knowable, by virtue of those very categories and names. This 
in turn means that we are constantly fragmented, being reconstituted and reframed. The performances 
and names by which we are known, recognised, and identified by others are shifting and incomplete, and 
therefore we are essentially ambiguous in our fragmented presentation to others, and ourselves. Our 
ontology, not always known to ourselves and certainly not to others, is in a state of constant flux, and 
given this change and the representational gaps between our social roles and our embodied reality, we 
are vulnerable. This notion of “fragments” should remind us of the Pre-Socratic Atomists and their notion 
of solid matter as “atoms” extended and divisible within the absolute void of space. If we could 
“fragment” our definitions of embodied types, then we could discover other dimensions along the 
spectrum of experience besides those of, for example, race, sex, and age. In turn, those dimensions 
would also have to be fragmented to avoid over-representation and coherence: sex would have to be 
fragmented into more than simply two or three types. Along the spectrum of embodied experience, sex 
itself would also become a spectrum. And then, as a third fragmentation, those “types” of sex identified, 
such as male, female, intersex, transgender, would themselves have to be fragmented since no two 
female bodies are alike, or indeed, are guaranteed the same functions, such as childbirth. The vulnerable 
                                                 
156 Since the “real”, at least in psychoanalytic terms, “refers to something potentially terrifying and outside 
comprehension” (Pick, 2015:92), because it falls outside language and representation, creating a moment of 
trauma when apprehended without the mediation of abstract laws and concepts. This does not mean that the 
“real” is itself somehow objectively traumatic or “bad”, but rather that the lack of representation forces an 
unmediated encounter, which may be traumatic. Zizek and Laclau agree, for instance, that the real refers to 
the incompletion of the human subject as one who does not know the full extent of their own history (Butler 
et al., 2000:12). 
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human is thus the incoherently fragmented human. To return here quickly to the notion of the spectrum 
introduced in 3.1. Empirical Facts, this fragmentation is, I think, compatible with a spectrum of being 
insofar as neither take a single category of embodiment (such as race or sex) or any number of types 
within that category (such as white, female, with specific properties) as the definition of a subject’s 
identity. The notion of humans as ontologically fragmented or ambiguous thus helps us move away from 
Irigaray’s positively descriptive attempt to group and define all women as humans with specific and 
enduring (bodily sexual) properties. The same can be said for other attempts to define “race”. Together, 
the notions of fragmentation and physical vulnerability present an alternative to the attempt to 
categorise people coherently (as unfragmented) using a specific physical trait (that is not vulnerable to 
change and ambiguity). 
Furthermore, where these categories of experience no longer exist with self-identical rigid definitions, 
and are no longer limited to specific one-to-one relations with other experiences – in other words, where 
they are no longer binaries under Irigaray’s diagnosis of the logic-of-the-one – they can overlap with 
others and so extend the horizons of experience. Fragments suggest space, difference, mobility, 
potentiality. They suggest the ability of a larger whole to be reduced to an interplay of smaller factors and 
contexts, but they also suggest the ability to come together and construct a greater whole without yet 
committing to a rigid structure, tying in with Irigaray’s diagnostic warnings about the metaphysics of 
solids and the logic-of-the-one. They represent unity as much as difference, construction as much as 
deconstruction, the space of an interval as much as the ability to reorganise that space into something 
more coherent; and perhaps they therefore represent vulnerability, ambiguity, and the horror (or joy?) of 
collapse as well. In this way, the individual conceived as a Humean “bundle” of fragmentary, processual, 
and ambiguous identities is able to maximise the potential for interaction and relationality with others. 
The points of contact from person to person are variable, fluctuating, receptive to contact and further 
development (on account of being incomplete and ambiguous), and thus not limited for example to 
contact between two (and only two) different (and only different) sexes, as Irigaray claims, suggesting a 
solution to her cisgender heteronormativity. Ontological ambiguity, therefore, is conducive to 
relationality; suggesting that relationality need not be limited to bodies which are both unambiguously 
defined and unambiguously different (male/female) as in Irigaray’s ontological negative, which she 
considers the paradigm for reciprocal ethical relations. As long as this relationality is underpinned by the 
appropriate response to vulnerability (to be discussed soon), ambiguity is conducive to ethics. 
In addition to being ontologically fragmented and ambiguous in this way, we are also epistemologically 
fragmented. We are not fully known to ourselves, and certainly not fully knowable to another. And how 
we know and speak about states-of-affairs in the world is also limited by our fragmentary horizons. The 
link between vulnerability, relationality, representation, and the unrepresentably ambiguous real, can be 
approached in this manner. It could be argued that anything which exceeds our capacity for 
representation throws us back upon ourselves in a position of vulnerability, perhaps back upon those 
“real”, unmediated (unrepresented) bodies I mentioned in the Introduction, in contrast to the safer, 
mediated bodies produced through scripts and representations (such as the scripted “males” and 
“females” of Irigaray). After all we can only understand, predict, or communicate that which is 
representable, and in the absence of this our position becomes precarious. Encountering the ambiguous 
other face-to-face challenges us with something that is fundamentally unknowable in just this manner. 
Therefore, we are fragmented both ontologically and epistemically; and our fragmented natures give rise 
to our constant mutual exposure and vulnerability. 
Having identified and elaborated two conceptual tools so far, namely vulnerability and fragmentation, 
the question now becomes: what is the appropriate response to the fragmented, vulnerable human? If it 
is true that apprehending both ourselves and others as vulnerable fragments is an experience that throws 
us back upon ourselves in a realisation of our own precariousness, and if this existential dimension of 
experience indeed describes a generalizable, non-specific part of that ground of embodied reality we can 
temporarily glimpse through the tear between representation and reality, then it follows that recognising 
the vulnerability and essential indescribability of another human being (or our own) is an immensely 
transformative experience. The closest analogies would be the religious epiphany, or the experience of 
the sublime; I shall take the latter here because the sublime often refers to a humbling experience in the 
face of nature’s enormity, and after all, glimpsing the ground of human reality, such as the relation of our 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
107 
 
vulnerability, is glimpsing our “human condition”, whereas the religious epiphany entails a metaphysical 
assumption. The unsayable sublime, perhaps rather like the uncanny, and the unrepresentable limit-
experiences of thinkers such as Bataille and Foucault (Gutting, 2005:15-16), is a visceral and unmediated 
encounter with the “horror of the real”, that is, with the disjunction between real and represented. 
The classic treatment of “the sublime”, a concept which emerged with the rise of Romantic sensualism in 
response to the rationalism of the neoclassical Enlightenment, is of course Edmund Burke’s A 
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas on the Beautiful and the Sublime.157 In his treatise, 
Burke tells us “whatever is in any sort terrible […] is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the 
strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling” (Burke, 2015:33-34), and he adds that “the 
sublime is an idea belonging to self-preservation” (2015:71). The sublime, then, is an encounter with an 
aspect of reality (often undisturbed nature) that is vast beyond our ability to represent or describe. This 
encounter leaves us faced with our own precariousness and vulnerability. This is exactly parallel to what 
we have derived so far on our own, regarding unmediated bodies and the disjuncture between 
representation and reality. But Burke goes on to state that this terror need not be displeasing: “The 
passion caused by the great and sublime in nature, when those causes operate most powerfully, is 
Astonishment; and astonishment is that state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended” 
(2015:47); “suspended” here referring to the uncertainty or motionlessness introduced by surprise, the 
interruption by an/other. This astonishment is useful for our purposes because, returning to our main 
interlocutor, Irigaray in fact provides us with her own interpretation of what we might call the sublime, in 
reading Descartes’ conception of wonder – we shall treat “wonder” here as synonymous with 
“astonishment”.158 For Irigaray, wonder exists outside binary definition, escaping the possibility of 
negation under, for instance, the old logic-of-the-one: “This passion has no opposite or contradiction and 
exists always as though for the first time” (Irigaray, 1993:12). Consequently, in an encounter between 
two subjects, wonder cannot be subsumed under one, but exists in a constant oscillation of suspension 
and recognition: “[T]hat wonder which beholds what it sees always as if for the first time, never taking 
hold of the other as its object. It does not try to seize, possess, or reduce this object, but leaves it 
subjective, still free” (Irigaray, 1993:13). In other words, for Irigaray wonder acts as a negation of sorts by 
existing as the product of the other’s unknowability to us, the other is on the other side of wonder: “Who 
or what the other is, I never know. […] This feeling of surprise, astonishment, and wonder in the face of 
the unknowable” (1993:13). Irigaray refers to it as an “interval between himself and the other […] to 
wonder” (1993:73) and an “intermediary” (1993:82), returning us to the useful notion of the ontological 
negative (section 2.3.) we carried over from Irigaray. Crucially, wonder at the sublime of our 
unknowability and vulnerability is therefore a potential manifestation of Irigaray’s ontological negative 
situated centrally within ethical human relations. Or, as Irigaray asks us: “Wonder is the motivating force 
behind mobility in all its dimensions. […] The ground or inner secret of genesis, of creation?” (1993:73). 
This “ground” of creation links up immediately with the notion of the disjuncture between 
representation and reality, the evasive grounding source of authentic, unmediated experience and 
                                                 
157 Interestingly, extending our scope for a moment back to Classical Antiquity again, an earlier treatment of 
the sublime can be found in Longinus’ On the Sublime (3rd century CE). In his treatment of greatness in 
rhetoric, Longinus foreshadows the appeal to nature and sudden emotional surrender of the Romantics in his 
own diction, against the formalism of other rhetoricians. Of fine writing he says “greatness appears suddenly; 
like a thunderbolt it carries all before it” (Longinus, 1991:4). Cicero is compared to both a vast fire and a flood 
(1991:21). Quoting an ode, he also praises the contrariness of the poetess Sappho: “Do you not marvel how 
she seeks to make her mind, body, ears, tongue, eyes, and complexion, as if they were scattered elements 
strange to her, join together in the same moment of experience? In contradictory phrases she describes 
herself as hot and cold at once, rational and irrational” (1991:18). Note the accepting presence of “body”, 
“elements”, “contradictory”, and “irrational” in describing the sublime in the writing of a lesbian, female 
poetess. Considering the restrictions of the logic-of-the-one (recall the devaluing of such values, outlined in 
Chapter 1), Irigaray would probably approve of such a charitable reading by a man, which again problematizes 
her interpretation of the Western tradition as solely and monolithically patriarchal. 
158 I did not introduce Irigaray’s treatment of the concept “wonder” previously in Part 1, since it was not 
relevant to her diagnostic or constructive work there, nor to the framing of that work for our analysis in 
Chapter 3. 
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ethicity, that we have been alluding to and pursuing throughout this thesis. Might it finally be that 
vulnerability in our fragmented state and wonder at the equally vulnerable other across the space of the 
ontological negative together form a minimally generalizable and negatively non-specific definition of 
personhood without exclusion?159 Perhaps then, all we can say of the fragmented, unmediated, 
unrepresentable body is that it is vulnerable, and this thesis began after all with the assumption that such 
a minimally unmediated body is the most morally significant. 
This explains how we respond to the sublime of vulnerability, but it does not offer us an ethical account 
of how to approach the vulnerable other. As the final voice in our fugue, I would like to very briefly 
introduce the concept of trust. I shall follow Hawley in defining trust as something that pertains 
interpersonally to subjects rather than objects (we cannot trust chairs, though we may rely on them), 
something that is not the equivalent of truthfulness (should Kant tell the murderer where to find us, we 
would still call Kant honest, but not trustworthy), and finally, trust as reciprocal commitment: trust can 
only be broken if the other knew, and agreed, that they were being trusted to do “x” (Hawley, 2012:5-
6,111). The last point of reciprocity is the most important, it means that we expect the other not to injure 
or betray us or something we asked them to do, returning us to Weil’s remark that the source of ethics is 
the inherent hopefulness that the other will not harm us, and returning us thus to our main notion of 
vulnerability. When we reveal ourselves to another in vulnerability, we also, by definition, reveal what it 
is that can be most painful and most destructive to us, yet we trust that the other will cherish us in our 
fragmented incompleteness rather than exploit it, and they likewise expect the same commitment of us. 
If vulnerability is the prime condition of our existence, then trust is its most appropriate response as 
mutual agreement to preserve the other across the ontological negative, in their becoming and not 
merely in static being. Together these two form the most basic reciprocal function of ethics. And so 
perhaps it is right that Dante condemned betrayers of trust to the very deepest level of hell. 
In summation then, we have: the human being as ontologically and epistemically fragmented, resulting in 
a constant state of vulnerability. This vulnerability, the prime existential and phenomenological 
dimension of being and becoming, since it exists as the constant possibility of not-being or being limited 
through injury in whatever definition, resists representation and throws us back upon the reality of our 
own limits, meaning that the most we can say about the unmediated body is that it is fragmented and 
vulnerable. This encounter with unrepresentable incompleteness and precariousness, both in ourselves 
and others, induces a state of wonder similar to that of the sublime. Finally, this draws us into a 
relationship of ethical reciprocity with others under the notion of trust, since, in existing precariously and 
recognising this in others, and in recognising that others see the same in us and themselves as well, we 
exist in the hope that this constantly fragile state of being – the ground of our desires, sensations – will 
not be injured or ended. 
This definition helps us in several ways, given the criticism raised throughout the thesis. Firstly, it avoids 
deterministic realist essentialism, as well as extreme nominalist social constructionism, by grounding 
being in existential yet bodily vulnerability and ambiguity. It avoids sameness/difference, since it does not 
positively specify what may constitute vulnerability; unlike a theory of race or sex which specifies that 
personhood requires membership of “race x” or “sex y”. Vulnerability and trust also avoid the logic-of-
the-one by resisting binary definition and maintaining a commitment between at least two subjects,160 in 
which both are expected to reciprocate an act of care that does not injure the other’s vulnerability. Thus, 
this definition also keeps in mind Irigaray’s own ontological negative as a useful measure of ethicity, and 
her warnings about the logic-of-the-one. Vulnerability does not specify bodily markers, but rather stands 
as a general capacity for suffering, which may be expressed in different ways. Not only for ethical and 
ontological reasons then, but also for purely conceptual reasons, we may suggest that vulnerability offers 
a fair alternative for rethinking embodiment on terms not limited to single categories of experience, such 
as sex or race. 
 
 
                                                 
159 Perhaps this can be extended to animals, since they too are vulnerable after all. 
160 Who need not be two sexually different subjects as in Irigaray’s model. 
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5. CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
This thesis concerned itself with the use of embodiment as a category of identity. In particular, it set out 
to explore the ways in which appeals to embodied identity, which rely on the selection of certain physical 
features as easily-identifiable and enduring markers of identity, might in fact misrepresent the body and 
experience of the person being identified, by creating a generalised description of the person with a 
potentially incomplete or inaccurate representation of their embodiment, ultimately resulting in that 
person being unable to express or experience the excluded dimensions of their body under the 
description imposed. In turn, this problem itself indicates the possibility of a disjuncture between the 
“real” material body, and what is arbitrarily and contingently noticed and “represented” about that body, 
or, similarly, a disjuncture between identity and the act of identification. The possibility of the disethics of 
misrepresentation, or in the language of the title, the misidentification of the lived, phenomenological 
experience and the abstract semiotic label, raises a host of problems which this thesis set out to explore, 
among them the empirical underpinnings of the “real” material or unmediated body, the epistemic 
coherence of the act of identification, and the ethical implications of such “represented” or mediated 
identities forming ordered typologies of human subjects. Selecting the theory of sexually-dual 
embodiment developed by Irigaray as an example, this thesis set out to explore these problems. 
Beginning with the observation that moral theories of embodiment have generally tended towards a 
state of minimum description and prescription (everyone can marry, all facilities are desegregated), my 
argument proposed that ideologies of embodiment tend to group into binary pairs that negate one 
another in a quasi-Hegelian dialectic, resulting in a minimal state (recall Diagram 2). These ideologies, or 
systems describing and prescribing embodiments, are formed in three stages. The first stage creates a 
“type” or “set” of embodiment (such as “sex”, and subsequently “female”) by identifying not only the 
category, but ascribing properties to it in a descriptive fashion, creating a coherent “unity”. In the 
introduction this was described as racialism or sexualism. The second stage imposes a moral imperative 
upon the category and its properties by saying, for example, not only that there are two sexes, but that 
there should be two sexes; and if the concept of sexual or romantic desire is included as a property of the 
set, then a moral prescription such as “desire should be maintained between type A and type B” may 
follow. In the third stage, the descriptive typology of categories and prescriptive script of how those 
categories should act, enters society, usually through socialisation from an early age, as a coherent 
performance in which the original, and arbitrary, artificial construction of the categories is forgotten, 
resulting in an unquestioned and unnoticed hegemony. Having established the topic of our investigation 
and the background assumptions, the method of analysis was introduced as the three-pronged 
empirical/epistemic/ethical approach. 
We then began with an exposition of Irigaray in Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 1. Chapter 1 explored Irigaray’s 
early work, consisting of her diagnostic critique of the patriarchal Western tradition. We followed Irigaray 
in reading canonical texts, and in her identification of the logic-of-the-one as the primary tool of 
patriarchal oppression. The logic-of-the-one, which imposes a vertical hierarchy of binaries, operates by 
negating the value of concepts, or the subjectivity of the other in practice, by using “x/not-x” binaries 
rather than “x/y” dualities, where “y” exists on its own terms. The point of reference for the logic-of-the-
one is the male subject, the negated other is the female subject. In reducing one term, such as “y”, or the 
subject denoted by it, the female, to a negation of the other, the logic-of-the-one operates by enforcing 
sameness. We noted also that this binary negation can be described as a suppression of intersubjective 
space. Chapter 2 outlined Irigaray’s solution to the patriarchal society, using a horizontal logic-of-the-two, 
or logic-of-the-dual. For Irigaray, the only solution to the patriarchal sameness is a society of absolute 
difference, where neither term, and neither subject, can be expressed in terms of the other, and 
therefore stand “horizontally” beside each other rather than above each other in a vertical hierarchized 
power relation. We saw that, for Irigaray, this difference can only be realised as sexual difference 
between two, and only two, differently sexed subjects, since the sexed dimension of experience, and not 
only the female dimension of experience, has been largely ignored in the male patriarchal tradition. As 
we saw, Irigaray’s sexed subjects are cisgender, heterosexual men and women, unable to transition from 
one sex to the other, and possessing sex-specific traits such as an aptitude for aggression in men, and an 
aptitude for interpersonal relations in women. No distinction between sex and gender is drawn by 
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Irigaray, and instead the subjectivity of individuals is causally determined by whether they have a male or 
female body. For Irigaray, these two insuperably different subjects form complementary poles on either 
side of an “ontological negative” or interval that responds directly to the lack of such intersubjective 
space enforced by the negation and sameness of the logic-of-the-one. Irigaray’s solution is thus premised 
on the distinction between stable categories of sameness and difference, upon the assumption that sexes 
exist in an essential sense (sexualism, recall Diagram 1), that sexes exist in a way that is clearly 
identifiable as same/different from other sexes, and that they exist in two and only two forms – male and 
female (cisgender). We also saw that within Irigaray’s theory, this relation of difference (posited in 
opposition to the sameness outlined in Chapter 1) takes the form of a heterosexual couple. 
Beginning with Part 2, we turned our attention to critiquing Irigaray’s theory of embodiment in Chapter 
3, in response to the problematic essentialist and cisgender-heteronormative underpinnings of her work, 
and in response to the view that her theory represents a hegemonic typology (as outlined in Diagram 1 
and the related discussion) not much better than the patriarchy it attempted to oppose, since both still 
order mediated or constructed bodies into exclusionary social relations. We began section 3.1. of Chapter 
3 by considering the empirical data surrounding the existence of sexual types and differences, and found 
the evidence insufficient to maintain that there are differences between men and women, or, given the 
resulting blended spectrum, that such types can be identified at all in the first place. We also remarked 
upon the impossibility of deriving the existence or properties of types of embodiment in any essential or 
material sense from hermeneutic exercises in textual interpretation, in contrast to Irigaray’s attempt to 
do so for men (in Chapter 1) and for women (in Chapter 2), recalling the theme of “reality versus 
representation” and the distribution of (over-described or mediated) identification with which this thesis 
began. In considering the epistemic branch of our critique in 3.2., we problematized the notion of 
separating clearly between sameness and difference as stable concepts which are diametrically opposed, 
by arguing that statements about difference can easily be rewritten as statements about sameness with 
the same truth value. This destabilised Irigaray’s solution to patriarchy since her theory as outlined in 
Part 1 is premised upon the conceptual distinction between “same” and “different” as categories of 
language and reason (recall the logic-of-the-one and the metaphysics of solids), and upon same and 
different as categories of sex necessary for an ethical solution to patriarchy (where patriarchy was a 
regression to the sexual “same” and required disruption with feminine sexual “difference”). In rejecting 
the divide between same and different, the notion of multiplicity was introduced as a negative or non-
specific category that does not rely on specific, over-described, and arbitrarily selected physical traits in 
order to define individuals, thus providing a possible alternative to Irigaray’s diagnosis and solution in 
Chapters 1 and 2. Thereafter, as part of our ethical critique in 3.3., we explored Irigaray’s negative 
comments on non-heterosexuality and her tendency to interpret homosexuality only through a 
heterosexual lens. Again this tendency was shown to be the result of her insistence on the essential 
existence of two and only two sexes (clearly tied to two genders and two roles), and the result of her 
claim that anything other than “difference”, or the logic-of-the-two, is always a regression to the “same” 
– these two claims were explored earlier throughout the exposition of Part 1. This in turn reminded us of 
the way the pseudo same/different dichotomy frequently results in moral exclusion. Returning to 
Irigaray’s idea of space, or the interval of the ontological negative carried over from Chapter 2, we 
explored the way in which her own logic-of-the-two also enacts a negation or suppression of space by 
denying the existence of the queer body outside her male/female duality, just as the logic-of-the-one 
denied the existence of the female body outside the male hegemony in Chapter 1. We ended Chapter 3 
by mentioning the fact that men have also been misrepresented by patriarchy, and that Irigaray’s 
decision to retain men as stereotyped aggressors does nothing to advance the cause of either women or 
men, but only perpetuates a crystallised same/different divide on the basis of arbitrary physical markers, 
such as genitalia. 
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Having explored in Chapter 3 the shortcomings of Irigaray’s theory outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, Chapter 
4 considered the possibility of an alternative theory of embodiment without recourse to specific 
embodied markers, but rather to general existential traits such as vulnerability and trust – in contrast to 
theories of sexual or racial specificity such as Irigaray’s (especially as outlined in Chapter 2). Carrying over 
Irigaray’s useful notion of the ontological negative (or reciprocal space), her warning about the logic-of-
the-one as a regression to one pole of subjectivity, and suggesting that vulnerability is a trait everyone 
can experience and is a trait compatible with the ontological negative’s “ethics of space”, it was argued 
that vulnerability might provide an alternative basis for developing a non-specific theory of embodiment 
that does not rely solely on the selection and grouping of contingent physical markers, such as skin colour 
or genitalia. Such an alternative would avoid the same/different pseudo-problem and its exclusionary 
tendency, as well as avoid misidentifying the unmediated body with an over-described mediated body – 
problems we noticed in Irigaray’s solution to patriarchy during the critique of Chapter 3. 
Moreover, an alternative based on vulnerability would satisfy the requirements of multiplicity 
(introduced in Chapter 3 to replace Irigaray’s same/different duality from Chapters 1 and 2), and would 
also satisfy Irigaray’s insight that ethics requires reciprocity. Reciprocity in vulnerability is provided by a 
relation of mutual trust at the wonder of the other as other, and care for the other across the space or 
interval or wonder (recalling and modifying Irigaray’s ontological negative from Chapter 2), without the 
need for such a space to be sexed or for the individuals to be sexually different. Returning to the 
overarching theme of representation versus reality, vulnerability and the reciprocal ethics of trust thus 
provide us with a minimal description of unmediated human bodies, without the injustice of over-
extending that description into a exclusionary typologies which use categories of sameness and 
difference to arbitrarily construct, identify, and order human “types” into social patterns. 
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7. APPENDIX: IRIGARAY INDEX 
 
This appendix contains an index of important concepts and their related phrases in Luce Irigaray’s work, 
which I gathered from the thirteen primary sources (by Irigaray) surveyed for this thesis. The quotes 
compiled below thus refer only to Irigaray. To save space and ink, and to make reference to titles easier, I 
have forgone Harvard referencing here. Each entry is still placed in quotation marks and referenced, but I 
have simply indicated the name of the book and the page numbers beside each quote, rather than 
Irigaray’s surname (since that should be obvious) and the year of publication (since that requires 
cumbersome reference to the bibliography in order to ascertain which book the year refers to). Full 
references for all texts cited here still appear in the bibliography. 
 
Abbreviations for titles of primary texts by Luce Irigaray in this index: 
1. Speculum of the Other Woman: “SW” 
2. This Sex Which is Not One: “TS” 
3. An Ethics of Sexual Difference: “ESD” 
4. Je, Tu, Nous: “JTN” 
5. Why Different? A Culture of Two Subjects: “WD” 
6. Thinking the Difference For a Peaceful Revolution: “TD” 
7. Democracy Begins Between Two: “DB” 
8. The Question of the Other: “QO” 
9. What Other Are We Talking About?: “WOT” 
10. Being Two, How Many Eyes Have We?: “BT” 
11. The Language of Man: “LM” 
12. Why Cultivate Difference? Towards a Culture of Two Subjects: “WCD” 
13. When Our Lips Speak Together: “WLS” 
 
DEATH (post-sex, gender-blending, transgender, asexuality, neuter all as death in new Irigarayean 
society) 
- “Yet the prospect of a neutral, asexual community is disturbing. […] Although life, obviously, is 
always sexed, death on the contrary no longer makes this distinction. […] A society which 
eliminates the dividing line between life and death is capable of all forms of holocaust. […] This is 
the point we have reached today” (DB p37) 
- “This neutralisation, if it were possible, would mean the end of the human species. The human 
species is divided into two genders which ensure its production and reproduction. To wish to get 
rid of sexual difference is to call for a genocide more radical than any form of destruction there 
has ever been in History” (JTN p4) 
- “The world changes. Nowadays, its development seems to threaten life and the creation of 
values” (JTN p29) 
- “What will result from the blurring of identities? Whom and what does this serve today? To 
surpass a still unaccomplished human destiny? Why this immoderation? Is it not, once again, a 
vehicle of death more so than of life?” (WD p152) 
- “[G]ender neutrality puts us, individually and collectively, in danger of death” (JTN p73) 
- “Abolishing the reality of the genders to resolve the domination of one by the other does not 
make much sense, and brings danger for humanity itself” (DB p150) 
- “it is better, too, to remain living persons: men and women, than to become neutral, abstract, 
artificial individuals” (DB p155) 
- “the risk of producing monosexed, neutralised crowds, and this is one of the dangers of our 
time” (WD p45) 
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DEATH (woman as death in old patriarchal Epistemology W) 
- “They represent the total reduction of instinctual arousal. Therefore, the re-assurance of death” 
(SW p94) 
- “woman will assume the function of representing death” (SW pp26-27) 
- “The death of consciousness (and) of sex is necessary to achieve a dialectical progression 
through phallic sublimation” (SW p111) 
- “she is […] the representative representing negativity (death)” (SW p141) 
- “Man’s only ‘passion’, therefore, is being” (SW p165) [male being opposed to female death] 
- “The mother is in this death therefore” (SW p318) 
- “guardianship of the dead” (ESD p146) 
 
DEFINITION OF “MAN” 
- “he seems to get more sexual satisfaction from making laws than love” (SW p39) 
- “For man needs an instrument to touch himself with: a hand, a woman, or some substitute. This 
mechanism is sublated in and by language. Man produces language for self-arousal” (SW p232) 
- “In order to touch himself, man needs an instrument […] And this self-caressing requires at least 
a minimum of activity” (TS p24) 
- TS p132 [as above on masculine autoeroticism] 
- “contraphobic” (SW p53) 
- “the desire for the same that man has” (SW p103) 
- “his passion for sameness” (SW p224) 
- “masculine self-affection” (SW p230) 
- “The love of sameness among men […] represents the love of a production by assimilation” (ESD 
p100) 
- “Man’s identity in the hommologous, his reason in hommosexuality” (SW p197) 
- “For the most part, this [male] sexuality offers nothing but imperative dictated by male rivalry” 
(SW pp24-25) 
- Masculine economy is one of “aggressive jealousy” (TS p32) 
- “the ‘masculine’ is not prepared to share in the initiative of discourse. It prefers to experiment 
with speaking, writing, enjoying ‘woman’” (TS p157) 
- “Does pleasure, for masculine sexuality, consist in anything other than the appropriation of 
nature, in the desire to make it (re)produce” (TS p184) 
- “For the masculine has to constitute itself as a vessel to receive and welcome. And the 
masculine’s morphology, existence, and essence do not really fit it for such an architecture of 
place” (ESD p39) 
- “Insofar as man or men are concerned, it seems that auto-affection is possible only through a 
search for the first home. Man’s self-affect depends on the woman […] Love of self, for man, 
seems to oscillate among three poles: nostalgia for the mother-womb entity, quest for God 
through the father, love of one part of the self (conforming principally to the dominant sexual 
model) (ESD pp60-61) 
- “Because he is almost always in a state of narcissistic insecurity in sexual relations, man projects 
his insecurity onto others” (ESD p63) 
- “Their love is teleological. It aims for a target outside them” (ESD p101) 
- “man seems to cling ever tighter to that semblance of familiarity he finds in both his everyday 
and his scientific discourse” (ESD p113) 
- “man would like to equal the machine. Consciously or unconsciously, he thinks of himself as a 
machine” (ESD p143) 
- “the great rhythms of incarnation, respiration, circulation of the blood, have never been taken 
on by man. Who never grows up” (ESD p144-145) 
- “Men, in contrast, prefer the subject-object relation, the production of pieces of work rather 
than respect for the world as it already exists, the use of instruments, the relationships between 
one and an imprecisely defined multiple: people, others, nations, etc, the representation of the 
universe as made up of abstractions” (DB p15); ALSO (DB pp152-153) 
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- “transcending the subject-object split, which is a more masculine ideal” (DB p116) 
- “Half of humanity: the men. It privileges their values: their genealogy […] war instincts, the desire 
to possess and capitalise in order to assert their power” (WD p65) 
- “This warlike method of organising society is not self-evident. It has its origin in patriarchy. It has 
a sex” (TD p5) 
- “Mankind is traditionally carnivorous, sometimes cannibalistic. So men must kill to eat, must 
increase their domination of nature in order to live or to survive, must seek on the most distant 
stars what no longer exists here” (TD p5) 
- “Men’s science helps destroy” (TD p7) 
- “Men care little about living matter or its cultural economy. Men’s society is built upon 
ownership of property” (TD p16) 
- “what they are interested in above all is money, competition for power” (JTN p51) 
- “Take the right to make noise […] which is a man’s privilege. Most of them are only finally 
satisfied once they can play about with noisy machines in front of others, particularly women. 
Their social discontent fades away at the wheel of a vehicle” (JTN p57) 
- “A man defines himself in relation to his house or his neighbour’s, his car or any other means of 
transport, the number of miles he’s covered, the number of matches he’s played […] Man 
doesn’t concern himself with improving the quality of man” (JTN p77) 
 
DEFINITION OF “WOMAN” (new, redeemed Epistemology I) 
- Valorising of female homosexuality: “the special nature of desire between women” (SW p101) 
- “Woman is not to be related to any simple designatable being, subject, or entity. Nor is the 
whole group (called) women. One woman + one woman + one woman will never add up to some 
generic entity: woman. (The/a) woman refers to what cannot be defined, enumerated, 
formulated or formalised. Woman is a common noun for which no identity can be defined. 
(The/a) woman does not obey the principle of self-identity” (SW p230) 
- “She is neither one nor two. […] She resists all adequate definition” (TS p26) 
- TS pp122-124 [Cannot define the feminine in current discourse] 
- “The feminine cannot signify itself in any proper meaning, proper name, or concept, not even 
that of woman” (TS p156) 
- “woman is always already in a state of anamorphosis […] A state of cyclic discontinuity closing in 
a slit whose lips merge into one another” (SW p230) 
- “the/a woman who doesn’t have one sex organ, or a unified sexuality” (SW p233) 
- “the sex of woman is not one” (SW p239) 
- “woman’s autoeroticism is very different from man’s” (TS p24) 
- “Woman takes more pleasure from touching than from looking” (TS p26) 
- “Her sexuality, always at least double, goes even further: it is plural […] woman has sex organs 
more or less everywhere. She finds pleasure almost anywhere” (SW p28) 
- “What might have been, ought to have been, astonishing is the multiplicity of genital erogenous 
zones (assuming that the qualifier ‘genital’ is still required) in female sexuality” (TS p64) 
- “her ‘fluid’ character, which has deprived her of all possibility of identity with herself within such 
a [masculine, phallic, rigid] logic” (TS p109) 
- “What I want, in fact, is not to create a theory of woman, but to secure a place for the feminine 
within sexual difference” (TS p159) 
- “I refuse to let myself be locked into a single ‘group’ within the women’s liberation movement 
Especially if such a group […] purports to determine the ‘truth’ of the feminine, to legislate what 
is means to ‘be a woman’” (TS p166) 
- “this way of reducing the other to feelings is a more feminine way” (WD p105) 
- “morphologically, she has two mouths and two pairs of lips” (ESD p11) 
- “there is also the fact that the female does not have the same relation to exteriority as the male” 
(ESD p63) 
- “if she did not have to feed herself and procreate […] woman could live in love indefinitely” (ESD 
p64) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
119 
 
- “that porousness  and mucous that they are” (ESD p69) 
- “Any thinking of or about the female has to think through the mucous” (ESD p110) 
- “The sameness of women, among women” (ESD p115) 
- “she moves in harmony with the fecundity of nature […] Tuned differently to the rhythm of the 
earth and the stars. Intimately tied to universal circulation and vibration” (ESD p195) 
- “she, the one who is unique” (ESD p215) 
- “Women, in fact, privilege intersubjectivity, relationship with the other gender, the relationship 
of being-two, the physical, and, particularly, the natural environment” (DB p15); ALSO (DB p152) 
- “because I am a woman, the goal of my path is to cultivate the relation between two subjects” 
(DB p116) 
- “I am a little doubtful as to whether women enjoy manufacturing arms” (DB p147) 
- “Interior decorating […] should meet with their approval” (DB p148) 
- “For women, however, private and public struggles are indissociable” (WD p23) 
- “the fact that daughters and mothers have the same body: they talk about the corporeal events 
that mark their life: puberty, pregnancy, childbirth, breastfeeding, mothering, children” (WD 
p32) 
- “The little girl has the greatest aptitude for dialogue; she wants to talk with” (WD p37) 
- “Differences between women in the horizontal dimension are more existential. They’re linked to 
different stories but not to a different relationship with being or identity” (WD p84) 
- “What harms her is to be subjected to a science which is not appropriate for her” (WD p151) 
- “Generally, man uses his breath on the outside: to make objects, to build his world. Man keeps 
little breath in himself. Women, on the other hand, keep breath in themselves in order to share it 
with the other” (WD p180) 
- “This is even truer of women, who are more sensitive from this point of view [hearing]” (TD p22) 
- “…woman lives in greater continuity with the cosmos…” (WD p149) 
- “this becoming has its own specific often cyclical, temporality linked to cosmic rhythms” (TD p25) 
- “If women have felt so threatened by the Chernobyl accident, it is because their bodies have this 
irreducible relationship to the universe” (TD p25) 
- “Women are affected more fatally by the break with cosmic equilibria” (TD p26) 
- Women are more interested in the other sex, in place, in qualities of people (TD p49) 
- “female law was characterised by […] temporality that respects the rhythms of life, the light 
cycle, the seasons” (JTN p83) 
- “she is never completed in a single form. She is ceaselessly becoming, she ‘flowers’ again and 
again, if she stays close to herself and the living world” (JTN p103) 
- “For us women, meaning remains concrete, close, related to what is natural, to perceptible 
forms” (JTN p104) 
- “sensible representation is our primary method of figuration and communication” (JTN p104) 
- “time in a woman’s life is particularly irreversible, and that, compared to men’s time, it is less 
suited to the repetitive, entropic” (JTN p108) 
- “During all this time, a woman experiences menstruation, her periods, as continuously related to 
cosmic time, to the moon, the sun, the tides” (JTN p108) 
- “little girls are more aware and creative than little boys, particularly because they have a more 
developed aptitude for relational life” (WCD p81) 
- “the superiority of feminine subjectivity in relational life” (WCD p85) 
- “what if, for women, dichotomous oppositions didn’t make sense as they did for men, at least 
not without a radical submission to the phallic” (LM p197) [in discussion on Classical Logic, law of 
non-contradiction, principle of identity] 
- “The unique character of feminine spirit” (QO p14) 
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DEFINITION OF WOMAN AND MAN AS IRREDUCIBLY DIFFERENT 
- “Irreducible in their strangeness and eccentricity one to the other. Coming out of different times, 
places, logics, ‘representations’, and economies” (SW p139) 
- “crisis of ontico-ontological difference” (SW p145) 
- “that great design that nature has inscribed in the difference between the sexes: procreation” 
(SW p207) 
- “Woman’s desire would not be expected to speak the same language as man’s” (TS p25) 
- “Thus man and woman, woman and man are always meeting as though for the first time 
because they cannot be substituted one for the other. I will never be in a man’s place, never will 
a man be in mine. […] they are irreducible to one another” (ESD p13) 
- “Man sets the infinite in a transcendence that is always deferred […] Woman sets it in an expanse 
of jouissance here and now […] Body-expanse that tries to give itself to exteriority” (ESD p64) 
- “Time is not measured in the same way for her as for man” (ESD p65) 
- “the  living symbol of sexual difference” (ESD p113) 
- Woman has “an ability to perceive the divine (daimon) to which man in his shell, his various 
shells, remains a stranger […] unless he is initiated into it by women” (ESD p115) 
- “what I hear is sexually differentiated. Voice is differentiated” (ESD p168) 
- “the male lover ignores the irreducible strangeness of the one and the other” (ESD p210-211) 
- “an other which is irreducible to it: the other gender” (DB p6) 
- “the insurmountable difference that separates us” (DB p7) 
- “the insurmountable difference between man and woman” (WD p106) 
- “the other […] remains incomprehensible to us” (DB p7) 
- “safeguarding the universal relation between two singularities, as is that between man and 
woman” (DB p9) 
- “in faithfulness to their bodily and spiritual differences, maintain the ideal of their own gender” 
(DB p26) 
- “the nakedness of my own nature, which is not the same as man’s” (DB p27) 
- “woma(e)n and ma(e)n represent two different worlds, two visions of the world which remain 
irreducibly distinct” (DB 151) 
- “In sexual difference, the fact that men and women belong to two different worlds” (WD p85) 
- “women cannot submit to the same rhythms as men” (TD p62) 
- “in order to communicate with this other – be it a he or a she – new means of communication 
are called for: communicating with the other is impossible within a single logic” (WOT pp76-77) 
- “We live in a different world in which the relation with oneself, with the other, with the universe 
is not the same” (WCD p84) 
- “[N]ormally […] “I love you” is said to an enigma: an “other”. An other body, an other sex” (WLS 
p70) 
 
DRAFT CODE OF CITIZENSHIP BY IRIGARAY FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
- “The draft code of citizenship which follows embraces this intention. It takes into account: the 
necessary restructuring of the family, and, therefore, of life as a couple also; the rights of the two 
sexes or genders” (DB p68) 
- “the relationships between individuals as male and female citizens” (DB 69) 
- “Many factors moreover make it necessary in our times to define positive rights which guarantee 
a specific civil identity to male and female citizens” (DB p69) 
- “A relative destructuring of family unity, which requires that each man and woman should enjoy 
specific civil identity […] which confirms the need for a new civil relationship between woman 
and man, women and men” (DB p70) 
- “rights and responsibilities appropriate to real civil individuals: women and men” (DB p71) 
- “One can only deplore the fact that the Commission for Women’s Rights, in its own proposal for 
amendment, replaced the words ‘respect for the difference between men and women’ with the 
words ‘respect for individual choices’ […] this Commission tried to eradicate […] the man-woman 
difference, preferring the definition of a neutral individual” (DB p80) 
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EASTERN PHILOSOPHY 
- “I have learnt another way from my own experience and from the traditions of the Far East, in 
particular from the most primitive Indian cultures […] … return to the heat in herself” (DB p113) 
- “the culture of the Far East has helped me […] This culture has taught me to perceive rather than 
simply to experience through the senses…” (DB p115) 
- “opening up to the Far-Eastern traditions, namely the Indian tradition, also she another light, 
another breath” (WD p30) 
- “the culture of perception as such is very important in Far Eastern cultures” (WD p73) 
- “in the Far Eastern tradition, there was a preoccupation with an education of perception” (WD 
p114) 
- “In the East, there is less of a separation between thought and poetry” (WD p133) 
- “Far-East culture teaches us that in order to be in charge of our own life we have to cultivate 
breathing” (WD p179) 
- “In India, for example […] sexuality was cultural, sacred” (TD p11) 
- “Some of those philosophers have turned to the culture of the Near or the Far East” (BT p148) 
 
EPISTEMOLOGY I 
- “a new age of thought, art, poetry, and language: the creation of a new poetics” (ESD p5) 
- “In theory, [traditional] philosophy wants to be literature or rhetoric, wishing either to break 
with ontology or to regress to the ontological” (ESD p6) 
- “Poetry and philosophy don’t have to be separate. When philosophy is no longer poetry, it’s 
often just scholarly commentary rather than thought. Personally, I’m looking for a way to write 
philosophy that doesn’t split abstract logic on the one hand, and poetry on the other” (WD p134) 
- “It’s a matter of questioning the foundations of Western rationality and asking yourself why a 
syllogism is thought to be more rational than respect for nature” (WD p73) 
- “No thinking about sexual difference that would not be traditionally hierarchical is possible 
without thinking through the mucous” (ESD p110) 
- “an education in citizenship requires […] both respect for, and the development of, the specific 
characteristics of man and woman […] with each gender retaining its own tendencies” (DB p16) 
- “How can we get out of these false dilemmas: difference equals hierarchy” (WD p11) 
- “’I Love to You’ means: I don’t take you as an object of my love or desire. I love you as irreducibly 
other. I keep a ‘to’ as an inalienable space between us, a guarantor of your freedom and mine 
[…] in order to avoid any amorous possession of consumption […] I will never entirely know you 
and that to love you implies respecting the mystery that you will always be for me” (WD p81) 
- “The to is the place where the intention of the one and the other can meet” (WD p90) 
- “rebuild democracy on an infinite number of relationships between women and men” (WD p83) 
- “Such a language doesn’t conform to traditional Western logic, with its complement: poetry. It 
unfolds between two modes of speaking, two languages […] creates a third language, so to 
speak, a language that we still don’t know, that is yet to be created” (WD p131) 
- “The one no longer remains here the visible or invisible, conscious or unconscious paradigm” 
(WD p146) 
 
FLUIDS / TURBULENCE 
- “prohibition on bleeding” (SW p126) 
- “the capacity of matter herself, at her most fluid […] to produce beautiful forms” (SW p207) 
- “the characteristics of fluids that are difficult to idealise” (TS p79) 
- TS pp106-107 
- “historically the properties of fluids have been abandoned to the feminine” (TS p116) 
- “she is habitually devalued in relation to the fluid” (ESD p52) 
- “what is most archaic in me, the fluid” (ESD p156) 
- “The fluid will always spill over reason, ratio, go beyond measure, plunge back into the 
undifferentiated” (LM p199) 
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HORIZONTALITY vs VERTICALITY 
- “a horizontal coexistence between us all, male and female” (DB p55) 
- “The title To Be Two also means to be two in a horizontal, not a hierarchical, relationship” (WD 
p116) 
- “one task for our time is to establish a horizontal civic society and not an exclusively genealogical 
and vertical one” (WD p58) 
 
LACK / SACRIFICE / DENIAL 
- See “Freud is still party […] lack, absence, default” under METAPHYSICS OF SOLIDS/SUBSTANCE 
- “She exposes, exhibits the possibility of a nothing to see […] In her having nothing penile, in 
seeing that she has No Thing. Nothing like man” (SW pp47-48) 
- “woman cannot mime, pretend, any relation to her own sex organ(s) because she has been cut 
off from any access to idea, ideality, specula(riza)tion, and indeed a certain organic ‘reality’” (SW 
p114) 
- “Being is never made flesh” (SW p312) 
- TD p12 
- “destruction of the sensible world” (TD p29) 
 
LANGUAGE / LAW / LAW OF THE FATHER 
- “the seduction function of law itself. And its role in producing fantasies. When it suspends the 
realisation of a seduced desire, law organises and arranges the world of fantasy at least as much 
as it forbids, interprets, and symbolises it” (SW p38) 
- “desire that must be seduced to the discourse and law of the father. In place of the desire for the 
sexuate body of the father […] we find a law proposed and imposed” (SW p38) 
- “desire will henceforth pass through the discourse-desire-law of men’s desire. “You will be my 
woman-mother, my wife […] You will be for me the possibility of repeating-representing-
appropriating the/my relation to the origin”” (SW p42) 
- “the law of the same desire, of the desire for the same” (SW p55) [See also LOGIC-OF-THE-ONE 
and MEN-AMONGST-THEMSELVES] 
- “Language leaves men amongst themselves and deprives women of women-amongst-
themselves” (TD p45) 
 
LAW NON-CONTRADICTION / EXCLUDED MIDDLE / CLASSICAL LOGIC / MATHEMATICS 
- “…the text will have surreptitiously broken the thread of its reasoning, its logic. […] defies all 
resumption of a linear discourse and all forms of rigour as measured in terms of the law of 
excluded middle. Here the unconscious is speaking. And how could it be otherwise? Above all 
when it speaks of sexual difference.” (SW p17) 
- “The language system, or system of languages, doubled or accompanied by epistemological 
formalism and formal logic, takes from women and excludes them from the threshold of living in 
their world” (ESD p107) 
- Principle of identity is problematic because it is a metaphor of man’s flight from the mother (LM 
p194) 
- Principle of non-contradiction maintains man’s power (LM p196) 
 
LIGHT vs DARK (see also LOOK) 
- On Freud’s views of the “feminine riddle”: “So psychology does not offer us the key to the 
mystery of femininity -  that black box, strongbox, earth-abyss that remains outside the sphere of 
its investigations: light must no doubt come from elsewhere” (SW p20) 
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LOGOS 
- “It would seem that the idea – or Idea – of sex or at any rate sexual function shapes Freudian 
“discourse” […] this must obviously entail both modifying the economy of the Idea and trapping 
sex in a logos, a logic” (SW pp36-37)  
- “Even so isn’t a logos necessary before the genus and species of the plant can be decided? Etc. 
The plant may indeed conform to her own purpose, but an order has to certify this” (SW p162) 
- “Western philosophy is accompanied by the constitution of a logos, a language obeying rules 
such as those of self-identity, of non-contradiction, etc., which distinguish it from a simple 
empirical language. These logical rules have been defined in order to ensnare the totality of the 
real in the nets of language” (WD p154) 
 
LOGIC-OF-THE-ONE / AUTOLOGIC / SELF-REFERENTIALISM 
- “The same re-marking itself – more or less – would thus produce the other, whose function in 
the differentiation would be neglected, forgotten. Or else carried back into mere extrapolation, 
into the infinity” (SW p21) 
- “the other is always the other of the same and not an actual other” (QO p10) 
- “the Other, who is always to some extent his Other” (SW p135) 
- “others of the same” (SW p335) 
- “The like prefiguring itself there as that other of the same” (TS p118) 
- “This is again a question that arises out of an economy – and again an economy of 
representation – to which Freud has recourse without criticism, without sufficient questioning: 
this is an organised system whose meaning is regulated by paradigms and units of value that are 
in turn determined by male subjects” (SW p22) 
- Giving children surname of father: “the desire than men here displays  to determine for himself 
what is constituted by “origin”, and thereby eternally and ever to reproduce him (as) self” (SW 
p23) 
- “projected, reflected auto-representations” (SW p51) 
- “the automatism of repetition, the reestablishment of an earlier economy, the infinite regression 
of pleasure” (SW p53) 
- “Certainly, it is one. For this race of signifiers spells out again the solipsism of him who summons 
them” (SW p135) 
- “Representation here is auto-affective, auto-affecting solipsism” (SW p181) 
- “when the ‘I’ thinks about something, the object of its thought is in fact itself […] This is the basis 
for (its) representation” (SW p182) 
- “the horizon line is already drawn, and drawn, in fact, by the ‘subject’ who defines himself at the 
same time, in a circularity that knows no end except the return, over and over again” (SW p192) 
- “logos of sameness” (SW p232) 
- “autoerotic, auto-positional, auto-reflexive economy…of the subject” (TS p101) 
- “discourse is monosexual” (ESD p177) 
- “monosubjective, monosexualised, patriarchal, and phallocratic philosophy” (QO p12) 
 
 
LOOK / GAZE / SIGHT / EYE / OCULOCENTRISM 
- “He will be able to see that I don’t have one […] She exposes, exhibits the possibility of a nothing 
to see” (SW p47) 
- “Better than the gaze of the other, which is necessarily threatening […] is the subject’s self-
observation” (SW p81) 
- SW, p95 
- “man’s eye – understood as a substitute for the penis” (SW p145) 
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- “apparatus that stands between man and light prevents light from touching him at all” (SW 
p148) 
- “By excluding the gaze of the other, or others, this extrapolated point of view organises and 
projects the world into a paralysed empire. Formalisations of laws laid down in perpetuity, logos 
of the Father” (SW p339) 
- “Vision is effectively a sense that can totalise, enclose, in its own way. more than the other 
sense, it is likely to construct a landscape, a horizon” (ESD p175) 
- Vision is “A way of talking about the flesh that already cancels its most powerful components” 
(ESD p175) 
- “Gazing at the beloved, the lover reduces her to less than nothing if this gaze is seduces by an 
image, if her nudity […] becomes the site of a disguise rather than the astonishment at 
something that moves […] The beloved’s vulnerability is this unguarded quality of the living” (ESD 
p192) 
 
MECHANICS (see also FLUIDS and METAPHYSICS OF SOLIDS) 
- “mechanics of solids” (TS p107) 
- “All of which have excluded from their mode of symbolisation certain properties of real fluids” 
(TS p109) 
- “Western logic calls for and relies on a mechanics of solids” (LM p199) 
 
MEMBRANES / MUCOUS / CONTACT / CARESS / POROUS / LIPS 
- “Just like the lips, any of the lips, and the vulva, though all of these are so perfectly accessible 
that the little girl cannot fail to have discovered their sensitivity […] The pleasure gained from 
touching, caressing, parting the lips and vulva simply does not exist for Freud” (SW p29) 
- “the child’s manifest resistance to weaning as a symptom of the trauma occasioned by the final 
break in material contact with the inside of the mother’s body: rupture of the foetal membranes” 
(SW p40) 
- “contact between ‘things’ is of very little importance to the wise man […] He would prefer to get 
rid of it in order to concentrate upon the ‘types’, and their chain of organisation” (SW p349) 
- “In this approach, where the borders of the body are wed in an embrace that transcends all 
limits – without, however, risking engulfment, thanks to the fecundity of the porous” (ESD p18) 
- ESD pp44-51 
- “the mucous has no permanence, even though it is the ‘tissue’ for the development of duration” 
(ESD p109) 
- “Touch makes it possible to wait, to gather strength, so that the other will return to caress” (ESD 
p187) 
- “all the senses share in the nature of the caress, the hand serving, in its way, as the most 
intimate” (ESD p193) 
- “Touching can also place a limit on the reabsorption of the other in the same. Giving the other 
her contours, calling her to them, amounts to inviting her to live where she is without becoming 
other” (ESD p204) 
- “The caress is no longer a gesture that aims to grab hold of the other in his/her freedom, 
mystery, ‘virginity’ or ‘integrity’ (as is still the case with Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas)” (WD 
p115) 
 
MEN-AMONGST-THEMSELVES / AUTOEROTICISM 
- “So it would be a case of you men speaking among yourselves about woman” (SW p13) 
- “the autoeroticism more or less deferred or differentiated into the autological or homologous 
representations of a (masculine) subject […] The pleasure man can take therein becomes 
apparent” (SW p28) 
- “Or, again, will desire ever break away from mere repetitive automatism?” (SW p31) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
125 
 
- “Doesn’t he reduce all these specific modalities of libido to the desire […] that the man feels for 
the man? More exactly that the phallus feels for the phallus” (SW p32) 
- “auto-erotic, homosexual, or indeed fetishistic character of the relationship of man to woman” 
(SW p32) 
- “he seems to get more sexual satisfaction from making laws than love” (SW p39) 
- “Auto-eroticism has been permitted, authorised, encouraged insofar as it is deferred, exhibited 
in sublated ways” (SW p50) [For instance, in language and law] 
- SW p95 
- “the society of men among themselves” (TS p161) 
- “they communicate only among themselves, the ‘brothers’ who share the same language, the 
same subjectivity” (WD p129) 
- “the society of men-amongst-themselves” (TD pXIV) 
- “We live in a society of men-amongst-themselves” (TD p7) 
- TD p29 
- “The written law is a law established for a society of men-amongst-themselves” (TD p59) 
- “the laws of the world of men-amongst-themselves” (TD p99) 
 
METAPHYSICS OF SOLIDS/SUBSTANCE AND POSITIVE PRESENCE 
- “this crisis point in metaphysics where we find exposed that sexual “indifference” that had 
assured metaphysical coherence and “closure”” (SW p28) 
- “Freud is still party to a certain logos and therefore to a certain economy of ‘presence’, a certain 
representation of ‘presence’, and he will be able to picture the little girl becoming a woman only 
in terms of lack, absence, default” (SW pp41-42) 
- Absence is considered not-being and therefore not-true: On the traditional view having no penis: 
“That is to say, no sex/organ that can be seen in a form capable of founding its reality, 
reproducing its truth. Nothing to be seen is equivalent to having no thing. No being and no truth” 
(SW p48) 
- [On Descartes’ view], “Reality is formally and objectively demonstrable as thinking substance” 
(SW p184) 
- “[e]verything has to be (re)invented to avoid the vacuum” (SW p228) 
- “if there were really a vacuum, ‘nature’ of her own volition would closer over, sealing the two 
lips of that slit” (SW p188) 
- “The ‘subject’ identifies himself with/in an almost material consistency that find everything 
flowing abhorrent” (SW 237) 
- “representation designated as presence” (SW p247) 
- “The paradigm of all proper names/nouns is Being, or else Truth. The being of Truth or the truth 
of Being.” (SW p272) 
- “a symbolisation that grants precedence to solids” (TS p110) 
- “a masculine subject that erects itself out of the mucous. And which believes it is based on 
substances, on something solid” (ESD p109) 
- “starting from an undifferentiated subjectum, he erect[s] himself as a solid entity” (LM p199) 
 
NEGATIVE (see also LACK) 
- “woman’s lack of penis and her envy of the penis ensure the function of the negative, serve as 
representations of the negative, in what could be called a phallocentric – or phallotropic – 
dialectic” (SW p52) 
- SW pp208-209 
- “the relationship to the others of the other […] to the other of the other, anyone who ventures 
near it will be threatened with loss of self (as same) […] the other is the reverse, the negative of 
the properties of sameness; it overflows the unit of self-identity” (SW p335) 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
126 
 
NEUTRALITY / SAMENESS / PLURALITY / MULTIPLICITY 
- “polymorphous perversity” only if not regression to masculine sameness (TS pp139-140) 
- “so that we can abandon the model of a single and singular subject altogether. This does not 
mean that the one of the subject can become many” (DB p6) 
- “The argument of the plurality of citizens is not valid, either. Society is made up of two sexes, not 
of ‘men’: youth, workers, the disabled, immigrants, the unemployed, women, etc” (TD p59) 
- “And it is not possible that a common third still exists between us, man and woman. This is true 
between different cultures or traditions, but first of all it is true between us, between our 
masculine and feminine subjectivities” (WCD p82) 
- “the exploitation of woman takes place in the difference between the genders and therefore 
must be resolved within difference rather than by abolishing it” (QO p10) 
- QO p11 
 
NON-HETEROSEXUALITY (within sex) 
Bisexuality: 
- SW p14 
- SW p15 
- SW p17 
- SW p20 
- SW p22 
- SW p23 
- SW p35 
- SW p111 
- SW p217 
- WD p84 “the divine also ought to be spoken in two genders or bisexually” 
Homosexuality, female: 
- SW pp98-104 [traces the problematic assumption that lesbianism on the Freudian view is a 
regression to the male universal] 
- TS p43 [same conclusion as above] 
- TS p65 [same conclusion as above] 
- TS p69 [same conclusion as above] 
- TS pp194-195 [same conclusion as above] 
- SW p128-129 
- SW p141 [female hom(m)osexuality unfair interpretation as male sameness] 
- TS p32 [as alternative to male, heterosexual economy] 
Ho(m)mosexuality, male: 
- SW p20 
- SW p23 
- SW p26 
- SW p32 “reduce all modalities of libido to the desire […] that the man feels for the man” 
- SW p32 
- SW p33 female: “has put away her auto-erotic, homosexual pleasure, sublimated her partial 
drives” 
- SW p35 
- “So there will be no female homosexuality, just a hommo-sexuality in which women will be 
involved in the process of specularising the phallus” (SW p103) 
- “the dominant ideology – that is of hom(m)osexuality and its struggles with the maternal” (SW 
p142) 
- “the prescriptions of a hommosexual imaginary and to its relationship to the origin, to a logos 
that claims to lead the potency of the maternal back into the same” (SW p229) 
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- On Greek homosexuality: “Thus he is in love. But with what? With his image? That would be a 
comedown for love, truly” (SW p323) 
- “The only men who love each other are, in truth, those who are impatient to find the same over 
and over again” (SW p327) 
- “that homosexual a-musement is not about to give out” (TS p99) [referring to masculine denial 
of an actual other pleasure/sexuality/femininity] 
- “the masculine homosexual ideology” (TS p145) 
- “ho(m)mo-sexual monopoly” and “reign of hom(m)o-sexuality” (TS p171) 
- “reign of masculine hom(m)o-sexuality” (TS p172) 
- “heterosexuality has been up to now just an alibi for the smooth workings of man’s relations 
with himself, of relations among men” [homosexuality, in other words] (TS p172) 
- “This means that the very possibility of a sociocultural order requires homosexuality as its 
organising principle. Heterosexuality is nothing but the assignment of economic roles” (TS p192) 
- Rare favourable interpretation of erotic male homosexuality as subversive: (TS p193) 
- “all economic organisation is homosexual” (TS p193) 
- Homosexuality is love of self (ESD p61) 
- “It often constitutes a kind of ontology of the anal or else a triumph of the absorption of the 
other into the self in the intestine” (ESD p101) 
- WD p140-141 
- “these religions are more social, monosexual and homosexual, built in the interest of only one 
sex” (WD p174) 
Transsexuality: 
- SW p275 “trans-sexuate” 
 
NON-SEXUALITY / ASEXUALITY / POST-SEX (outside sex) 
- “the neuter” (SW p48-49). Only dealt with by Irigaray as woman-with-no-penis on Freudian view. 
- SW p237 
- SW p275 
- TS p149 [phallocentric representational order means that one can either speak as a man, or as 
asexed] 
- Neutral or neuter is hostile to wonder and interval between difference (ESD p82) 
- “the world is not undifferentiated, not neuter, particularly insofar as the sexes are concerned” 
(ESD p126) 
- “Feminism’s blindest alley is to force women into a deconditioning which strips them of their 
feminine identity in order to attain an undifferentiated state of universality to be shared in a 
masculine or neutral world” (DB p37) 
- “the prospect of a neutral, asexual community is disturbing” (DB p37) 
- “Nor does neutralising the difference serve any purpose, other than a loss of human identity” 
(DB p54) 
- “a neutral identity, which signifies a partial loss of identity” (DB p66) 
- “Gender alienation occurs as a result of the reduction of the two to the one: the human gender, 
so-called universal and neutral” (DB p150) 
- “the neutering of the sexual element which goes together with the imperialism of monocratic 
discourse and the technological age, its ultimate achievement” (WD p44) 
- “denying that women and men are different in the name of some hypothetical social equality is a 
delusion, a bias in favour of a split – an impossible split – between private life and social identity. 
Out of bed or away from home, we somehow mysteriously become unisexual or asexual” (TD 
pVIII) 
- “…non-existent neutral individuals…” (TD pXV) 
- “the neutral individual is nothing but a cultural fiction” (TD p75) 
- “Indeed, life is not neuter” (JTN p70) 
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ONTIC / ESSENTIALIST 
- “ontic-ontological difference” (ESD p86) 
 
ONTOLOGICAL NEGATIVE 
- “In the end, every ‘war’ machine turns against the one who made it […] Unless, at every 
opportunity, we ourselves take the negative upon ourselves. Which would amount to allowing 
the other his/her liberty, and sex” (ESD p120) 
- “the importance of the boundary, the negative which is necessary for conceiving and practicing 
difference” (WD p77) 
- “using a negative that’s open to the existence of two genders, two subjects” (WD p87) 
- “the negative of an irreducible alterity” (WD p130) 
- “in a manner different from that of Hegel. The negative will remain insurmountable, and it will 
serve to maintain the singularity of the subjectivity of the one and the other as well as the 
inalienability of the relation between the one and the other” (WOT p70) 
- “the negative at work is not equivalent to a nothingness: it is that which accounts for the alterity 
of the other and which protects it” (WOT p72) 
- WCD p84 
 
PHALLUS / PENIS IS SELF-IDENTICAL / RIGID / SOLID 
- “[the phallus] would not be the privileged signifier of the penis or even of power and sexual 
pleasure were it not to be interpreted as an appropriation of the relation to origin and of the 
desire for and as origin” (SW p33) 
- “The penis – or better still the phallus! Emblem of man’s appropriative relation to the origin” (SW 
p42) 
- “the Same is being postulated again in this “new” signifying economy, organised under the 
control of the said Phallus” (SW p44) 
- “the phallus – that master signifier whose law of functioning erases, rejects, denies the surging 
up, the recall of a heterogeneity” (SW p50) 
- “his [Freud’s] wish to perpetuate sexual homogeneity: a non-sex-organ, a castrated sex-organ, or 
‘penis-envy’, does not constitute a sexual heterogene but rather represents a type of negativity 
that sustains and confirms the homogeneity of masculine desire” (SW p63) 
- “that solid that the penis represents” (TS p113) 
 
 
PROCESSUAL COSMOLOGY 
- “the capacity of matter herself, at her most fluid […] to produce beautiful forms” (SW p207) 
- “the jouissance of women exceeds all this. It is indefinite flood in which all manner of 
developments can be inscribed […] extension swelling outward without discernible limits. 
Without telos or arche.” (SW p229) 
- “woman is always already in a state of anamorphosis […] A state of cyclic discontinuity closing in 
a slit whose lips merge into one another” (SW p230) 
- “How can we work out a problematic of place that would involve not cutting or annihilation but a 
rhythmic becoming in relation to place?” (ESD p42) 
- “her [woman’s] relation to the cyclical” (ESD p64) 
- “the great rhythms of incarnation, respiration, circulation of the blood” (ESD p144-145) 
- “rhythms of the flesh” (ESD p162) 
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- “there is a rhythmic pulse which beats between going out towards the other and returning to the 
self […] between coming out into the light and going back into the darkness, into the invisibility 
of interiority, into the mystery of alterity […] …of the cyclones” (DB pp111-112) 
 
REASON over MATTER (in patriarchal order) 
- “an organ of sight that has forfeited the body” [Descartes’ thinking subject] (SW p184) 
- “’I think’ therefore I have being” (SW p185) 
- “the sexual indifference that underlies the truth of any science, the logic of every discourse” (TS 
p69) 
 
 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 
- “The other cannot be transformed into discourse, fantasies” (ESD p216) 
- “If I consider some of the differences between woma(e)n and ma(e)n, differences which form 
part of their subjectivity and are not related to variations which reduce one and the other (male 
and female) to objects of scientific scrutiny (sociology, psychology, biology, etc) […] I cannot 
avoid the conclusion that woma(e)n and ma(e)n represent two different worlds” (DB pp150-151) 
- “naturally or ontologically, to my belonging to a gendered body, and therefore to a gender. I do 
not produce the split through my thought: it already exists. I either recognise it or I don’t” (WD 
p75) 
- “Social and cultural sexualisation for the two sexes is far from finished, and women’s liberation 
can have no other issue” (TD p14) 
 
SPACE / ENVELOPE 
- Of Freud: “Woman is nothing but the receptacle that passively receives his product” (SW p18) 
- The woman is “A reserve supply of negativity sustaining the articulation of their [men’s] moves, 
or refusals to move” (SW p 22) 
- “She function as a hole – that is where we would place it at its point of greatest efficiency […] in 
the elaboration of imaginary and symbolic processes” (SW p71) 
- “The vagina in fact is ‘now valued as a place of shelter for the penis’” (SW p93) 
- “she is the matter used for the imprint of forms” (SW p141) 
- “She is merely a receptacle” (SW p166) 
- “she is never anything but the still undifferentiated opaqueness of sensible matter; the store (of) 
substance for the sublation of self, or being as what is, or what he is” (SW p224) 
- “Woman is still the place, the whole of the place in which she cannot take possession of herself” 
(SW p227) 
- “Woman is neither open nor closed. She is indefinite, in-finite, form is never complete in her. […] 
This incompleteness in her form, her morphology, allows her continually to become something 
else” (SW p229) 
- “the maternal-feminine also serves as an envelope, a container, the starting point from which 
man limits his things” (ESD p10) 
- “As for woman, she is place [in patriarchy]” (ESD p35) 
 
SPACE / INTERVAL / INTERMEDIARY / DAIMON 
- Of traditional logos’ denial of space: “using the self-identity of that assertion to define its equal 
spatial distinctness from others, but also and at the same time, decisively cutting up the whole 
matter of language, the whole of speculation, and, moreover, of the ‘blanks’ in discourse” (SW 
p235) 
- Daimon: SW p324 
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- “the ‘intermediary’ soul’s store of fire and ardour must be devoted to the quest for divine light. 
Without those flames, no daimon can do anything” (SW p326) 
- “Obliteration of the passage between […] Whatever intermediaries have been produced to make 
up for this lack of relationships, they are always slaves to (the) one, to the same” (SW p344) 
- “to put the accent back on space was – perhaps – to restore some chance for the sexual pleasure 
of the other – woman” (TS p98) 
- “The transition to a new age […] entails an evolution or a transformation of forms, of the 
relations of matter and form and of the interval between” (ESD 8) 
- “Desire occupies or designates the place of the interval” (ESD p8) 
- “A sexual or carnal ethics would require that both angel [intermediary] and body be found 
together” (ESD p17) 
- ESD pp20-33 [Diotima on love as daimon, interval of fecundity] 
- “often the one and the other destroy the place of the other […] they possess or construct only an 
illusory whole and destroy the meeting and the interval (of attraction) between the two” (ESD 
p54) 
- “What we need is to discover how two can be made which one day could become one in that 
third which is love” (ESD p66) 
- “interval between himself and the other […] to wonder” (ESD p73) 
- “Wonder would be the passion of the encounter […] A third dimension. An intermediary” (ESD 
p82) 
- “interval of exchange” (ESD p104) 
- “spacing or interval for the freedom of questioning between two” (ESD p183) 
 
SPEECH / VOICE 
- “the zone of silence that lies outside the volume defined by the place from which discourse is 
projected […] Outside of this volume already circumscribed by the signification articulated in (the 
father’s) discourse nothing is: awoman.” (TS pp112-113) 
 
TIME 
- “The theory is that this is all a matter of time. Of transition, and progressive transition” (SW 
p284) [link to linearity, improvement, and rigidity] 
- “Time is cut up, over and over again, and lost in all kinds of caesuras and scansions that will be 
forced to toe the party line by deceptive plays of relationships” (SW p290) 
- “how could that analysis be possible, except as a simple mechanical repetition, since man knows 
only one time? The time that flies (here, now)” (SW p354) 
- “In the beginning there was space […] This world is then peopled, and a rhythm is established 
among its inhabitants. God would be time itself […] Time becomes the interiority of the subject 
itself, and space, its exteriority. […] The subject, master o time, becomes the axis of the world’s 
ordering” (ESD p7) 
 
WOMEN ONLY IN RELATION TO MEN, NO VOICE OF OWN 
(AS COMMODITIES / PRODUCTS / MEANS TO A MASCULINE END) 
- “in the case of these women, it must be a question of activism exerting itself by gracious 
permission of the submissive docility of the male.” (SW p17) 
- Speaking of Freud: “passivity is required of woman at the moment of intercourse by reason of its 
usefulness in sexual functioning […] [activity] may be recognised in woman insofar as that activity 
prepares for sexual functioning and is rigorously regulated” (SW p18) 
- “…he will mark the product of copulation with his own name. Thereby woman […] becomes the 
anonymous worker, the machine in the service of a master-proprietor who will put his trademark 
upon the finished product” (SW p23) 
- “the vagina becoming the indispensable instrument of male pleasure” (SW p30) 
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- “Woman would thus find no possible way to represent or tell the story of the economy of her 
libido” (SW p43) 
- “Here again no economy would be possible whereby sexual reality can be represented by/for 
woman. She remains forsaken and abandoned in her lack” (SW p49) 
- “’Penis-envy’ would represent, would be the only effective representation of woman’s desire to 
enter into symbolic exchange as a ‘subject’ and raise woman from her status as a mere 
‘commodity’” (SW p56) 
- “this fault, this deficiency, this ‘hole’ inevitably affords women too few figurations […] Which all 
surely keeps her deficient” (SW p71) 
- SW pp73-74 
- “She is included in the exchange market only as a commodity” (SW p118) 
- Marriage as 1) an exchange of commodities 2) between men who determine dowry (SW pp121-
122) 
- Women have no voice of their own and cannot express the concerns specific to their 
embodiment (SW p140) 
- “For (the) woman neither is able to give herself some meaning by speech nor means to be able 
to speak…” (SW p229) 
- TS pp84-85 
- “Because women have no language sexed as female […] they are deprived of speech. And this 
makes it hard for a woman to achieve a for-itself, and to construct a place between the in-itself 
and the for-itself” (ESD p107) 
- Women’s entry into masculine order is through a trial of suffering: childbirth (JTN pp95-96) 
- “They [women] are deprived of a subjective order by which they can unify their corporeal 
vitality” (JTN p98) 
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